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Abstract 
The present study examined the nature of and relationship between attributions, 
just world beliefs (JWB) and adjustment in a sample of 62 community pain 
sufferers. This was exploratory because it accounted for shortcomings of these 
concepts, meaning they have not been investigated like this in pain. Specifically, it 
accounted for the scarcity of research distinguishing between cause, responsibility 
and blame; allowing the self-definition of responsibility, blame and adjustment; 
examining changes in attributions and adjustment, and considering just world 
beliefs. The importance of investigating these issues in pain was detailed. 
The research was conducted in two phases. The first, brief phase piloted a 
measure to account for these shortcomings. The second phase used the piloted 
measure to investigate the shortcomings in a series of five aims. 
Descriptive analyses indicated that most participants made causal attributions for 
their pain, with around half attributing responsibility and blame. Although similar 
in the types of attributions made, cause was distinguished from responsibility and 
blame, which were indistinguishable from each other. Attributions did not change. 
Additionally, JWB were weakly correlated with pain intensity, and analyses of 
variance techniques found JWB to interact with pain duration, such that those with 
1 month-2.5 years' duration had stronger JWB than those in the 3-9 years' 
duration. 
ii 
JWB did not interact with attributions or adjustment, but chi-square analyses 
found attributions interacted with adjustment, such that attributions to the self 
were adaptive, while attributions to others resulted in poor adjustment to pain. 
Stepwise multiple regression analyses suggested that these latter attributions 
predicted pain intensity, as did pain treatments. Additionally, individual 
differences in attributions, adjustment and pain intensity emerged in chi-square 
analyses, although none were found on JWB. 
Full interpretations were made of these findings, and their implications for future 
research discussed. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION AND THESIS OVERVIEW 
Pain presents a challenge on several levels. It is a challenge to health professionals 
and clinicians who attempt to treat it. It is a challenge to scientists who strive to 
understand the biological mechanisms behind pain. It is also a challenge to society, 
which strives to find the medical, scientific and financial resources to prevent or at 
least relieve pain as much as possible (Melzack and Wall, 1996). However, the 
biggest challenge of pain must be to the people who suffer from it. Theirs is 
sometimes a lifelong struggle to live with pain that cannot be treated. This struggle 
occurs on several levels. The effects of pain are immediately physiological, with 
economic, social and psychological consequences. This thesis will consider the 
consequences of pain, paying particular attention to the psychological impact, in 
relation to what people come to believe about their pain, in terms of attributions about 
pain, just world beliefs in relation to pain, their interactions both with each other, and 
with adjustment to pain. 
The research undertaken in the thesis is presented in six chapters. Chapter 2 provides 
an overview of literature investigating beliefs and adjustment in pain. There are three 
main sections to the chapter. The first section provides an overview of the nature of 
pain. The second section discusses the foundations and theoretical origins of 
attributions, just world beliefs and adjustment, and the third section reviews the nature 
of the relationship between attributions and adjustment in pain and related illness and 
injured samples. 
Chapter 3 outlines and provides a justification for the research aims of the study. 
Chapter 4 details the method employed in the study, including design issues, the study 
instruments, and how the data was managed. Chapter 5 provides a detailed analysis of 
the aims of the study outlined in Chapter 3. The sixth chapter overviews the study 
rationale, interprets and discusses the main findings of the study in relation to the 
literature reviewed in Chapter 2, assesses the contribution of the results to the 
literature, and reflects on the study limitations and implications of the study findings, 
both clinical and for future research. 
2 
CHAPTER 2: LITERATURE REVIEW: BELIEFS AND 
ADJUSTMENT IN PAIN 
2.1 THE NATURE OF PAIN 
2.1.1 Introduction 
The first section of the chapter will review relevant literature on the nature of pain. 
The following areas will be considered. Firstly, pain definitions and types of pain. 
Secondly, the progression of pain from the acute to the chronic state. Thirdly, the 
prevalence of pain in the community. Fourthly, physiological and psychological 
theories of pain. Fifthly, the measurement of the physiological experience of pain, and 
sixthly, the impact of pain on individuals suffering from it. This first section of the 
chapter will close with a summary of all sections. 
2.1.2 Defining Pain 
Given its complexity, the concept "pain" has never been satisfactorily defined 
(Melzack and Wall, 1996). The most commonly used definition states, "Pain is an 
unpleasant sensory and emotional experience associated with actual or potential tissue 
damage or described in terms of such damage" (International Association for the 
Study of Pain (IASP), 1979). However, despite the all-inclusive nature of this 
definition, there remain a number of criticisms. For example, it has been noted that 
the use of the word "unpleasant" is unsatisfactory, because the experience of pain is 
much more than this. What is missing from the definition is the misery, anguish, 
desperation and urgency that are part of some pain experiences (Melzack and Wall, 
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1996). Additionally, it has been suggested that the IASP definition has become largely 
meaningless by attempting to incorporate all facets of pain. "Such a flexible and 
indistinct definition is no definition at all" (Hom and Munafo, 1997, p.50). Instead, it 
is suggested that the definition adopted by researchers should be based on the 
perspective they are working from (Horn and Munafo, 1997). However, despite these 
criticisms the IASP definition has been widely used and has the advantage of 
accounting for the emotional as well as sensory components of the pain experience 
(Melzack and Wall, 1996). As such, this definition of pain was adopted in this study. 
Several different types of pain have been identified. These can generally be classed as 
acute and chronic. Acute pain is essentially a sensory experience which serves an 
important adaptive function in that it warns an individual that something is wrong 
(Sternbach, 1984). This then prompts action to be taken to resolve the problem and 
promote survival. Chronic pain, on the other hand, serves no adaptive function in that 
it persists beyond the time in which healing would be expected to occur. Various pain 
duration criteria have been used to determine when pain becomes chronic. This has 
varied from two weeks (Crook, Rideout and Browne, 1984; Crook, Tunks, Rideout 
and Browne, 1986), to six months (Jones, 1993; Zarkowska and Philips, 1986), and 
even five years after the initial pain onset (Ackerman and Stevens, 1989). However, 
the most commonly used criterion for chronic pain is that defined by the !ASP (1986), 
which states that chronic pain is, "pain that persists beyond normal tissue healing 
time, which is taken to be three months". This criterion was adopted in the present 
study. 
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2.1.3 The Process Involved in Becoming a Chronic Pain Sufferer 
The acute pain response is something health professionals are best prepared to handle, 
where it is assumed that once the injury is treated and healing has taken place, pain 
will cease (Hanson and Gerber, 1990). This is not the case with chronic pain. Violon 
(1982) developed a model of the process involved in becoming a chronic pain sufferer 
which suggests that at the onset of pain, an individual presents him/herself to a doctor, 
who aims to find a clear-cut cause of the pain. This could involve using conservative 
treatments and, where they fail, surgical treatment, with the idea that "pain equals 
disease" (p.26). This treatment might last for a number of years after the initial pain 
onset. If treatment fails to resolve the pain, a doctor may view his/her patient as 
having nothing physically wrong and make a referral for psychological assessment to 
determine any possible psychological roots of the pain. A pain sufferer who feels 
there is a physiological basis to his/her pain could resent such a referral. This may 
lead to a search for another doctor who will be able to name and resolve the pain. 
Although at this stage it is evident that the pain is unlikely to be resolved, some pain 
sufferers and health professionals still view the pain as if it were acute by continually 
searching for causes and cures of it (Hanson and Gerber, 1990; Hom and Munafo, 
1997). This is likely to focus the pain sufferer on his/her condition pennanently, 
leading to the belief that there is something seriously wrong. 
Given that chronic pain is something that may not be resolved, and is such a problem 
for both those who are suffering from it, and those who attempt to treat it, 
consideration will now be given to its prevalence in the community. 
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2.1.4 The Prevalence of Pain 
Crook et al (1984) provided an example of the incidence of acute pain in the 
community, where they found 5% of a randomly selected sample of Canadian 
households to report experiencing acute pain in the two weeks preceding their survey. 
Estimates of the prevalence of chronic pain in the community have been difficult to 
detennine due to two main problems. Firstly, some prevalence rates have been based 
on pain clinic samples (Crook et al, 1986; Crook, Tunks, Kalaher and Roberts, 1988; 
Crook, Weir and Tunks, 1989). However, pain experienced in these samples differs 
from that experienced in the general community, and so generalisations cannot be 
made from one sample to the other (Crombie and Davies, 1998). Secondly, 
prevalence rates are difficult to collate, due to the many different types of pain on 
which these rates are based, different countries of study, and different research 
methods used to obtain them. 
To date, five studies have investigated the prevalence of chronic pain in the United 
Kingdom. Using different methods, three of these have reported rates of 7% 
(Bowsher, Rigge and Sopp, 1991), 35% (Croft, Rigby, Boswell, Schollum and 
Silman, 1993), and 20.7% (Gureje, Von Korff, Simon and Gater, 1998). Additionally, 
Elliot, Smith, Penny, Smith and Chambers (1999) found 50.4% of a sample of the 
general population selected from general practices in the Grampian area of Scotland 
to report chronic pain. These reports were based on the experience of general chronic 
pain. In contrast, Smith, Elliot, Chambers, Smith, Hannaford and Penny (2001) 
reported both on the significance and severity of chronic pain in the community, and 
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found prevalence rates of 14.1% for pain significance and 6.3% for pain severity. This 
suggests that although up to 50% of any community sample can report experiencing 
chronic pain, the percentage of those who experience it to a significant or severe 
degree is actually quite small. 
2.1.5 Pain Theories 
2.1.5.1 Introduction 
Three main physiological pain theories include specificity theory, pattern theory, and 
Gate Control Theory. These will be considered before psychological theories of pain 
are addressed. 
2.1.5.2 Specificity Theories 
The main idea of specificity theory is that the brain receives information about pain 
from free nerve endings (Muller, 1842). This holds that there is a direct, one-way 
communication from the pain receptors in the skin to the brain, specifically the 
thalamus that was postulated to be the "pain centre" (Head, 1920). Two main 
criticisms have been made of this theory. Firstly, that it is naive to assume stimulation 
of free nerve endings will lead to a sensation of pain, because stimulating free nerve 
endings may awaken other senses (Melzack and Wall, 1996). Secondly, there may not 
be a direct link between stimulation of pain receptors and the amount of pain 
experienced. Physiological evidence suggests that gentle touch can trigger 
excruciating pain, and pain can spread to various parts of the body, other than that 
stimulated. This fails to suggest a rigid, straight-through system from pain receptors in 
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the skin to the brain (Melzack and Wall, 1996). Additionally, psychological factors 
can influence the extent to which pain is experienced, depending on, for example, 
how the pain is interpreted (Melzack and Wall, 1996). Despite criticism, this was a 
useful theory of acute pain, providing the basis for subsequent research. 
2.1.5.3 Pattern Theories 
In order to account for the weaknesses of specificity theory, other pain theories were 
developed and grouped under "pattern theory". Pattern theories propose that all nerve 
endings are alike. The simplest form, peripheral pattern theory (Sinclair, 1955; 
Weddell, 1955), holds that pain is due to excessive peripheral stimulation of non-
specific receptors, which is interpreted centrally as pain. However, this has been 
criticised on the basis that it does not take account of receptor-fibre specialisation 
(Melzack and Wall, 1996). Livingston (1943) developed one other form of pattern 
theory that can be used to explain the experience of prolonged pain, such as phantom 
limb pain. This model asserts that stimulation of sensory nerve fibres initiates activity 
in reverberatory circuits in the grey matter of the spinal cord. These circuits are 
closed, self-exciting loops of neurons, and when stimulated are self-sustaining and 
can lead to pain being experienced long after an injury has healed. This abnormal 
activity can generate volleys of nerve impulses that are interpreted centrally as pain, 
and can be triggered by stimuli that are not normally painful. 
Although both specificity and pattern theories make a contribution to understanding 
acute and chronic pain mechanisms, they do not provide a satisfactory general theory 
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of pain. They lack unity, and fail to address the complex experience of pain (Melzack 
and Wall, 1996). 
2.1.5.4 Gate Control Theory 
The Gate Control Theory of pain (Melzack and Wall, 1965) accounted for the 
limitations of earlier pain theories, through accounting for the complex experience of 
pain. This involves not only the physiological experience of pain, but also 
psychological mechanisms such as past experience, expectation and emotion, which 
can affect individual perceptions and interpretations of the physiological pain 
experience (Skevington, 1995). 
The main proposition of the theory is that there is a neural "gate" in the dorsal horns 
of the spinal cord that can be opened or closed in varying degrees, thereby modulating 
incoming pain signals before they reach the brain. Pain is perceived when the amount 
of information that passes through the gate exceeds a critical level. The route from the 
periphery to the brain proceeds through a series of stages. At first, peripheral nerve 
fibres, myelinated A-delta and unmyelinated C-fibres are stimulated by injury. They 
then deliver impulses to the centrally projecting transmission cells in the dorsal horns 
of the spinal cord, which contain facilitatory cells. A third type of fibre, large 
diameter A-beta fibres are thought to have an inhibitory function. Close to the 
transmission cells in the spinal cord is the substantia gelatinosa, which contains both 
excitatory and inhibitory neurons. The A-beta fibres are thought to activate cells in the 
substantia gelatinosa, which serve to inhibit the activity of the transmission cells. A-
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delta and C-fibres inhibit the activity of the substantia gelatinosa and facilitate the 
transmission cells. The balance of activity from these cells will determine if the "gate" 
is opened or closed. 
Pain information going through the gate reaches centres in the brain responsible for 
the physiological and emotional aspects of the pain experience. Once pain information 
has reached the brain, several factors such as emotion, attention and past experience 
can influence how the pain is perceived. These factors can also serve to open or close 
the "gate" in descending inhibitory controls from the brain, and can alter sensory 
messages travelling from the spinal cord to the brain. This suggests a loop from the 
spinal cord to the brain and back to the spinal cord. 
The processes involved in Gate Control Theory have been supported by subsequent 
work (see Melzack and Wall, 1996 for a review of this literature). However, some of 
this evidence has never been substantiated, and is not consistent with a gating 
mechanism (lggo, 1972). Various criticisms of Gate Control Theory have been 
proposed (see Skevington, 1995 for a review of this literature). Despite this, it was the 
first theory to introduce pain as a physiological experience at both peripheral and 
central nervous system levels, which can be influenced by many factors such as past 
experience and emotional states. As such, it remains the most influential working 
model for pain researchers. 
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2.1.5.5 Psychological Theories 
Subsequent research has attempted to determine the nature of the relationship between 
the physiological and psychological experience of pain. Some conflicting ideas have 
emerged concerning whether psychological dysfunction predates or follows the 
physiological experience of pain. Some literature has suggested that psychological 
dysfunction and chronic pain have reciprocal influences over each other (Craig, 
1999). Romano and Turner (1985) noted that around 50% ofthose suffering from pain 
and depression develop these disorders simultaneously. However, other literature has 
either suggested emotional disturbance to be a consequence of chronic pain (Gamsa, 
1990; Gaskin, Greene, Robinson and Geisser, 1992), or a cause of it (Gamsa and 
Vikis-Freibergs, 1991). In support of this latter idea, early theoretical propositions 
suggested that in the absence of any detectable organic cause, the experience of pain 
must have a psychological basis. Engel (1959) used the tenn "psychogenic pain" to 
describe this type of pain. He stated that pain may serve a variety of emotional 
functions, and because of this certain individuals may actively seek pain, even to the 
extent of creating it as a psychic experience in the absence of any peripheral stimulus. 
Similar to Engel, Blumer and Heilbronn (1982) described pain in psychological tenns 
by proposing the experience of pain to be a fonn of"masked depression". 
Pain has been attributed to many types of psychological factors, such as childhood 
deprivation or trauma, personality problems, suppressed psychic conflict, repressed 
hostility, aggression, guilt and resentment (Gamsa, 1994; Merskey and Boyd, 1978; 
Violon, 1982). However, despite this evidence for the psychological basis of pain, the 
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exact nature of the relationship between psychological dysfunction and chronic pain 
cannot be determined, due to the wide methodological variations adopted in existing 
research (see Romano and Turner, 1985). 
2.1.6 Pain Measurement 
2.1. 6.1 Introduction 
In order to understand and treat pain, it needs to be measured. The measurement of 
pain is complex; there are many factors that contribute to an individual's response to a 
question about pain intensity. These include psychological, social and economic 
factors, as well as personal history, interpretation of symptoms and physical 
pathology (Jensen and Karoly, 1992). Additionally, the fact that the experience of 
pain is so subjective is a major problem in its measurement. Given the complexity and 
subjectivity of the pain experience, it can only ever be studied indirectly (Jensen and 
Karoly, 1992). Pain intensity has been investigated using unidimensional and 
multidimensional measures. 
2.1.6.2 Unidimensional Measures 
The most commonly used unidimensional measures are verbal rating scales, 
numerical rating scales, and visual analogue scales. Verbal rating scales consist of a 
series of verbal pain descriptors ordered from the least intense to the most intense (for 
example no pain, mild, moderate, severe) (Jensen and Karoly, 2001). Each person 
reads the list and chooses the word which best describes his/her pain intensity at the 
moment. A score of zero is assigned to the descriptor with the lowest rank, and scores 
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ascend to the score with the highest rank (Melzack and Katz, 1999). Numerical rating 
scales typically consist of a series of numbers ranging from 0 to 10, or 0 to 100, with 
endpoints representing the extremes of the possible pain experience, and labelled "no 
pain" and ''worst pain possible", respectively. Each participant chooses the number 
that best corresponds to the intensity of his/her pain at that moment. The most 
common visual analogue scale consists of a 1 0-centimetre horizontal or vertical line 
with two endpoints labelled, "no pain", and "worst pain ever". A person is required to 
place a mark on the line at the point that corresponds to his/her perceived pain 
intensity. The distance in centimetres from the low end of the scale to the patient's 
mark is used as a numerical index of pain severity (Melzack and Katz, 1999). 
There are several advantages and disadvantages of using each of these scales (see 
Melzack and Katz, 2001 for a review of this literature). One common disadvantage is 
the assumption that pain is a unidimensional experience which can be measured using 
a single-item scale (Melzack, 1975). This assumption is based on unidimensional 
theories of pain, namely specificity and pattern theories. 
2.1. 6. 3 Multidimensional Measures 
Gate Control Theory introduced the experience of pain to be multidimensional. As 
such, a single measure is needed to encompass all aspects of the experience. The 
McGill Pain Questionnaire (MPQ) (Melzack, 1975) is one of the most widely used 
measures of the multidimensional pain experience. This scale has its origins in 
research conducted by Melzack and Torgerson (1971). Physicians and university 
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undergraduates classified 102 words from clinical literature into small groups that 
described different aspects of the pain experience. From this data the words were split 
into three major classes and 16 subclasses. The three classes of words reflected the 
sensory, affective and evaluative aspects of the pain experience. The 16 subclasses 
were split into the three major classes, and contained words which were considered by 
most subjects to be qualitatively similar. In addition, each of the word groups in a 
subclass referred to a specific aspect of the pain experience. For example, the words 
"flickering", "quivering", "pulsing", "throbbing", "beating" and "pounding" 
represented the temporal quality of pain in the sensory subclass. Intensity ratings were 
then attached to each of the words in the 16 subclasses, and a high level of agreement 
was found on the intensity attached to each word among physicians, patients and 
students. This formed the basis of the descriptor subclasses of the MPQ. 
In completing the MPQ, each descriptor list is read to a participant who selects one 
word from each list that best describes his/her current pain. The word groups in each 
subclass are scored, such that the word implying the least amount of pain is assigned a 
value of one, the next a value of two, and so on in ascending order of intensity. The 
rank values of the words chosen can be summed to obtain total scores for each of the 
subclasses, or a total score for all subclasses could be obtained. 
There are several advantages and disadvantages to using the MPQ (see Melzack and 
Katz, 2001 for a review of this literature). One disadvantage is that it takes between 5-
10 minutes to complete (Melzack, 1987). A shorter version of the scale, the short-
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form McGill Pain Questionnaire (SF-MPQ) was developed, which can be completed 
within 2-5 minutes (Melzack, 1987). The SF-MPQ contains 15 representative words 
from the sensory (n = 11), and affective (n = 4) classes of the standard MPQ. The 15 
pain descriptors were based on the frequency with which they were used by patients 
suffering from a variety of acute, intermittent and chronic pains. One other sensory 
word was included in the scale, "splitting", because it is reported to be a key word for 
dental pain. Items 1-11 comprise the following sensory words: throbbing, shooting, 
stabbing, sharp, cramping, gnawing, hot-burning, aching, heavy, tender and splitting. 
Items 12-15 comprise the following affective words: tiring/exhausting, sickening, 
fearful and cruel-punishing. Each descriptor is ranked on an intensity scale of 0 = 
"none", 1 ="mild", 2 ="moderate", 3 ="severe". 
In addition to the descriptors, the SF-MPQ contains two other measures, a visual 
analogue scale, and a number-word combination used to describe the overall pain 
intensity. The visual analogue scale is scored in the way outlined in section 2.1.6.2. 
The number-word combination consists of a list of five words used to describe pain 
intensity. The words range in intensity from the lowest (0), to the highest (5), where 0 
= no pain, 1 = mild, 2 = discomforting, 3 = distressing, 4 = horrible, and 5 = 
excruciating. Participants are required to tick the option corresponding to their pain. 
The SF-MPQ is scored by adding together the rank values of the sensory and affective 
words chosen (Melzack, 1975), and summing these scores to obtain an overall pain 
score. A separate overall pain intensity and pain word score is obtained. 
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There are some advantages to using the SF-MPQ. Firstly, it has demonstrated both 
concurrent and discriminant validity. Its concurrent validity has been demonstrated 
from the fact that scores on the SF-MPQ have been found to correlate with scores on 
the standard MPQ (Dudgeon, Raubertas and Rosenthal, 1993). The discriminant 
validity of the SF-MPQ is demonstrated from the fact that it has been used in a variety 
of acute (e.g. Melzack, 1987), and chronic pain conditions (e.g. Church and Vincent, 
1996; Dudgeon et al, 1993). Additionally, it has been used to evaluate pain and 
discomfort in response to medical interventions (see Melzack and Katz, 2001 for a 
fuller discussion of this). This suggests the SF-MPQ may be capable of discriminating 
among different pain syndromes. Secondly, it has been found to be usable in a variety 
of different age groups. Gagliese and Melzack (1997) found consistency in the most 
frequently chosen pain descriptors across young, middle-aged and older pain 
sufferers. 
The foregoing unidimensional and multidimensional pain measures can be used to 
assess pain in both acute and chronic pain sufferers. However, by its nature chronic 
pain is tied up with many complex factors, and so the MPQ would be most 
appropriately used in this sample. The complexity and longevity of the chronic pain 
experience will have an impact on a sufferer's life on several levels. 
2.1.7 The Impact of Pain 
The experience of persistent pain may have a physical, social, economic and 
psychological impact on an individual. The impact need not follow a set pattern. As 
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pain continues, responses to the pain experience become increasingly individual, thus 
the impact is likely to vary for different chronic pain sufferers (Zarkowska and 
Philips, 1986). Additionally, the same painful process can affect people in different 
ways. Some people may shrug off the symptoms, resulting in the pain having a 
minimal impact on their lives, while others may be left incapacitated, leading to the 
pain having a huge impact on their lives (Jones, 1993). This is because pain can affect 
general mobility (Office of Population Censuses (OPCS), 1993), and in this way 
restrict daily (Bowsher et al, 1991), and leisure functioning (OPCS, 1993). 
Those chronic pain sufferers who have to reduce or give up daily and/or leisure 
activities may experience social isolation. Smith and Friedemann (1999) found most 
of their 30 chronic pain sufferers reported feeling isolated and lonely with their pain. 
They felt separated from and left out of family activities, and they often pushed 
themselves too hard in order to be included in or meet family responsibilities. The 
need to meet family responsibilities reflects the need to maintain the family role, one 
of many different social roles an individual may occupy. This role serves two 
important functions, as homemaker and nurturer, both of which may be affected by 
the experience of pain (Reisine, Goodenow and Grady, 1987). 
The occupational role may also be threatened by the experience of pain (Tunks and 
Roy, 1982). Chronic pain may make it difficult or impossible for an individual to 
continue with his/her occupational role, and if he/she had been the main provider in 
the household, this role is likely to be lost. A change in household roles may then 
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occur, with someone else adopting the role as provider and the chronic pain sufferer 
becoming a dependent {Tunks and Roy, 1982), and adopting a sick-role (Sternbach, 
1984). One possible outcome of this is pain becoming the central focus of life, with 
most of the pain sufferers' time being taken up visiting health professionals (Miller 
and Kraus, 1990). Not all chronic pain sufferers view the sick-role in a negative way. 
For some there may be a positive side to it as well, where there are "secondary gains" 
in being exempt from daily responsibilities and receiving attention from others 
(Gallagher and Wrobel, 1982). Regardless of how the chronic pain sufferer views 
his/her pain, it will likely have an economic impact on the individual. 
Various factors may determine the economic impact of pain on an individual, 
including the length of work loss, insurance in the event of sickness, alternative 
sources of income, and entitlement to various benefits (Main and Burton, 2000). For 
example, disability benefits are usually less than a person earns (Sternbach, 1984), as 
are any wages which are compensated for in the event of injury (Miller and Kraus, 
1990). Additionally, many chronic pain sufferers incur extra treatment costs through 
the use of alternative therapies and over-the-counter medications that are not 
reimbursed. They may also incur extra travel costs, where a taxi may be taken to a 
treatment centre because public transport is inconvenient. 
The physical, social and economic impacts of pain are likely to have a psychological 
impact on a chronic pain sufferer. Many psychological problems may be experienced. 
Pain may make an individual fearful that something is seriously wrong, believing that 
18 
pam is a warmng of some ongoing pathological process (Sternbach, 1984). In 
addition, the longer the pain lasts, the less certain the pain sufferer may be that it will 
resolve (White, Lefort, Amsel and Jeans, 1997). This could lead to feelings of 
hopelessness, helplessness, despair (Miller and Kraus, 1990), and less life satisfaction 
(Gamsa, 1990). As indicated in section 2.1.5.5 on psychological theories ofpain, pain 
and emotional distress are strongly associated with each other. Several studies have 
indicated that the longer pain lasts, the more anxiety, depression and distress is 
experienced (Ackerman and Stevens, 1989; Hinkley and Jaremko, 1994; Swanson, 
Maruta and Wolff, 1986; White et al, 1997). 
A combination of these affective, cognitive and behavioural dimensions in chronic 
pain has been described as a "chronic pain syndrome" (Hom and Munafo, 1997; 
Melzack and Wall, 1996). This suggests that chronic pain sufferers display common 
behaviour patterns. In support of this idea, certain patterns of abnormal illness 
behaviour have been identified in these pain sufferers (Pilowsky, Chapman and 
Bonica, 1977). Pain behaviours may be shaped by positive reinforcement, such as 
being rewarded through receiving attention from others or analgesic medication each 
time the behaviour is displayed. In this way pain behaviour becomes a learned 
response, and reinforcement serves to maintain it. Fordyce (1976) developed an 
operant approach to behavioural intervention aimed to modify those aspects of a pain 
sufferers' environment that maintains the pain behaviour. This involves not 
reinforcing it by for example ignoring signs of "suffering", and reinforcing more 
appropriate coping behaviour. In this way illness behaviour may be reduced or 
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eliminated. The treatment however is limited in its effectiveness because some 
individuals do not complete it. 
Beyond this, attempts have been made to alter the cognitive component of pain in 
cognitive-behavioural treatment (Turk, Meichenbaum and Genest, 1983). This holds 
that cognitive processes such as thoughts, expectancies, beliefs and memories are 
important because they can lead to problematic changes in both feelings, such as 
depression, and behaviours, such as an over-dependence on family members or 
friends, both of which can contribute to pain-related disability. Additionally, 
compliance with treatment can be affected by what a pain sufferer believes about 
his/her situation. Whether these beliefs are true or false, adaptive or maladaptive, they 
detennine whether or not an individual will actively comply with treatment. Thus, 
treatment success ultimately begins with the establishment of beliefs compatible with 
treatment (DeGood and Shutty, 1992). Cognitive-behavioural treatment is the most 
effective psychological treatment to date. 
2.1.8 Summary 
In summary, this section of the chapter reviewed relevant literature on the nature of 
pain. Two general types of pain were identified: acute and chronic. Theories of pain 
were also considered. Early physiological pain theories were limited in that they 
failed to take account of the complexity of the pain experience, instead proposing a 
direct, one-way pain communication from pain receptors in the skin to the brain. Gate 
Control Theory addressed this complexity by considering psychological factors that 
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may influence how the physiological experience of pain is interpreted. Psychological 
theories of pain were also discussed. These theories conflicted about the nature of the 
relationship between the physiological and psychological experience of pain. Some 
theories suggested that psychological dysfunction and chronic pain have reciprocal 
influences over each other, whilst others suggested emotional disturbance is either a 
consequence of chronic pain, or a cause of it. 
The physiological and psychological components of pain have been measured using a 
multidimensional descriptor tool devised for this purpose, the McGill Pain 
Questionnaire. Other, unidimensional rating scale measures have also been used to 
investigate the physiological experience of pain. However, given the subjective nature 
of the pain experience, each pain measure contains many limitations. 
This section of the chapter also considered the impact persistent pain might have on a 
sufferer's life on four levels: physically, socially, economically and psychologically. 
A combination of these factors has been identified as a specific pattern of behaviour 
in chronic pain sufferers, the "chronic pain syndrome". This behaviour pattern can be 
treated using behavioural means. Additionally, cognitive treatment can be used to 
alter beliefs that may interfere with compliance with treatment. 
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2.2 ATTRIBUTIONS, JUST WORLD BELIEFS AND ADJUSTMENT: 
FOUNDATIONS AND THEORETICAL ORIGINS 
2.2.1 Introduction 
Since pain beliefs may have repercussions for the pain experience (see section 2.1.7), 
the second section of the chapter will consider these beliefs in more detail. This will 
provide the foundation for an investigation of more specific types of beliefs, namely 
attributions about pain. Attributions will be followed by a review of the influence 
negative situations such as pain may have over the extent to which an individual 
believes the world to be a fair and just place. Attributions and just world beliefs will 
be considered because in addition to pain beliefs, they may also have repercussions 
for the pain experience, in terms of their interactions with adjustment to pain. As 
such, this section will end with an overview of the concept of adjustment, followed by 
a summary of the whole section. 
2.2.2 General Pain Beliefs 
Lazarus and Folkman's (1984) Cognitive Appraisal Theory has been the most widely 
used theory investigating the effects of beliefs in adapting to chronic pain. This theory 
was developed to investigate the relationship between stressful events and adjustment. 
Within the theory stress is defined as, "a particular relationship between the person 
and the environment that is appraised by the person as taxing or exceeding his or her 
resources and endangering his or her well-being" (Lazarus and Folkman, 1984, p.19). 
This highlights the interaction between an individual and his/her environment. The 
extent to which stress is experienced in a situation is dependent upon two appraisal 
processes. Within primary appraisal, a decision is made concerning whether or not 
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there is stress in an encounter, and the extent of it. Potential stressors may be 
appraised as either irrelevant, benign-positive, or harmfuVthreatening/challenging. In 
secondary appraisal the individual evaluates what may be done in order to combat a 
threat and the event is re-appraised in the light of this (Lazarus and Folkman, 1984). 
In relation to stress, beliefs have been defined as pre-existing ideas of reality through 
which people view the world. They influence how an environment is appraised 
through determining how an individual understands it (Lazarus and Folkman, 1984). 
This will help to determine whether a situation is initially viewed as stressful or not. 
Stress has been found to be associated with chronic pain in a number of ways. For 
example, chronic pain and its impact on such things as loss of income have been 
viewed as significant life-stressors (Jensen, Turner, Romano and Karoly, 1991). 
Beliefs about pain have been defined as, "the cognition's (thoughts) patients have 
about their pain problem" (Jensen et al, 1991, p.250). Beliefs about the onset and 
treatment of pain in particular and illness in general originate from many sources 
including scientific explanation, the media and lay referral systems. Scientific 
explanations include doctor's beliefs about pain/illness. Elder (1973) found half of the 
osteoarthritis sufferers in her study had learned to call the condition this from their 
doctors. The other half reported they had learned to call their condition osteoarthritis 
either from the media (Blaxter, 1983), or people around them. These latter beliefs 
reflect lay referral systems that may develop from culture or folk theories about 
pain/illness. Examples of folk theories concerning the treatment of ailments include 
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"old wives tales", such as "a copper bracelet for rheumatism", "a bee sting for 
arthritis", and ''where God puts a disease He also puts a cure" (Skevington, 1995, 
p.98). 
These beliefs may be abandoned when they are refuted by what a person experiences. 
For example, the cultural belief that pain is a sign that something is wrong and will go 
away when all is well may be abandoned by the experience of persistent pain 
(Williams, Robinson and Geisser, 1994). In such a case new pain beliefs will be 
formulated that are consistent with the individual's pain experience. 
The beliefs of persistent pain sufferers have been widely investigated. DeGood and 
Tait (2001) reported three main categories of pain belie£ Firstly, there are beliefs 
concerned with basic philosophical assumptions about the self and the world. These 
include beliefs about issues such as justice, fairness, suffering and responsibility. If 
one believes that life should be free of pain, this may exacerbate the suffering 
associated with chronic pain. Such beliefs are often inconsistent and unstable. The 
second category of beliefs are generalised and stable enough to be considered 
personality traits, such as attributional style (Abramson, Seligman and Teasdale, 
1978). This is a particular style adopted to explain events over time. The third type of 
belief is specific to the experience of pain, tied to what an individual thinks should be 
done to diagnose and control his/her pain. 
24 
Jensen et al (1991) reviewed beliefs specific to individual pain situations, and grouped 
them into seven categories. These included beliefs about general locus of control; 
control over pain; attributional style; cognitive errors; self-efficacy; outcome 
expectancies, and a general category of pain beliefs that did not fit into any of the 
above categories (see Jensen et al, 1991 for a discussion of these beliefs). Some 
beliefs covered in this latter category are investigated in pain belief measures. These 
include the Survey of Patient Attitudes (Jensen, Karoly and Huger, 1987) measuring 
beliefs associated with pain control, solicitude, medical cure, disability, medication 
and emotions; the Pain and Impairment Relationships Scale (Riley, Ahem and 
Pollick, 1988), measuring one's ability to function despite pain; the Pain Cognitions 
Questionnaire (Boston, Pearce and Richardson, 1990), measuring levels of coping, 
hopelessness/helplessness, and passive optimism; and the Beliefs About Pain Control 
Questionnaire (Skevington, 1990), measuring beliefs about internal, external and 
chance control over pain. 
Other pain belief measures include the Pain Beliefs and Perceptions Inventory (PBPI) 
(Williams and Thorn, 1989). This measures perceptions of pain as mysterious, beliefs 
about the duration of pain, and self-blame for pain. Additionally, the Pain Beliefs 
Questionnaire (PBQ) (Edwards, Pearce, Turner-Stokes and Jones, 1992) measures 
beliefs about the cause and treatment of pain. The self-blame measure of the PBPI and 
the cause measure of the PBQ have both been discussed as a more specific type of 
belief, attributions. 
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2.2.3 Attributions 
2.2.3.1 Introduction 
The following areas of attributions for pain will be considered. Firstly, definitions and 
theoretical origins. Secondly, conceptual and empirical distinctions between 
attributions. Thirdly, reasons for making attributions, in terms of their measurement 
and motives for making them. Fourthly, the extent to which attributions are made. 
Fifthly, the nature of any attributions made, and sixthly, the changing nature of 
attributions. Following this review, limitations of attribution research will be 
identified. 
2.2.3.2 Definitions and Theoretical Origins 
Three main types of attribution have been identified: cause, responsibility and blame. 
A cause has been defined as, "that which brings about a change" (Buss, 1978, 
p.1311). Responsibility has been defined as, "answerable, accountable to another for 
something, liable to be called to account", or "morally accountable for one's actions" 
(Fincham and Jaspars, 1980, p.95). These definitions were adopted in the current 
study. No definition of blame has been found in the literature, and so a dictionary 
definition was adopted in the present study. This defined blame as, "To find fault 
with" (Collins Gem English Dictionary, 1985). Cause and responsibility have been 
discussed within attribution theory, defined as a theory concerned with how ordinary 
people explain questions beginning with "Why?" (Kelley, 1972; 1973). This often 
involves the way in which people use their behaviour to explain events in their lives, 
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such as succeeding or failing at some task. There are several types of attribution 
theory. The most influential is Heider's (1958) Naive Theory of Psychology. 
Diagram 2.1 summarises Heider's (1958) theoretical perspective on making causal 
attributions. The diagram indicates there are two main types of causal attributions: 
personal, within the self, and impersonal, in the environment. Each has it own factors 
which influence whether or not each type of attribution will be made. The presence of 
the ability and intention to do something at the time of a negative event will influence 
whether or not personal attributions are made, while the presence of factors such as 
task difficulty, opportunity and luck will determine whether attributions for some 
event are made to environmental factors. Heider also suggested different numbers of 
attributions can be made, i.e. multiple or minimum. Various factors may influence 
whether a lot or few causes are sought to explain an event. These include emotions 
experienced at the time of searching for causes to explain an event. Some research 
suggests that experiencing positive emotions at the time of a negative event will lead 
to multiple causes being searched for, while negative emotions will lead to few causes 
being searched for (Liu, Karasawa and Weiner, 1992). 
Heider (1958) also developed five responsibility levels that could be assigned for the 
occurrence of a negative event. Diagram 2.2 summarises these levels. This shows that 
responsibility assignment ranges in intensity. The lowest intensity, association, is 
where an individual would be held weakly responsible for an event with which he/she 
was not causally linked. Justifiable responsibility, the highest intensity, is where an 
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individual would be held fully responsible for an event, but would be justified in 
carrying out the behaviour that led to a particular effect. 
Various criticisms have been made of these levels, including that Heider did not take 
account of the context in which behaviour occurs, thereby failing to consider the 
circumstances which led to the behaviour (Fishbein and Ajzen, 1973). Despite this, 
experimental literature has supported the existence of the responsibility levels (Shaw 
and Sulzer, 1964). These levels have also been reinterpreted as legal responsibility 
rules (Hamilton, 1978), paralleling responsibility levels in the legal literature (Hart, 
1968). This provides a real-life application of the levels, although beyond 
experimental and legal literature little use has been made of them. 
Blame attributions have been discussed within Janoff-Bulman's (1979) Theory of 
Self-Blame. Two main types of self-blame have been identified. Behavioural self-
blame involves blaming one's behaviour for a negative event. Characterological self-
blame involves blaming one's character for a negative event. Both types of self-blame 
and their individual features are summarised in Diagram 2.3. One of the features is 
that behavioural self-blame is adaptive in that it allows an individual to adjust well to 
his/her situation. However, characterological self-blame is maladaptive, resulting in 
poor adjustment to a negative situation. Explanations for this are given in Diagram 
2.3. Although behavioural self-blame is adaptive, not all situations lend themselves to 
the making of these attributions because behaviours may not be regarded as justifiable 
causes of serious events. For example a disease victim who has always taken care of 
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his/her health cannot make behavioural self-blame attributions for contracting the 
disease (Janoff-Bulman and Thomas, 1989). 
Janoff-Bulman's {1979) distinctions have been criticised by Shaver and Drown 
(1986). They suggested that neither type of blame reflects true blame. Instead, 
behavioural self-blame is a self-attribution of causality, and characterological self-
blame is a self-attribution of responsibility, because it lacks the intention required for 
blame. However, Macleod (1999) stated that although they may not measure blame, 
Janoff-Bulman's (1979) predictions remain unaltered. This is because Shaver and 
Drown (1986) indicated that causal attributions should be related to the re-
establishment of perceived control over future outcomes (reflecting behavioural self-
blame), while responsibility attributions should threaten self-esteem and increase the 
likelihood of future distress (reflecting characterological self-blame). 
Behavioural and characterological self-blame have been examined in real-life 
situation of rape (Janoff-Bulman, 1979), and situations related to pain, specifically 
involving cancer (Malcarne, Compas, Epping-Jordan and Howell, 1995; Timko and 
Janoff-Bulman, 1985), burns (Kiecolt-Glaser and Williams, 1987), and spinal injuries 
(Sholomskas, Steil and Plummer, 1990). In these studies both types of blame were 
measured using a Likert scale to indicate the extent of each type attributed. 
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I Cause I 
I 
I I 
I Types I I Number I 
I I 
I I l_ I 
Personal Impersonal Multiple necessary Multiple sufficient 
(within the self) (environmental) (more than one cause (a minimum number of causes 
Two main factors: required to produce an required to produce an 
effect). Influence: effect). Influence: 
I I I I I I 
Power Motivation Various factors influence Positive emotions Negative emotions 
(individual disposition (intention to do ability to achieve (Liu, Karasawa (Liu, Karasawa 
and ability to achieve something) (e.g. task difficulty, and Weiner, 1992) and Weiner, 1992) 
something) opportunity, luck) 
Diagram 2.1: Heider's (1958) theoretical perspective on making causal attributions 
Responsibility Levels 
(increasing intensity) 
I 
Association: 
person not directly linked 
to the negative situation but responsible 
by association 
I 
Causal responsibility: 
person is responsible because his/her behaviour , 
led to a negative outcome,but neither intended 
nor foresaw consequences of it 
I 
Foreseeability: 
person is responsible because he/she could have 
foreseen possible negative consequences 
of his/her behaviour that led to a negative outcome 
I 
Intentional responsibility: 
person is responsible because he/she was fully 
aware of potential negative consequences of behaviour 
and intended to produce these consequences 
J 
Justifiable responsibility: 
person is fully responsible for producing a negative 
outcome but his/her behaviour was justifiable 
Diagram 2.2: Heider's (1958) five responsibility levels 
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I Self-blame I 
I 
I Two Types: I 
I 
I I 
Behavioural Characterological 
(blaming one's behaviour) (blaming one's character) 
I I 
Features: Features: 
I I 
I I I I 
Time Adaptive Time Maladaptive 
- behaviour happened in the past - controllable (behaviour can be changed) - character flaws are pennanent -uncontrollable (character stable) 
- concerned with avoiding future -positive world view maintained (no one - concerned with the past and -decreases self-esteem (Janoff-
negative outcomes (change behaviour) inflicted hann, only one's behaviour) deservingness for past outcomes Bulman and Thomas, 1989) 
L___ 
-- -
L_____ --
Diagram 2.3: Janoff-Bulman's (1979) Theory of Self-Blame 
2.2.3.3 Conceptual Distinctions Between Cause, Responsibility and Blame 
Before embarking on conceptual distinctions between cause, responsibility and blame, 
it is relevant to note that causal attributions have been theoretically distinguished from 
one other type of attribution, reason attributions. In the same way that Buss (1978; 
1979) defined a cause as, "that which brings about a change", he defined a reason as, 
"that for which a change is brought about" (Buss, 1978, p. 1311) (such as goals, 
purposes). In defining both concepts in this way, Buss described causes and reasons 
as logically distinct categories for explaining different aspects of behaviour. 
Behaviour which 'occurs' is not intentional and is explained in terms of causes, while 
behaviour which is 'done' by someone is intentional and is explained in terms of 
reasons. Thus, the type of attribution which is made depends on the type of behaviour 
to be explained (occurrences or actions). Although criticisms have been made of this 
theory (Harvey and Tucker, 1979; Kruglanski, 1979), its distinctions between cause 
and reason attributions have been made elsewhere (Kruglanski, 1975). Additionally, 
the theory did highlight the fact that both concepts should not be used 
interchangeably. 
Shaver (1985) developed a Theory of Blame Assignment in which he distinguished 
between cause, responsibility and blame. The theory proposes that all three are related 
but conceptually distinct concepts. Shaver (1985) proposed the following criteria for 
the assignation of blame. Firstly, although causes themselves do not have to be of 
human origin, and can be human without the intention to create a negative situation, 
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in order for blame to be assigned an individual must have intentionally caused a 
negative outcome. Secondly, for responsibility to be assigned a person must have 
caused something, although this does not have to be intentional. Additionally, an 
individual can be found responsible for something he/she did not cause, for example a 
parent being held responsible for something his/her child caused. Thirdly, when an 
individual has been found responsible for something, whether or not blame is 
assigned depends on certain criteria. Firstly, an individual must have intentionally 
conducted behaviour, aware that it would lead to negative consequences. Secondly, 
the actions taken to produce the negative consequences must be voluntary. Thirdly, 
the individual must have had a normal capacity to understand what he/she was doing 
(i.e. must be able to distinguish between what is right and wrong). If any of these 
criteria are not met, blame will not be assigned. However, even in the presence of all 
criteria, blame may still not be assigned. This is because an individual may have a 
good justification or excuse for his/her behaviour. It is only in the presence of all 
criteria, and in the absence of a good justification or excuse that blame might be 
attributed. 
Although the theory suggests cause, responsibility and blame are related, it also 
indicates differences between them. Specifically, causes can operate independently of 
responsibility, and both concepts can operate independently of blame, although blame 
assignment requires that both cause and responsibility attributions are made. The 
concepts have also been distinguished on two other levels. Firstly, responsibility is 
equated with moralness, while blame is related to wrongdoing. Secondly, cause and 
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responsibility can be attributed for positive and negative events, while blame can only 
be assigned for negative events. 
Some literature has criticised Shaver's (1985) conceptual distinctions. It has been 
suggested that while this model of blame assignment was developed as a model of 
how blame ought to be assigned to an actor by a perceiver, blame is not always 
assigned in this way for two reasons. Firstly, the perceiver may not be so attentive to 
the conceptual distinctions. People may blame others through wanton recklessness 
rather than intentional action (Shaver, 1992). Related to this, investigating cause and 
blame attributions for spinal injuries, Wortman (1983) found her sample seemed 
annoyed by what they viewed as highly redundant questions. This suggests they did 
not distinguish between the concepts. Indeed, it has been suggested that even when 
distinctions are made between the concepts, people may not distinguish between them 
(Tennen and Affleck, 1990). Secondly, people may pay attention to the definitions, 
but assign blame even when they know it is not warranted because to do this serves a 
psychological purpose for them (Shaver, 1992). 
The above points suggest there may be differences between how the lay person uses 
attribution concepts, and conceptually sophisticated distinctions between them. In 
support of this, Shaver, Null and Huff (1982) found differences in distinctions made 
in responsibility-related words between attribution experts and students. Shaver 
(1985) warned that sophisticated distinctions between the concepts should not be 
imposed upon ordinary perceivers who are the subject of scientific enquiry. Instead, it 
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has been suggested that even though lay perceivers make conceptual errors in their 
use of attributions, this is how they use these concepts, and it is the job of researchers 
to understand how the lay person interprets these explanations (Lalljee, 1981). 
Most research interprets attributions in this way. Few studies define attributions to 
their participants. Only three studies have been found to do this. Borek and Shaver 
(1988) did this in their sample of young adults whose parents had experienced marital 
conflict. Although the precise definitions given were not reported, the results 
indicated that cause, responsibility and blame were highly correlated among those 
who had not been given definitions of the concepts, to values of between 0.79 and 
0.88. This was interpreted as a failure to distinguish between them. However, lower 
correlations were found between the concepts among those who had received 
definitions of them, although this was only for correlations between cause and blame 
(r = 0.46 - 0.60), and responsibility and blame (r = 0.46 - 0.54). Cause and 
responsibility remained indistinguishable from each other (r = 0. 76 - 0.82). This 
suggests that providing definitions of the concepts may help people distinguish 
between them. Of the remaining two studies to define the concepts, Berckman and 
Austin (1993) confused the terms "cause" and "reason", both of which have been 
distinguished from each other. Additionally, Drown (1985) provided definitions 
reflecting the way in which attributions were defined in Shaver's (1985) Theory of 
Blame Assignment. 
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2.2.3.4 Empirical Distinctions Between Cause, Responsibility and Blame 
Empirical distinctions between cause, responsibility and blame have fallen behind 
conceptual distinctions, because conceptual distinctions are more easily drawn than 
tested (Shaver, 1985). Empirical distinctions have been based on a wide variety of 
experimental and real-life research. This point is important to highlight because those 
who are suffering in real-life research may view the concepts in a different way to 
those who are viewing the suffering of others in experimental situations (Tennen and 
Affleck, 1990). Few studies have investigated and distinguished between all three 
concepts. Critchlow (1985) did this in her experimental study of attributions for 
drunken behaviour, reporting correlations between the concepts to range from 0.2 -
0.7. Contrary to the way in which Borek and Shaver (1988) interpreted their high 
attributional correlations (see section 2.2.3.3), these correlations were interpreted as 
representing the conceptual closeness of the concepts, whilst remaining distinct from 
each other. Mantler, Schellenberg and Stewart Page (2003) supported this idea in 
their experimental study of judgements of cause, responsibility and blame in males 
diagnosed either with cancer, or Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome. They found 
all three concepts were correlated to values of between 0.8 - 0.9, and stated that this 
reflects the overlapping nature of the concepts, whilst still remaining distinct from 
each other. Indeed, differences in their magnitude suggested that participants 
distinguished between them. fu particular, cause had a higher magnitude than 
responsibility, which had a higher magnitude than blame. 
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More commonly, pairs of attribution concepts have been examined in experimental 
and real-life research. Within real-life research there is a scarcity of literature 
measuring the use of more than one of these concepts in pain situations. Instead, 
attribution pairs have been explored in research investigating the attributions of those 
suffering from illness and injury, in different ways. In some instances they were used 
as two separate measures, with their results being reported separately (Gotay, 1985; 
Koslowsky, Croog and LaVoie, 1978; Moulton, Sweet, Temoshok and Mandel, 1987; 
Taylor, Litchman and Wood, 1984). In other instances pairs of attribution concepts 
have been statistically (Brewin, 1984; Rich, Smith and Christensen, 1999), and 
descriptively distinguished from each other (Pill and Stott, 1982). Some research has 
failed to distinguish statistically between attributions (Sholomskas et al, 1990; 
Wortman, 1983). The basis of this was high correlations between pairs of concepts. 
For example, Sholomskas et al (1990) reported a correlation of 0.55 between 
responsibility and blame, and interpreted this as such a high correlation that they are 
the same concept. This contrasts Critchlow's (1985) consideration of the conceptual 
closeness of the concepts. Responsibility and blame tend to be measured more in 
illness and injury situations, than pain situations. This being the case, the rest of the 
literature review will consider attributions made in pain/illness/injury situations. 
2.2.3.5 Influences on Whether or Not Attributions are Made 
Attributions may be made for the onset of pain/illness/injury either because they are 
directly measured (Enzle and Shopflocher, 1978), or for motivational reasons. Each 
will be considered in tum. 
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Three types of attribution measures have been identified: rating scales (i.e. structured 
measures), open-ended measures (i.e. unstructured measures), and spontaneous 
measures (Michela and Wood, 1986; Turnquist, Harvey and Anderson, 1988). Rating 
scales have the advantage that they allow attributions to be quantified easily, but have 
the drawback that they are derived by the experimenter and, as such, may result in 
demand effects (Turnquist et al, 1988). Open-ended measures have the advantage that 
they allow participants to produce their own attributions, thereby decreasing demand 
effects. Additionally, participants in studies may find them a more natural way to 
provide responses, and they are more suitably used in new situations (Elig and Frieze, 
1979). However, this type of measure is subject to two criticisms. Firstly, subtle 
differences in questions may produce different results. For example, the question, 
"Why?" in some studies may reflect causes of illness more than the question "Why 
me?'' (as opposed to someone else) in other studies, which may suggest an injustice 
has occurred (Lowery, Jacobsen and DuCette, 1993; Michela and Wood, 1986). A 
second criticism is that open-ended measures may lead researchers to probe further 
attribution responses. Turnquist et al (1988) discussed the implications of this using 
an example of a heart patient reporting a high serum cholesterol level as a cause of 
his/her illness. Investigators who probe to elicit the response that diet is the cause of 
high cholesterol may obtain results that are different from those of an investigator 
who accepts the initial response. Finally, spontaneous attribution measures are the 
least prone to error, although they may create problems for coding (Turnquist et al, 
1988). 
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Causal attributions have been examined usmg both structured and unstructured 
measures. Unstructured measures involve asking participants about any causes they 
attribute for their condition, as well as asking them to consider the question, "Why 
me?" in relation to their illness. Although this measure has faced criticism, Lowery, 
Jacobsen and McCauley (1987) defended its use in causal attribution research by 
stating that although the question is not appropriately phrased to gather causal 
attributions, a direct causal attribution question may produce answers which come 
from health professionals, rather than their own thoughts. Structured causal attribution 
measures consist of rating scales containing a list of possible causes of a particular 
illness, with participants being asked to select and/or rate the importance of a list of 
possible causes in contributing to their illness. 
Responsibility and blame attributions are commonly examined using structured 
measures. These can consist of ratings ofthe extent to which participants feel various 
participants are responsible/to blame for their condition. More commonly, however, a 
measure involving the assignment of responsibility or blame to the self, others, the 
environment and chance factors is used. This has been criticised by Shaver and 
Drown (1986), who stated that for blame attributions to be made, the intention to act 
must be present. Although the self and others are capable of intentional action, the 
environment and chance are not. This makes the measure inadequate to be used in 
blame studies. 
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People may be motivated to make unprompted attributions. Spontaneous causal 
attributions may be made to explain a negative and unexpected outcome, whether 
something is known about the cause of it or not (Sensky, 1997; Weiner, 1985; Wong 
and Weiner, 1981), and when there is uncertainty and threat in a situation (Michela 
and Wood, 1986). Thus, the onset of pain/illness/injury, which may involve all of 
these factors, may prompt a causal search in order to understand the onset of the 
negative situation. However, some pain/illness/injury situations are not of a sudden 
onset. In situations of a gradual onset, causal attributions might be made in order to 
gain control over the situation (Rothbaum, Weisz and Snyder, 1982). They do this by 
giving meaning to bodily discomfort, and suggesting possible actions to take to 
reduce it (Stoekle and Barsky, 1981). 
Motives for spontaneously making responsibility and blame attributions involve 
weighing up the advantages and disadvantages of making these attributions. 
Advantages include whether the suffering person is likely to be compensated. 
Responsibility and blame are more likely to be attributed when there will be 
compensation. For example, those involved in industrial accidents will be more likely 
to blame their employer to get compensation than those involved in domestic 
accidents where the chance of being compensated is remote (Lloyd-Bostock, 1991). 
One disadvantage involves the social repercussions of making these attributions. 
Claiming is seen as a nasty thing to do, and taking legal action against a work 
colleague, friend or family member may have many social costs, as well as being 
upsetting and bewildering (Lloyd-Bostock, 1991). 
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One other motive for making spontaneous attributions common across cause, 
responsibility and blame involves the maintenance of the belief in a just world 
(Lerner, 1980). This will be considered in section 2.2.4. 
2.2.3.6 The Making of Attributions 
Few studies have measured spontaneous attributions in pain/illness/injury patients 
(Abrams and Finesinger, 1953; Bard and Dyk, 1956; Gudmunsdottir, Johnston, 
Johnston and Foulkes, 2001). This makes it impossible to determine the extent to 
which attributions are freely made for these situations. In order to gain some idea of 
this, research using unstructured attribution measures will be examined to determine 
the extent to which attributions are made when participants are given the opportunity 
not to do so. 
Causal attributions for the onset of pain/illness/injury have been made by between 69 
- 95 percent of patients suffering from these conditions (Turnquist et al, 1988), 
regardless of the nature of the condition. For example people suffering from non life 
threatening conditions such as rheumatoid arthritis, and life threatening cancer and 
myocardial infarction conditions tend to make causal attributions to some extent for 
their condition (Affleck, Pfeiffer, Tennen and Fifield, 1987; Bale, 1996; Berckman 
and Austin, 1993; Gudmunsdottir et al, 2001; Lavery and Clarke, 1996; Low, 
Thoresen, Pattillo and Fleishmann, 1993; Lowery, Jacobsen and Murphy, 1983; 
Lowery, et al1987; Lowery et al, 1993; Taylor et al, 1984). 
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Additionally, casual attributions have been made at different times in these illness 
experience, from around the time of the onset of the condition, to several years later. 
However, contradictory evidence suggests that causal attributions are largely not 
made around the time of an illness onset (Fielding, 1987; Mumma and McCorkle, 
1982-83; Rudy, 1980). One explanation for this is that at this time there is more 
concern with treatment issues than causal attributions for the illness. Causal 
explanations may come later. In support of this, both Mumma and McCorkle (1982-
83), and Rudy (1980) found that one month after suffering a myocardial infarction, 
patients reported not knowing the cause of the attack. However, two months after the 
attack, most gave a cause for it. 
Most participants in the rheumatoid arthritis, cancer and myocardial infarction studies 
reviewed gave causes for the onset of their conditions regardless of what was 
medically known about them. The causal attributions given by the myocardial 
infarction sufferers were likely to have been driven by medical knowledge concerning 
what causes this. However, little is medically known about what causes rheumatoid 
arthritis and cancer, yet there was a high incidence of these sufferers proposing their 
own causes of the conditions. It is these attributions, searched for in the absence of 
medical knowledge, which are likely to hold meaning to an individual, and as such 
may have greater implications for adjustment to the negative situation. 
The making of causal attributions at the time of an interview has been distinguished 
from having previously considered attributions for a negative situation. Some studies 
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have asked participants if they had ever previously considered "Why me?" in relation 
to their pain/illness/injury, and if not to consider it at the time of the interview (Gotay, 
1985; Lowery et al 1987; Lowery et al 1993). Around one-quarter (Gotay, 1985) or 
one-half (Lowery et al, 1987; Lowery et al, 1993) of the participants in these studies 
reported having previously considered what caused their situation. However, if 
participants had not previously considered this then any subsequent attributions made 
may be unlikely to influence adjustment to the negative situation (Gudmunsdottir et 
al, 2001). 
A minority of participants in the arthritis, cancer and myocardial infarction studies 
reviewed did not make causal attributions. There are two possible explanations for 
this. Firstly, the participants may have been searching for a solution to the condition 
as a way of adjusting to it (Rothbaum et al, 1982). The second point is that it may 
simply have been unimportant for some people to make a causal attribution. The 
importance of making a causal attribution has been found to vary at different times in 
the same illness experience (Lowery et al, 1993). Additionally, the rated importance 
of making attributions has been distinguished from the attributions that are made. 
Taylor et al (1984) found most of their breast cancer sufferers made causal 
attributions for the onset of their condition, despite reporting the making of causal 
attributions to be largely unimportant at this time. Although the attributions were 
made retrospectively, the results suggest that attributions may be made without any 
importance being attached to them. Attributions made under these circumstances may 
have little effect on how an individual adjusts to his/her pain/illness/injury situation. 
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Rates of the extent to which responsibility and blame are attributed for the onset of 
pain/illness/injury cannot be determined due to the largely structured nature of these 
measures (see section 2.2.3.5). The only chance participants have to refrain from 
making attributions, is in relation to the specific attribution being measured. For 
example when asked whom, if anyone, they think was responsible or to blame for 
their situation, participants can respond with "no one". Under these circumstances 
people refrain from making attributions (DeGood and Kiernan, 1996; Schulz and 
Decker, 1985). 
2.2.3. 7 The Nature of Attributions Made 
Several factors may influence the nature of the causal attributions made for the onset 
of pain/illness/injury. These include gender (Elder, 1973), education level (Pill and 
Stott, 1982), religion (Bulman and Wortman, 1977), and social class (Taylor, 1982). 
Additionally, the types of causal attributions made have been found to be disease-
specific in a variety of samples. These include rheumatoid arthritis (Affleck et al, 
1987a; Lowery et al, 1983; Lowery et al, 1987), breast cancer (Bale, 1996; Lavery 
and Clarke, 1996; Lowery et al, 1993; Taylor et al, 1984), lung cancer (Berckman and 
Austin, 1993; Faller, Schilling and Lang, 1995; Mumma and McCorkle, 1982-83), 
and myocardial infarction (Affleck, Tennen and Croog, 1987; Affleck, Tennen, Croog 
and Levine, 1987; Croog and Richards, 1977; Fielding, 1987; Gudmunsdottir et al, 
2001; Koslowsky et al, 1978; Low et al, 1993; Petrie and Weinman, 1997; Rudy, 
1980). This has been regardless of whether structured or unstructured causal 
attribution measures were used to measure them. 
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Causal attributions for these conditions have been made to various different factors. 
For example, rheumatoid arthritis has frequently been attributed to fate, personal 
habits, the environment and heredity. Similarly, breast cancer has frequently been 
attributed to various factors including stress and diet. There have, however, been 
inconsistencies in the most frequent cause attributed for these conditions. This can be 
attributed to the lack of medical knowledge concerning the causes of rheumatoid 
arthritis and breast cancer, which may have led to people suffering from these 
conditions developing their own causes. In support of this idea, Kroode, Oosterwijk 
and Steverink (1989) found people suffering from various forms of cancer gave their 
own, sometimes uncertain explanations for their cancer, given the lack of medical 
knowledge into the causes of cancer. There has been more consistency about the most 
frequent causes of lung cancer and a myocardial infarction, both of which can be 
explained medically. 
Structured responsibility and blame measures typically encourage participants to 
make attributions for their condition to the self, others, the environment and chance 
factors. Attributions to chance factors have been found to be the most common 
response in injured (Bulman and Wortman, 1977; Heineman, Bulka and Smetak, 
1988; Kiecolt-Glaser and Williams, 1987; Nielson and MacDonald, 1988), and illness 
samples (Gotay, 1985). Fewer attributions in these samples were made to the self and 
other people. Indeed, incidences of these attributions in injured samples have typically 
ranged from between 20-30%, and there have been some instances of no self-blame 
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attributions being made at all (Schulz and Decker, 1985), yet these are the most 
commonly investigated responsibility and blame attributions. 
There has been conflict about whether two types of self-blame, namely behavioural 
and characterological self-blame are made in equal amounts (Timko and Janoff-
Bulman, 1985), or if behavioural self-blame is made more often than 
characterological self-blame (Kiecolt-Glaser and Williams, 1987; Malcarne et al, 
1995; Sholomskas et al, 1990). Several different types of spontaneous self and other-
blame attributions have also been identified. Self-blame attributions include blaming 
past behaviours for illness, a misdeed, one's own negligence, punishment for 
wrongdoing, and a failure to preserve one's health (Abrams and Finesinger, 1953; 
Bard and Dyk, 1956; Moses and Cividali, 1966). Other-blame attributions include 
blaming for inheritance, a blow by a family member, overexertion in the care of a sick 
relative, doctor negligence, and emotional tension created by others (Abrams and 
Finesinger, 1953; Bard and Dyk, 1956; Church and Vincent, 1996; Moses and 
Cividali, 1966). 
The context in which the onset of pain/illness/injury occurs will determine whether or 
not self or other-blame attributions are made. If no one else was involved in an 
accident in which an individual was injured, then self-blame attributions for the 
accident will be more likely to be made (Bulman and Wortman, 1977). If someone 
else was involved, then blame for the accident is more likely to be attributed to this 
other person (Bulman and Wortman, 1977). Tennen and Affleck (1990) contributed to 
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this by proposing that when the person present is in a position of authority, when 
he/she is not well-known, and when the outcome is severe, blame is more likely to be 
attributed to him/her. They did however, state that another person need not be present 
in order to be blamed for something. For example, doctors can be blamed for acts of 
negligence, even when they were not present at the time of the injury onset. Thus, 
when an authority figure is involved in a negative event, whether present or not, the 
probability of other-blame increases. Subsequent research has supported this idea 
(Church and Vincent, 1996; DeGood and Kiernan, 1996). For example, Church and 
Vincent (1996) investigated the blame attributions of chronic pain sufferers who had 
been injured as a result of a variety of different medical accidents, and found 86% of 
them blamed their doctor for their conditions, specifically the consultant or surgeon 
whose care the patient was under. Similar attributions have been made in other 
chronic pain samples (Eccleston, Williams and Stainton-Rogers, 1997). 
2.2.3.8 Changes in Attributions Over Time 
There is a scarcity of literature investigating cause, responsibility and blame 
attributions longitudinally in chronic pain/illness/injury samples. Skevington (1993) 
investigated causal attributions for rheumatoid arthritis from its initial onset, up to two 
years later, and found differences in the attributions made over time. Stable 
attributions (the belief that the pain would go away) tended to be made more often 
around the onset of rheumatoid arthritis. Global attributions (that the symptoms of the 
condition affect every area of the sufferers' lives) tended to be made more often the 
further the length of time since diagnosis. Given the lack of longitudinal 
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investigations, support for the changing nature of causal attributions in chronically ill 
samples comes from cross-sectional studies. These have shown that attributions may 
be made at some time in the illness experience and not others. Lowery et al (1993) 
found breast cancer sufferers who made a causal attribution for their cancer to be 
around 11 months past diagnosis of the cancer, while those who did not have a cause 
were around 17 months past their diagnosis. From this, the authors proposed that the 
intensity of the situation around the onset of the cancer might have prompted a causal 
search in order to understand the situation. The need for this may have subsided with 
the intensity of the situation over time. This suggests that making attributions may 
vary over time depending on their importance at different stages of a 
pain/illness/injury situation. 
Cross-sectional studies have also indicated that the nature of the attributions may 
change over time. Lavery and Clarke (1996) found their breast cancer sufferers made 
controllable attributions (i.e. attributions which allowed them to feel in control of their 
cancer) around the onset of their cancer. However, the longer the length oftime since 
diagnosis, the more uncontrollable attributions (i.e. attributions which did not allow 
them to feel in control of their cancer) were made. These results have been replicated 
elsewhere (Gotay, 1985). However, the latter findings should be interpreted with 
caution given that the controllability of the attributions in this study were inferred by 
the researcher, and may be at odds with the cancer sufferers' own interpretations of 
the controllability of their attributions. Berckman and Austin (1993) found in their 
sample of lung cancer sufferers that the longer the length of time since diagnosis, the 
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less likely causal attributions were to be made to external factors such as air pollution. 
To the extent that external factors are seen to be uncontrollable, this finding 
contradicts those of Lavery and Clarke (1996) and Gotay (1985). However, it has 
been proposed that external attributions are not necessarily uncontrollable. They may 
reflect the process of secondary control, where for example they can be reinterpreted 
in a positive way in order to allow an individual to accept his/her situation, and 
maintain a form of control over it (Rothbaum et al, 1982). This interpretation supports 
the idea that causal attributions are likely to be made to uncontrollable factors over 
time. 
These results suggest that causal attributions may change over time in chronically ill 
samples. However, the causal attributions of acutely ill patients have remained 
unchanged a couple of months after a myocardial infarction (Mumma and McCorkle, 
1982-83; Rudy, 1980), one year later (Affleck et al, 1987b; Croog and Richards, 
1977; Gudmunsdottir et al, 2001), and eight years later (Affleck et al, 1987c). There 
are three explanations for this. Firstly, this lack of change in attributions over time 
may reflect an attributional style (Affleck et al 1987b ). Secondly, it may be that over 
time making causal attributions becomes less important, leading to the same 
attributions being given over time (Mumma and McCorkle, 1982-83). Thirdly, the 
structured nature of some measures may lead people to select the same causal 
responses over time. 
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Although the heart attack patients did not change the nature of their attributions, some 
made fewer attributions over time (Gudmunsdottir et al, 2001). One explanation for 
this is that with time they became more knowledgeable about the causes of a 
myocardial infarction, and so formed fewer, more specific attributions over time 
(Gudmunsdottir et al, 2001). 
The available literature on the changing nature of responsibility and blame 
attributions suggests attributions to the self might change over time, up to one year 
after the onset of a spinal cord injury. Reidy and Caplan (1994) found 89% of their 
spinal-injured sample changed their blame attributions, with an increase in self-blame 
attributions and a decrease in other-blame attributions over an 18-24 month period. 
Richards, Elliot, Shewchuk and Fine (1997) contradicted this. They found half of their 
spinal-injured sample who attributed responsibility to themselves for their injury onset 
no longer made these attributions to themselves a year later. The authors suggested 
attributions might change because perhaps new information is learned over time about 
the circumstances of the injury that leads to changes in attributions. Regardless of the 
nature of the findings, the results from both studies suggest that responsibility and 
blame attributions may change over time. 
2.2.3.9 Limitations of Attribution Research 
Four main criticisms can be made of attribution research in pain/illness/injury 
samples. Firstly, there is a lack of real-life research investigating empirical 
distinctions between cause, responsibility and blame (see section 2.2.3.4). This limits 
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what can be learned about whether or not the concepts are distinguished from each 
other, and thus if it is important to examine all three concepts independently in 
pain/illness/injury situation. The implications of this also relate to the second criticism 
of attribution research. That is, despite having been theoretically distinguished from 
each other (see section 2.2.3.3), researchers often use the concepts cause, 
responsibility and blame interchangeably. Firstly, in the measurement of attributions, 
and secondly, in the interpretation of attribution results. 
Both points are demonstrated in research conducted by Taylor et al (1984), who 
investigated the attribution/adjustment relationship in a sample of women with breast 
cancer. To address the first point, there was conceptual confusion in two of the 
attribution measures used in this study. Firstly, responsibility was measured through 
asking participants to assign a percentage of responsibility for their breast cancer to at 
least one of four factors: the self, others, the environment and chance. This was 
described as a replication of a measure used elsewhere (Bulman and Wortman, 1977). 
However, Bulman and Wortman (1977) used the same measure to investigate blame 
attributions. Thus, Taylor et al (1984) confused responsibility with blame. Secondly, 
responsibility was confused with cause where participants were asked to provide 
ratings of the "causal responsibility'' of various factors in contributing to their cancer. 
To address the second point, the outcomes of these measures were interpreted as 
blame attributions. 
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One of the main problems with using the concepts interchangeably is that each has 
been found to be independently associated with adjustment to a negative situation. 
Thus, their interchangeable use creates problems in interpreting the nature of any 
attribution/adjustment associations found in studies. More research making empirical 
distinctions between all three concepts may reduce their interchangeable use in 
research. 
The third criticism involves attribution measures. Specifically, the structured nature of 
the responsibility and blame measures often used in pain/illness/injury samples do not 
allow for participants to refrain from making attributions, and limits them in the types 
of attributions they can make. This makes it impossible to determine the extent to 
which these samples would make attributions when given the opportunity not to do so 
(see section 2.2.3.5). Associated with this, the nature of any freely made responsibility 
and blame attributions cannot be determined, since structured measures are largely 
concerned with investigating attributions made to the self and others (see section 
2.2.3.7). 
The final criticism is that there is a lack of longitudinal research examining the extent 
to which cause, responsibility and blame attributions change over time (see section 
2.2.3.8). The limited available literature on this suggests they do change in chronically 
ill/injured patients, and the results of cross-sectional analyses supports this. However, 
contradictory evidence from acutely ill patients suggests attributions do not change 
over time. Thus, the scarcity and contradictory nature of this evidence limits what can 
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be learned about the changing nature of the attributions in pain/illness/injury samples. 
The importance of investigating the changing nature of attributions for 
pain/illness/injury situations comes from the fact that these situations can last a long 
time, and as such beliefs about them may be expected to change over the course of the 
experience. 
In summary, the present section discussed empirical literature on the extent to which 
attributions are made, the nature of them, and whether or not they change over the 
pain/illness/injury experience. The theoretical origins of cause, responsibility and 
blame were also outlined, and conceptual and empirical distinctions between them 
considered. Reasons why attributions may be made were examined. These included 
several motives for making them. One common motive across cause, responsibility 
and blame involved maintaining the belief in a just world. 
2.2.4 Just World Beliefs 
2.2.4.1 Introduction 
Section 2.2.2 noted that the belief that life should be free of pain may exacerbate the 
suffering associated with chronic pain (DeGood and Tait, 2001). This section will 
explore this idea in relation to the available research on the interactions between just 
world beliefs and adjustment to pain/illness/injury. Before this, however, 
consideration will be given to definitions and types of just world beliefs, 
circumstances under which they may be threatened and maintained, and their 
measurement. 
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2.2.4.2 Defining Just World Beliefs 
Individuals may react positively as well as negatively towards negative situations. 
Positive reactions include the maintenance of the belief in a just world. This is based 
on the just world hypothesis, which states that individuals have a need to maintain the 
belief that they live in a world where people get what they deserve and deserve what 
they get (Lerner, 1970; Lerner, 1980; Lerner and Miller, 1978). Associated with this 
is the idea that good things happen to good people, and bad things happen to bad 
people (Lerner, 1970). These beliefs serve an important adaptive function in that they 
allow individuals to view their environments as stable and orderly (Lerner and Miller, 
1978), creating a predictable and manageable world (Lerner, 1980). This creates a 
sense of security that everything is as it should be (Lerner, 1970). 
There has been some concern about whether the belief in a just world is a childhood 
fairytale, where the "goodies" win and the "baddies" lose in the end, or a fundamental 
delusion. The title of Lerner's (1980) book is, "The Belief in a Just World: A 
Fundamental Delusion". The belief is "fundamental", in that it is essential for security 
and sanity; it is a "delusion" in that it is a set of factually false beliefs (Lerner, 1998). 
However, although not accurate, illusions are adaptive in that they may protect 
individuals from the initial and intennediate stages of threat while they come to tenns 
with their new situation {Taylor, 1983). They have also been found to have a positive 
impact on mental health through promoting happiness, the ability to care for others 
and the capacity for creative, productive work (Taylor and Brown, 1988). Illusions 
can be maintained in the face of contradictory evidence through alternative 
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explanations that might maintain the illusion (Taylor, 1983). The belief in a just world 
is believed to be more of a fundamental delusion than a fairytale, given the complex 
dynamics involved in people protecting their just world beliefs (Furnham, 2003). 
People may be motivated to protect and maintain their just world beliefs because of 
the important adaptive function they serve (Lerner and Miller, 1978). Societal rules 
and laws by which an individual abides dictate his/her just world beliefs (Lerner, 
1998). This suggests that an individual may only be concerned that justice is 
maintained in his/her society, not in other societies. Indeed, Dalbert (1998) reported 
that individuals tend to believe more strongly in a personal world than a general 
world. People may also hold their own personal ideas of justice that may be 
emotionally biased (Lerner, 1998). Regardless of the motives behind just world 
beliefs, an individual may be greatly distressed if he/she comes up against evidence 
suggesting that the world is not just at all (Lerner and Miller, 1978). 
2.2.4.3 Circumstances Under Which Just World Beliefs May be Threatened 
Just world beliefs may be threatened in the presence of unjust suffering, although the 
extent of this threat is dependent on the strength and intensity of the belief (Lerner, 
1980). Most of the just world literature is concerned with an individual's just world 
beliefs being threatened when witnessing the unjust suffering of another individual in 
a variety of situations. Just world beliefs and reactions to one's own injustice is a 
relatively new area of research (Hafer and Olson, 1998). The available literature on 
this typically refers to those who are suffering as 'victims'. However, an individual is 
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only a victim to the extent that he/she perceives him/herself in this way. Montada 
(1991) proposed that whether or not a person will feel victimised by suffering 
depends on whether or not his/her perceived entitlements are met. These entitlements 
may be based on societal and legal rules of justice. Any instances where they are 
threatened, for example by the onset of illness, where there may be a loss of status, 
health, security and self-esteem, may lead an individual to feel victimised by the 
illness. In the present study the maintenance of just world beliefs in the face of one's 
own suffering (i.e. pain) will be considered. 
2.2.4.4 Ways in Which Just World Beliefs Can be Maintained 
When an individual has suffered an injustice, his/her just world beliefs may be 
maintained using several means. Lerner (1998) proposed one common way in which 
this may happen. He stated that adults do recognise instances where innocent people 
suffer and bad people win, but rather than giving up their just world beliefs, they 
develop various ways of neutralising the anger and anxiety resulting from this. The 
easiest way to do this is through 'normalising' the event for example, 'shit happens'. 
The idea being that if something 'bad' happens to someone through no fault of their 
own, the person can take comfort from the fact that these things eventually happen to 
everyone, and so he/she is not being unjustly singled out for victimisation. The person 
will be able to say that he/she is only getting a fair share of what everyone 
experiences. Thus, if an unpleasant occurrence is 'normal' in society, there is no 
injustice. 
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Taylor, Wood and Lichtman (1983) identified four different strategies that can be 
used to reduce feelings of injustice in the face of a variety of forms of victimisation, 
including crime, natural disaster and illness. These strategies may help an individual 
maintain his/her just world beliefs. Firstly, downward social comparisons can be 
made with less fortunate others experiencing a similar type of injustice, to allow an 
individual to feel fortunate in relation to others who are worse-off. Secondly, the 
individual may imagine that the situation could be worse, again viewing him/herself 
in a fortunate position. Thirdly, some benefits or meaning may be found in the 
harmful event. Finally, people may selectively focus on attributes that make them 
appear advantaged in the situation. 
As indicated in section 2.2.3.5, attributions can also be made as a way of maintaining 
just world beliefs. Self-blame attributions can be made to reduce feelings of injustice 
in various situations, including illness (Montada, 1991 ), since in making these 
attributions it is possible to avoid feelings of injustice because no external agents 
inflicted harm, only the individual him/herself. Attributions made to one's behaviour 
(behavioural self-blame) may allow an individual to feel in control of the injustice 
with the knowledge that future injustices can be avoided by ceasing to carry out the 
behaviour that originally led to the injustice. Events will only be perceived as unjust 
when a person or institution is held responsible and liable to blame (Montada, 1992). 
In such circumstances, the suffering person's need for justice can be satisfied by 
having his/her entitlements acknowledged, being compensated in a court of law, or 
receiving an apology by the wrongdoer. 
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Causal attributions can also be made as a means of maintaining just world beliefs, 
because they provide explanations for an unfair situation, thereby reducing the 
distress associated with it (Kidd and Utne 1978; Utne and K.idd, 1980). Making causal 
attributions leads to a reduction in distress because they provide information about the 
intentions and abilities of the person creating the injustice and it is this information 
which reduces distress. Three types of information are provided. Firstly, it is 
determined whether the causes of the injustice were internal (to the individual), or 
external ( outwith the individual). More distress will be created by external attributions 
as this suggests an intention to produce the injustice. Secondly, it is determined 
whether the cause of the injustice was stable or unstable. An injustice that has a 
greater likelihood of recurring (unstable) will create more distress than an injustice 
that occurs only once or twice (stable). Thirdly, it is determined if the cause was 
controllable or uncontrollable. This type of explanation interacts with the others, in 
that for example internal attributions are perceived as being more controllable than 
external attributions. 
Lupfer, Doan and Houston (1998) have provided empirical support for the benefits of 
making causal attributions. They found high just world believers who gave a causal 
explanation of an unfair outcome to be less distressed than high just world believers 
who were not given the opportunity to provide a cause of an unfair outcome. Giving a 
cause was a way of justifying the unfair outcome for high just world believers. Those 
high just world believers who were not given the opportunity to provide a cause of the 
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unfair outcome were more distressed because they could give no explanation to justify 
it, and as a result their just world beliefs were threatened. 
2.2.4.5 The Measurement of Just World Beliefs 
The introduction of scales to measure just world beliefs signalled a shift in research 
from inferring justice beliefs in experimental situations (Lerner and Miller, 1978), to 
measuring just world beliefs in real-life situations (Furnham and Procter, 1989). 
Rubin and Peplau (1973; 1975) developed a unidimensional Just World Scale to 
measure, "an attitudinal continuum extending between two poles of total acceptance 
and total rejection of the notion that the world is a just place" (Rubin and Peplau, 
1975, p.66). This scale measures general just world beliefs. The original scale 
consisted of 19 statements corresponding to the belief in a just world, and belief in an 
unjust world. These statements originated from a factor analysis of data collected 
from 66 Boston university undergraduates. 
Subsequent factor analysis of the scale items based on the responses of participants 
from a study of the national draft lottery (Rubin and Peplau, 1973) reduced the scale 
to 16 items. Nine of these items were worded in a positive direction. The extent of 
agreement with these items on a six-point continuum reflected some belief that the 
world is a just place. Seven of the items were worded in a negative direction, and 
agreement with these reflected a belief that the world is unjust. Subsequent research 
disagreed with this latter interpretation. Furnham (1985) viewed this score as 
reflecting low just world beliefs, instead of a belief in an unjust world. Additionally, 
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scores on the midpoint of the whole scale have been taken to reflect a belief in a 
random world, although problems with this has made it difficult to determine 
(Furnham, 1998). 
The Rubin and Peplau (1973) scale has been found to be internally consistent 
(coefficient alpha= 0.79). Subsequent research using 180 undergraduate students to 
clarify the construct of a belief in a just world led to a 20-item revised version of the 
scale (Rubin and Peplau, 1975). This measures justice beliefs in a variety of domains 
incorporating health, family, school, politics and criminal justice. Thirteen of the 
original16 items were included in the scale, in addition to seven new items. Eleven of 
the 20 scale statements measure just world beliefs, while the remaining nine items 
measure unjust world beliefs. All 20 items are randomly presented in the scale. Level 
of agreement with each of the 20 items is indicated on a six-point continuum, from 
strongly agree (6) to strongly disagree (1). To score the scale, the 11 just world items 
are scored positively and added together, while the nine unjust world items are scored 
negatively and added together. Both scores are then summed to provide a total belief 
in a just world score out of 120, with higher scores indicating stronger just world 
beliefs. Coefficient alpha for the revised scale is similar to the original scale 
(coefficient alpha = 0.80), and it correlates highly with the original scale (0.93). 
Subsequent reliability estimates have varied between 0.53 - 0.81 (Furnham, 1998), 
providing varied levels of support for the scale reliability. 
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Three main criticisms have been made ofthe scale. Firstly, a large amount of research 
has been concerned with testing the psychometric properties of the scale, which have 
been unimpressive. For example, there is little evidence for the test-retest reliability of 
the scale, and validity studies have largely concentrated on concurrent rather than 
construct or predictive validity (Fumham, 1998). It could be argued, however, that the 
face, concurrent and predictive validity of the scale are satisfactory, because the scale 
has been found to correlate significantly and predictably with many other self-report 
measures (to be discussed in section 2.2.4.6). Additionally, various experimental 
studies using just world belief scores as independent variables have usually found 
them to be predictably related to specific behaviour (Furnham, 1998). 
Secondly, while some factor-analytic studies have supported the unidimensionality of 
the scale (Ahmed and Stewart, 1985), other studies have found the scale to be 
multidimensional (Ambrosio and Sheehan, 1990; Caputi, 1994; Hyland and Dann, 
1987; Lea and Fekken, 1993; Whatley, 1993). Indeed, the belief in a just world and 
the belief in an unjust world have been viewed as tapping into different belief 
systems, and have been found to have separate correlates (Connors and Heaven, 1987; 
Furnham, 1998; Furnham and Gunter, 1984; Heaven and Connors, 1988). They have 
also been found to load on separate factors, in factor analysis (Couch, 1998). Furnham 
and Procter (1989) believed the scale to be multidimensional because it is possible to 
hold just world beliefs about some domains in the scale and not others. This not only 
fails to replicate the unidimensionality of the scale, but also fails to support just world 
theory, the basis ofwhich is that the beliefin a just world is a single construct. 
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Thirdly, Lerner (1980) criticised the scale on the grounds that it taps a very narve 
view of social reality. He stated that the items in the scale may not be applicable to 
everyone, and responses may not reflect just world beliefs so much as the 
socialisation processes of the individual in his/her society. 
It has been suggested that the scale should be used as an index of different styles 
people use to maintain their just world beliefs (Furnham and Procter, 1989). This 
suggests that the belief in a just world is an attributional style which is activated when 
faced with events in which issues of justice are salient (Lupfer et al, 1998). However, 
the extent of a person's just world beliefs may vary depending on various factors, 
such as the type of day the person has had. 
Given the shortcomings of the Rubin and Peplau (1973; 1975) scale, other just world 
scales have been developed. Lipkus (1991) developed a Global Belief in a Just World 
Scale that was found to be unidimensional. Subsequent research has supported the 
unidimensionality of the scale (O'Connor, Morrison and Morrison, 1996). A number 
of countries have also produced their own multidimensional just world measures in 
recent years (see Furnham, 2003 for a view of this literature). Additionally, measures 
of specific spheres of justice, rather the global justice beliefs have been introduced 
(Furnham and Procter, 1992; Paulus, 1983). For example, Maes (1998) identified two 
main types of just world beliefs. The first is a belief in 'immanent justice', which 
holds that present suffering is punishment for past deeds, and a second belief in 
'ultimate justice'; the notion that consolation for a present injustice on earth is 
63 
provided through the promise of a higher justice, perhaps in another world. This latter 
type ofbeliefmaybe evident in highly religious people. Although both types ofbelief 
allow an individual to cope with injustice, the belief in ultimate justice may be more 
adaptive since it allows an individual to adapt easily to a present injustice with the 
thought that a solution to the injustice will be provided in the future. In support of 
this, highly religious people have been found to view more justice than injustice in 
everyday life-events (Pepitone and L' Armand, 1996), than people with low religious 
beliefs. The belief in immanent justice may lead to rumination that present suffering is 
a punishment for past deeds, and thus poor adaptation (Maes, 1998). Maes developed 
a scale to measure immanent and ultimate justice beliefs, and found both to be 
internally reliable and correlate with the full belief in a just world. 
Despite the development of new just world beliefs measures, the Rubin and Peplau 
(1973; 1975) scale has been used for over 20 years to measure just world beliefs 
(Furnham, 1998). Indeed, despite its shortcomings the scale opened up a new area of 
research for just world theory. It provided a measure that could be used to provide 
direct links between the way people react to events in their environment, and their just 
world beliefs. Moreover, with its widespread use the scale has been found to be 
remarkably robust (Furnham, 1998; Furnham and Procter, 1989). The scale has been 
used in varied research areas including juror behaviour, general attitudes towards 
justice, accidents, misfortunes, and fate. The samples in these studies have largely 
consisted of North American students. These studies have found the belief in a just 
world to correlate with many factors including the protestant work ethic, 
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conservatism, social attitudes towards the poor, locus of control, personality, 
authoritarianism, and trust (Furnham and Procter, 1989; Rubin and Peplau, 1975). 
Correlates of the belief in a just world have also been found in research on those who 
are suffering. This will now be considered. 
2.2.4. 6 Correlates of Just World Beliefs in Situations of Personal Suffering 
Correlates of the Rubin and Peplau (1973; 1975) scale have been found among those 
who are suffering in both experimental and real-life situations. Many experimental 
correlates of the belief in a just world have been found, and so only an example of 
these will be given here. This research has been concerned with differences between 
those with different strengths of just world beliefs. High just world beliefs have been 
associated with positive outcomes such as less stress (Lipkus, Dalbert and Siegler, 
1996; Tomaka and Blascovich, 1994), less depression (Lipkus et al, 1996), and 
greater well-being and life satisfaction (Lipkus et al, 1996), than those with weaker 
just world beliefs. Those with high just world beliefs have also been found to view 
their injustice as more 'fair' than those with weaker just world beliefs (Hafer and 
Olson, 1989; 1998). There are also many correlates of the belief in a just world in 
various real-life suffering situations. For example, in unemployment situations a high 
belief in a just world has been associated with low depression scores (Benson and 
Ritter, 1990; Ritter, Benson and Snyder, 1990). 
High just world beliefs have not always been associated with adaptive outcomes. 
They have also been associated with such negative outcomes as disappointment and 
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anxiety to poor student grades (Hafer and Olson, 1998). However, most of the 
correlates reviewed suggest that high just world beliefs are adaptive in the face of 
personal suffering. Dalbert (1998) proposed that just world beliefs might be functional 
because they help a person deal with daily life struggles, through reducing the 
possibility of depression and other stress-induced illnesses. 
2.2.4. 7 Limitation of Just World Research 
There has been a scarcity of literature investigating the just world beliefs of those 
suffering from real-life pain and related illness/injury conditions. Only three articles 
have been found to do this, in spinal-injured (Bulman and Wortman, 1977; 
Heinemann et al, 1988), and burns patients (Kiecolt-Glaser and Williams, 1987). In 
these samples just world beliefs were correlated with happiness (Bulman and 
Wortman, 1977), and self-blame (K.iecolt-Glaser and Williams, 1987). 
This lack of research is surprising because the physical, social, economic and 
psychological impacts of pain on an individual are likely to be perceived as unfair and 
challenge the extent to which he/she believes the world to be a fair and just place. 
Additionally, if one believes that life should be free of pain, the experience of pain is 
likely to exacerbate the suffering associated with it. Both points suggest that a 
person's just world beliefs may be influenced by pain. 
Given that the experience of pain may be expected to influence a person's just world 
beliefs, it is important to measures these beliefs in pain sufferers because they may 
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influence how a person adjusts to his/her pain. Just world beliefs have been associated 
with psychological adjustment to a temporary negative personal situation, such as the 
loss of a job (Benson and Ritter, 1990; Ritter et al, 1990). This being the case, it 
would be expected that they would also be associated with longer-term negative 
personal situations, such as pain/illness/injury. 
2.2.5 Adjustment 
2.2.5.1 Introduction 
In their review of the chronic pain literature, Jensen et al (1991) noted that some 
chronic pain sufferers seem to adapt to their pain situation better than others. From 
this they proposed a need to identify factors leading to good adjustment. Before this 
can be undertaken, adjustment needs to be defined. The present section will define 
adjustment, and identify ways in which it has been measured. The section will end 
with a consideration of the associations between pain beliefs and adjustment. 
2.2.5.2 Defining Adjustment 
Adjustment is a multidimensional concept that has been defined in several ways. 
Adjustment outcomes commonly identified across pain, illness and injury literature 
loosely fall under three main groupings: health, psychological, and functioning. The 
outcomes falling under health include general health (Lazarus and Folkman, 1984), 
self-reported pain severity, and various pain management strategies, including 
medication use and health services use (Jensen et al, 1991). The outcomes falling 
under psychological factors include issues associated with satisfaction in one's life, 
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morale (Lazarus and Folkman, 1984), and various emotional indicators. These involve 
both positive affect (Roesch and Weiner, 2001), and negative affect, such as 
depression, distress, anger, anxiety and hostility (Jensen et al, 1991; Roesch and 
Weiner, 2001). 
Both physical and social functioning outcomes have been identified in the literature. 
Physical outcomes include pain behaviour, mobility, and daily functioning, including 
living skills (domestic environment functioning), and work functioning (Bar-on, 
1987; Berckman and Austin, 1993; Jensen et al, 1991; Lowery et al, 1983). Social 
functioning outcomes have included both social functioning in general, and specific 
outcomes in terms of the way an individual fulfills his/her various roles in society, for 
example as a parent, job holder and community member (Lazarus and Folkman, 
1984). 
Despite the fact that adjustment is independent of coping (Jensen et al, 1991; Roesch 
and Weiner, 2001), one problem in defining adjustment is that it has been closely 
associated with coping, in the following ways. Firstly, it has been used 
interchangeably with coping (Silver and Wortman, 1980; Wortman, 1983). Secondly, 
adjustment has been taken as one meaning of coping (Michela and Wood, 1986), and 
thirdly, some coping measures are confounded by items that reflect adjustment 
constructs (Jensen et al, 1991). In support of this, PSYCHINFO database searches on 
adjustment and pain/illness tend to produce coping literature. 
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2.2.5.3 Measuring Adjustment 
Adjustment has been measured using both single and multiple adjustment outcomes. 
The use of multiple adjustment measures has been criticised. Firstly, combinations of 
unrelated adjustment components have been reported to be unreliable (Turnquist et al, 
1988). Secondly, the use of multiple adjustment measures may make it impossible to 
evaluate the overall adjustment of one person. This is because a response may be 
beneficial to one domain of adjustment, but detrimental to another. For example, a 
persons' optimistic outlook may lead him/her to be free of negative emotions, but 
neglect treatment regimes (Michela and Wood, 1986). 
Adjustment measures tend to be either self-report in nature or ratings by other people 
such as spouses and health professionals of their perceptions of patient adjustment. 
The ratings often take the form of Likert scales, which require participants to 
numerically score the intensity of their attitudes towards something. One criticism of 
the use of self-report measures is that they may be subject to bias. For this reason it 
has been suggested that observational measures of patient functioning should be used 
instead (Jensen, Turner, Romano and Lawler, 1994). However, Jensen, Romano, 
Turner, Good and Wald (1999) found patient beliefs to be associated more with self-
report than observational measures of adjustment. One other consideration is that 
reliance on self-report measures poses the risk that shared method variance may 
explain some of the associations found between measures (Jensen et al, 1999). For 
example, a strong relationship between beliefs about being disabled by pain, and 
physical disability adjustment measures may be attributable to the possibility that both 
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are tapping into the same dimension, rather than there being a real association 
between disability and the specific belief. 
In addition to addressing issues concerning the type and nature of adjustment 
measures, consideration has also been given to their timing. Turnquist et al (1988) 
stated that the timing of the assessment of adjustment needs to be considered, since 
longitudinal studies of illness and injury indicate changes in domains of adjustment 
over time. For example, at diagnosis issues of emotional adjustment are strongest, 
while issues of physical activity and occupational functioning may become more 
important during recovery. 
2.2.5.4 The Pain Belief/Adjustment Relationship 
Negative pain beliefs have been found to be associated with poor adjustment to pain. 
For example, the belief in the permanency/constancy of pain has been associated with 
poor psychological adjustment (Herda, Siegens and Basler, 1994; Williams et al, 
1994), and greater pain intensity (Williams and Thorn, 1989). Similar negative 
adjustment outcomes have been found for the belief in pain as being something 
mysterious. In addition, the belief in oneself as disabled has been found to be 
associated with poor physical and psychological functioning (Jensen and Karoly, 
1992; Jensen, Turner and Romano, 1994), while the belief that pain signals harm and 
is organic in origin has been associated with poor physical functioning (Jensen et al, 
1999; Walsh and Radcliffe, 2002). Positive pain beliefs have been found to be 
associated with good adjustment. Jensen and Karoly (1991) found that the more that 
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chronic pain sufferers felt in control of their pain, the better psychologically-adjusted 
they were to their condition. 
Pain severity has been found to mediate the pain belief/adjustment relationship. 
Jensen and Karoly (1991) found perceived pain controllability to be strongly 
associated with activity level for those reporting low levels of pain severity. 
Additionally, Jensen and Karoly (1992) found the belief in oneself as disabled to be 
associated with low activity level only for those reporting low or medium levels of 
pain severity. These results suggest that pain beliefs are more strongly related to 
adjustment for patients reporting relatively low levels of pain. They should, however 
be interpreted with caution given that subsequent research has failed to replicate them 
(Jensen et al, 1999). 
2.2.6 Summary 
The second section of the chapter described the background and theoretical origins of 
attributions, just world beliefs and adjustment to pain/illness/injury. Three types of 
attributions were identified: cause, responsibility and blame. Conceptual and 
empirical distinctions between them were discussed, along with reasons for making 
them, in terms of their measurement and motives. Few studies have measured 
spontaneous attributions, making it impossible to determine the extent to which 
attributions are freely made. Some idea of this was taken from research using 
unstructured measures, suggesting that causal attributions for the onset of 
pain/illness/injury are made by between 69 - 95% of people suffering from these 
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conditions. These are disease-specific. However, the nature of and extent to which 
responsibility and blame attributions are made are more difficult to determine due to 
discussed limitations of attribution research. Limitations in research examining the 
extent to which cause, responsibility and blame attributions change over the course of 
a pain/illness/injury experience was also considered. 
Different types of just world beliefs were identified, and circumstances under which 
they may be threatened in situations of personal suffering examined. These include 
that the possible loss of health, status, security and self-esteem as a result of illness 
may leave an individual feeling victimised by the illness, challenging the extent to 
which he/she feels the world is a just place. Various ways in which just world beliefs 
may be maintained when faced with the unfairness of personal suffering were 
outlined. Additionally, an overview of the Rubin and Peplau (1973; 1975) Just World 
Scale was provided, and criticisms of the scale reported. Correlates of the scale in 
both experimental and real-life situations of personal suffering were briefed. This 
suggested that high just world beliefs might be adaptive in the face of personal 
suffering. The section ended with an overview of the limitations of just world 
research. 
The final part of the second section described adjustment. This was defined in terms 
of three outcomes: health, psychological and functioning. Ways in which adjustment 
has been measured and problems associated with this were discussed. The section 
ended with an investigation of associations between pain beliefs and adjustment. This 
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indicated that positive pain beliefs are associated with good adjustment to pain, while 
negative pain beliefs are associated with poor adjustment to pain. 
2.3 THE ATTRIBUTION/ADJUSTMENT RELATIONSHIP IN PAIN/ 
ILLNESS/INJURY 
2.3.1 Introduction 
In addition to just world and pain beliefs, attributions also have implications for 
adjustment to the pain experience. The third and final section of the chapter will 
review research on associations between cause, responsibility and blame attributions, 
and adjustment to pain/illness/injury, in five sections. The first two sections will deal 
with associations between adjustment outcomes and causal attributions, followed by 
responsibility and blame attributions. The third section will outline individual 
differences in attributions and adjustment, and the fourth section will critique this 
research. This will be followed by a conclusive summary ofthe attribution/adjustment 
relationship. 
2.3.2 The Causal Attribution/Adjustment Relationship 
2.3.2.1 Introduction 
The causal attribution/adjustment relationship will be considered in two sections: 
chronically-ill samples, and acutely-ill samples, before an overall summary of this 
relationship is provided. 
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2.3.2.2 Chronically Ill Samples 
Lowery et al (1983) examined the causal attribution/adjustment relationship in a 
sample of 55 male rheumatoid arthritis sufferers recruited from the arthritis clinic of a 
medical centre on average 12 years after the arthritis onset. The mean age of the 
sample was 58 years. Causal attributions were measured through asking participants if 
they had ever considered the question, "Why me?" in relation to their situation. 
Adjustment was measured using both psychological and physical functioning 
outcomes. Three main findings were reported. Firstly, those who did not make a 
causal attribution for their arthritis were more poorly psychologically adjusted in 
terms of being more anxious, depressed and hostile, than those who did. However, 
other research using a similar method and illness duration reported no differences in 
the psychological adjustment ofboth groups (Lowery et a11987). This difference can 
be attributed to the fact that Lowery et al (1987) distinguished the use of"Why me?'' 
from making causal attributions at the time of the interview, while Lowery et al 
(1983) did not do this. This distinction is important because both have been 
independently associated with adjustment. Causal attributions have consistently held 
mixed associations with adjustment, while previously considering "Why me?" has 
been consistently associated with poor adjustment (Affleck et al, 1987a; Lowery et al, 
1987; Lowery et al, 1993). 
Secondly, Lowery et al (1983) found some attributions were better associated with 
adjustment than others. Specifically, those who made attributions to the environment 
or personal habits scored lowest on measures of anxiety, depression and hostility. 
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Those who cited hereditary factors and fate as causes of their arthritis scored higher 
on these measures. This suggests some attributions lead to better adjustment than 
others. However, other research has found no attribution/adjustment relationship in 
rheumatoid arthritis patients (Affleck et al, 1987a). This conflict may be a reflection 
of two variations in method between studies. Firstly, there were sample differences in 
that the 92 rheumatoid arthritis sufferers in Affleck et al (1987a) were slightly 
younger (mean = 50.4 years) with a slightly shorter illness duration (mean = 9.91 
years), than the Lowery et al (1983) sample. Additionally, they were largely female, 
compared to the male sample in the Lowery et al (1983) study. Secondly, different 
adjustment measures and methods of administration were used in both studies. In the 
Affleck et al (1987a) study health care professionals rated the psychological 
adjustment of their patients, while in Lowery et al (1983) participants rated their own 
psychological adjustment. Both studies have in common a third finding of Lowery et 
al (1983), that attributions were unrelated to daily functioning and living skills. 
Affleck et al (1987a) suggested an alternative explanation for these contradictory 
results. They found that although causal attributions were unrelated to psychological 
and physical adjustment in their rheumatoid arthritis sample, attributions for symptom 
flares and remissions were related to both types of adjustment. From this the authors 
proposed that causal attributions for patterns of disease severity might play a greater 
role in adaptation to rheumatoid arthritis than causal attributions for the condition 
itself. 
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The latter of these explanations for the contradictory findings seems more plausible 
when considering that consistent causal attribution/adjustment results have been 
found in breast cancer sufferers, despite both methodological differences and 
similarities in the studies investigated. Similarities include that all breast cancer 
sufferers were recruited from specialised cancer treatment centres, and were of a 
similar age (mean = 53-56 years) (Lavery and Clarke, 1996; Lowery et al, 1993; 
Taylor et al, 1984). Three main differences have been identified. Firstly, various types 
of attribution and psychosocial adjustment measures were used in the studies. These 
were administered in different ways, using both interview (Lowery et al, 1993; Taylor 
et al, 1984), and mailed questionnaire formats (Lavery and Clarke, 1996). Secondly, 
varied ranges of illness durations have been adopted across studies, ranging from 13.9 
months (Lowery et al, 1993) to 25.5 months (Taylor et al, 1984) and 9.1 years 
(Lavery and Clarke, 1996). Thirdly, there have been large differences in the number 
of breast cancer sufferers comprising the samples of each study, ranging from 78 
participants (Taylor et al, 1984), to 195 participants (Lowery et al, 1993) and 394 
participants (Lavery and Clarke, 1996). Despite this, the results of all studies 
indicated no differences in adjustment to cancer between those who made a causal 
attribution for their cancer and those who did not. Additionally, no particular 
attributions were associated with adjustment. These findings suggest causal 
attributions are not important for adjustment to breast cancer. 
Indeed, while there was little relationship between causal attributions and adjustment, 
Taylor et al (1984) found various types of control to be positively associated with 
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adjustment. Additionally, Lowery et al (1993) found a negative association between 
control and adjustment, such that feelings of a loss of control since the breast cancer 
diagnosis were associated with poor psychological adjustment. The fact that control 
rather than causal attributions was associated with adjustment may be explained by 
the nature of the condition. For pennanent conditions such as spinal cord injuries 
where there is no threat of a recurrence of the injury, making a causal attribution may 
allow an individual to take meaning from and control of the uncontrollable situation, 
and this may be associated with good adjustment. However, for conditions such as 
breast cancer, which can recur, giving a causal attribution may not help adjustment to 
the situation. Instead, taking control over the cancer in order to avoid a recurrence 
may be more adaptive (Taylor et al, 1984). 
A causal attribution/adjustment association has been found in lung cancer patients. 
Berckman and Austin (1993) investigated this relationship in their sample of 61 
largely male lung cancer sufferers with a mean age of 60 years, and illness duration of 
19.8 years, recruited from private general practices and hospital radiation and 
chemotherapy departments. Causal attributions were measured using both structured 
and unstructured measures. A psychosocial measure was used to measure adjustment 
in terms of health, psychological and functioning outcomes. 
The main outcome of this study was that those cancer sufferers who gave both 
internal attributions such as smoking, and external attributions such as air pollution 
for their lung cancer experienced poor psychosocial adjustment to their lung cancer in 
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relation to their domestic and social environments, and were psychologically 
distressed. Using a similar sample, Faller et al (1995) found psychosocial attributions 
such as inner anxieties, nervousness and insufficient ability to cope with stress and 
crises to be associated with higher emotional distress, less hope, and higher 
depression levels. Few positive causal attribution/adjustment associations were found. 
The fact that causal attributions were associated with adjustment in male lung cancer 
sufferers, but not female breast cancer sufferers indicates gender differences may be 
contributing to these results. However, negative association in the lung cancer sample, 
combined with the lack of a causal attribution/adjustment association in breast cancer 
sufferers suggests that causal attributions are not beneficial for adjustment to a cancer 
situation. Although control was found to be beneficial for adjustment to breast cancer 
(Lowery et al, 1993; Taylor et al, 1984), Berckman and Austin (1993) found 
perceived control over lung cancer to be unrelated to adjustment. This suggests other 
factors may be important for adjustment to lung cancer. 
The literature reviewed thus far suggests making causal attributions for the onset of 
both a life-threatening (cancer) and non life-threatening (rheumatoid arthritis) chronic 
illness is either not relevant or beneficial for adjustment to the illness. Instead, there 
are issues specific to the nature of the illness that may be better for current 
adjustment. In rheumatoid arthritis sufferers this is attributions for current symptoms, 
and in breast cancer sufferers this is taking current control of the cancer. Both indicate 
that rather than causal attributions for the onset of a negative situation which may 
have occurred months or even years earlier, current attributions may help adjustment 
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to the situation now. In order to explore this further, the causal attribution/adjustment 
relationship will be considered in acutely ill samples. This is because in acute illness 
situations (i.e. of a short duration) attributions and adjustment are investigated for the 
same time. In these samples it is recovery rather than adjustment outcomes which are 
investigated. However, they are similar to adjustment outcomes in terms of including 
health, psychological and functioning measures. 
2.3.2.3 Acutely Ill Samples 
Causal attributions have both short and long-term implications for recovery from 
acute illness. In the short-term, Lowery et al (1987) found in their sample of 83 
largely male first-time myocardial infarction sufferers recruited from hospital (mean 
age = 60 years), that those who gave a cause of their illness were more poorly 
adjusted to the situation than those who did not provide a cause. Specifically, they 
were more anxious, depressed and hostile, and were less optimistic about their 
perceptions of future recovery. Additionally, DuCette and Keane (1984) found some 
attributions to be better associated with adjustment than others in their sample of 90 
predominantly male acute surgical patients, with a mean age of 55 years. Those who 
attributed their illness to such things as heredity factors had better recoveries in terms 
of both general outcomes (such as ability to eat, sleep, absence of nausea), and 
activity outcomes (such as the ability to move). Those who attributed their illness to 
such things as bad habits made poorer recoveries in terms of general health outcomes. 
79 
Meana, Binik, K.halife and Cohen (1999) also found some attributions to be better 
associated with adjustment than others in their sample of I 00 dyspareunia sufferers 
recruited from the community. Those who attributed their condition to psychosocial 
causes including anxiety and relationship problems had poorer emotional adjustment 
and higher pain levels than those who gave physical attributions (such as lack of 
lubrication, unresolved vaginal infection), for their condition. 
Although these results indicate some causal attributions are maladaptive, they also 
suggest some are beneficial for recovery from acute illness. DeValle and Nonnan 
(1992) provided a good example of why this may be the case. They found an 
association between the causal attributions made by first-time myocardial infarction 
sufferers for their condition, and subsequent health-behaviour changes. For example, 
those who had reduced their alcohol intake since their myocardial infarction were 
likely to attribute their myocardial infarction to excessive alcohol intake, and 
attributions to smoking were associated with a reduction in smoking behaviour. Petrie 
and Weinman (1997) found similar associations in their myocardial infarction sample, 
although this has not always been the case. Croog and Richards (1977) found no 
association between attributions to smoking and subsequent smoking behaviour. 
Despite this, these results suggest an association between making attributions and 
immediate outcomes, such that as a result of making certain causal attributions health 
behaviours may change, with the effect of facilitating recovery and offsetting another 
myocardial infarction in the long-tenn. 
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Bar-on (1987) investigated long-tenn associations between causal attributions and 
recovery in a sample of 89 male first-time myocardial infarction sufferers, whose 
mean age was 49 years. All were interviewed three times: within 48 hours of hospital 
admission, 2 - 3 weeks later, before being released from hospital, and at a regular 
clinic check-up, 4- 6 months after the myocardial infarction. Causal attributions were 
measured using a structured measure where all participants had to select causes of 
their myocardial infarction from a list. Outcome measures consisted of a measure of 
return to work and functioning, including physical, sexual and workload functioning, 
compared with their pre-myocardial infarction functioning. In addition, a medical 
rehabilitation measure was used to examine each participant's health status. A factor 
analysis of the causal responses produced five main factors, two of which were 
classed as "Fate and Luck", taken to be external to the person and uncontrollable, and 
"Limits and Strengths", which were taken to be internal and controllable. The 
remaining three factors are not discussed in the current analysis. 
Neither factors were associated with the medical rehabilitation outcomes. However, 
both were correlated with the return to work and functioning measure. Those who 
made causal attributions to fate and luck at the end of hospitalisation returned to work 
to a lesser extent, and rated their functioning as significantly lower than patients who 
made attributions to limits and strengths. Similar outcomes of attributions to fate were 
reported in earlier work (Bar-on, 1983). At a follow-up one year later, the significant 
effect of attributions to fate and luck was maintained. The fact that attributions helped 
account for rehabilitation after a first myocardial infarction in the present study, led 
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Bar-on to suggest that early attribution choices may lead patients to plan different 
routes of, for example, behaviour change, to avoid the possibility of a future 
myocardial infarction. The results of DeValle and Nonnan (1992), and Petrie and 
Weinman (1997) support this. 
Affleck et al (1987c) investigated the power of causal attributions and perceiving 
benefits over a myocardial infarction in predicting a second attack eight years later. 
Two hundred and five participants were interviewed both at seven weeks and eight 
years after a myocardial infarction. All were male, largely in the 50 - 59 year age 
range, and were recruited from the hospitals in which they were being treated. Causal 
attributions were measured using a list of causes contributing to a heart attack. 
Various health status outcomes were used, and participants were asked about any 
benefits or gains that they had taken from their myocardial infarction. It was found 
that seven weeks after a first myocardial infarction, the tendency to attribute the attack 
to such factors as "stress" and ''worry'', and the failure to perceive any benefits was 
predictive of morbidity at eight years. Additionally, the failure to perceive any 
benefits from the experience, coupled with the tendency to make attributions to others 
for the myocardial infarction, were associated with a high incidence of re-infarction 
eight years later. 
Conflicting results have been reported in literature that found those who did perceive 
benefits of their myocardial infarction were more likely to suffer a second myocardial 
infarction eight years after a first attack (Low et al, 1993). Low et al (1993) also 
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identified certain attributions that were predictive of a second myocardial infarction, 
where 50% of those who attributed their attack to their marriage/spouse suffered a 
second heart attack. This result was explained in terms of the fact that the attributions 
may have led to feelings of victimisation, resulting in a poor prognosis. One 
explanation for the contradictory findings between Low et al (1993) and Affleck et al 
(1987c) involves differences in the samples and attribution measures used in both 
studies. The sample in the Low et al (1993) study were female, and were asked what 
they thought caused their heart attack. However, the sample in the Affleck et al 
(1987c) study were male, and were provided with a structured list from which to 
select causes of their heart attack. It may be that the attributions made by the female 
myocardial infarction sufferers and the feelings of victimisation associated with them 
overrode any benefits they had taken from their experience, and together both 
predicted a second heart attack. 
One criticism of the longitudinal investigations of Bar-on (1987), Affleck et al 
(1987c) and Low et al (1993) is that the authors did not report what happened in the 
time period between the initial investigation and follow-up investigations. As such, it 
cannot be ruled out that certain life experiences may have mediated the influence of 
causal attributions on subsequent adjustment. In support of this idea, in their meta-
analytic review of the causal attribution/adjustment relationship, Roesch and Weiner 
(2001) found attributions to be indirectly associated with adjustment through certain 
coping methods. From this they proposed that causal attributions might interact with 
other variables to predict adjustment. Some of these variables may be overt, including 
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perceived invulnerability, control and self-esteem (Macleod, 1999; Timko and Janoff-
Bulman, 1985). Other variables may be undetected. This might explain why in some 
studies an association is found between attributions and adjustment, and not in others 
(Macleod, 1999). 
2.3.2.4 Conclusions: The Causal Attribution/Adjustment Relationship 
Three main conclusions can be drawn about the nature of the causal 
attribution/adjustment relationship from the literature reviewed. Firstly, making causal 
attributions may be more adaptive for some conditions (a myocardial infarction), than 
others (rheumatoid arthritis and cancer). Secondly, the fact that causal attributions 
were found to be more adaptive in acute than chronic illness in general suggests that 
causal attributions for a situation now may be more adaptive for adjustment to the 
situation now, than investigations between retrospective attributions and current 
adjustment. This suggests a third point, that perhaps causal attributions have 
implications for recovery from an acute illness, regardless of the nature of the 
associations found. Causal attribution/adjustment associations may be poor/lacking in 
chronic illness conditions because other factors may be important for adjustment to 
these longer-term conditions. 
2.3.3 The Responsibility/Blame/Adjustment Relationship 
2.3.3.1 Introduction 
This section will consider associations between adjustment and responsibility/blame 
attributions to the self and others, in the following way. Firstly, a key study in the 
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area, the Bulman and Wortman (1977) study, will be described. Secondly, research 
supporting the study findings, and thirdly, research that fails to do this will be 
discussed. The fourth section will explain the failure to replicate Bulman and 
Wortman's (1977) findings, one of which will lead to a fifth section examining the 
associations between types of self-blame and adjustment. Finally, research on the 
associations between specific types of other-blame attributions and adjustment will be 
considered. 
2.3.3.2 The Bulman and Wortman (1977) Study 
Bulman and Wortman (1977) carried out the earliest study investigating the self-
blame /adjustment relationship, in a sample of 29 largely male spinal-injured patients. 
The mean age of the sample at the time of the injury was 23 years. They were 
recruited from an inpatient rehabilitation programme. All had been injured as a result 
of a variety of accidents, the most frequent of which were automobile accidents. 
These had occurred in the year prior to being interviewed. Self-blame for the injury 
sustained was examined using two measures: one with a question requiring 
participants to answer using a Likert-scaled response, and a structured measure, where 
participants had to assign a percentage of blame for their injuries to the self, others, 
the environment and chance factors. Adjustment was not measured in this sample. 
Instead, a coping measure was used, where nurses and social workers involved with 
each patient rated how well they thought the patient under their care was coping with 
their situation. Participants were also asked about the extent to which they perceived 
they could have avoided the accident, and about their perceived happiness. 
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Factor analysis of both self-blame measures produced a composite blame score that 
was used in subsequent analyses. Multiple regression analyses revealed the best 
predictors of coping to be blaming other people (r = 0.4 7), blaming the self (r = 0.65), 
and perceived avoidability (r = 0.60), such that the more another person was blamed, 
or the more the participants believed they could have avoided the accident, the worse 
they coped. However, the more the participants blamed themselves, the better they 
coped. One other indicator of the adaptiveness of self-blame attributions is that those 
who made these attributions reported themselves to be happier than those who blamed 
other people for their spinal injuries. Perceived avoidability of the accident was found 
to be a predictor of self-blame. However, self-blame was associated with good 
coping, and perceived avoidability was associated with poor coping. In order to 
investigate this apparent contradiction further, median splits were obtained for self 
blame (high and low), perceived avoidability (high and low), and coping (high and 
low). This revealed that those who placed a high amount of blame on themselves and 
did not feel they could have avoided the accident were most likely to be good copers 
than poor copers. Conversely, those who placed little blame on themselves and felt 
they could have avoided the accident were more likely to be poor copers than good 
copers. These results suggest that perceived avoidability of the accident leading to the 
injury mediated the self-blame/adjustment relationship. Subsequent research has 
supported this (Schulz and Decker, 1985). 
86 
2.3.3.3 Studies in Support of Bulman and Wortman's (1977) Findings 
Some research has supported Bulman and Wortman's (1977) findings of the 
adaptiveness of self-blame and maladaptiveness of other-blame. Lambert and 
Falconer (2001) found self-blame to be associated with better adjustment than other-
blame in their sample of hospitalised burns patients. Specifically, those who blamed 
themselves for their injury were less susceptible to posttraumatic stress disorder 
(PTSD), and were less distressed than those who blamed others for their injury. 
Delahanty, Herberman, Fullerton, Ursano, Craig and Hayward (1997) supported these 
findings in their investigation of responsibility attributions for motor vehicle accidents 
(MV A) in 173 predominantly male MV A sufferers (mean age = 36 years) over a one-
year period following the accident: 14-21 days after the accident, and then 3, 6 and 12 
months later. They were recruited from the trauma centre of a metropolitan hospital. 
All participants were asked who they thought was responsible for the accident. Both 
general health (e.g. heart rate) and psychological (distress, intrusive thoughts, PTSD) 
measures were completed at various different times over the one-year period. 
To summarise the main findings, those who had been in an accident for which other 
people were responsible reported more Iong-tenn distress, and were more likely to be 
diagnosed with PTSD than those who reported being responsible for their own 
accident. Three months after the accident, those who reported other people to be 
responsible felt more threatened by the accident and reported thinking that they would 
experience the same kind of event again. From this the authors proposed that these 
respondents experienced a loss of confidence in their ability to control future driving 
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incidents. In addition, while both the self and other-responsible groups experienced 
intrusive thoughts, those who had originally attributed responsibility to others 
experienced more intrusive thoughts across all time periods. The authors stated that 
this might indicate either self-attributions for the accident buffered its long-term 
impact, or something about not being responsible for the accident made adjustment 
more difficult. 
Support for the benefits of attributing responsibility to the self has also been reported 
in people suffering from Aids Related Complex (ARC), although not in people 
suffering from AIDS (Moulton et al, 1987). These differences were attributed to the 
nature of both conditions. AIDS is thought to end in death, so making attributions to 
the self for a condition which is unchangeable and severe is likely to be more 
distressing than making attributions to such factors as other people or chance. This 
would not be expected in the ARC group, because although severe, the condition is 
thought to be changeable. Indeed, self-attributions for improvement in the condition 
were associated with an increase in health behaviour change in this group. These 
results contribute to the point made in section 2.3.2.3 about the attributions made for a 
situation, and subsequent behaviour change. 
2.3.3.4 Studies Failing to Support Bulman and Wortman's (1977) Findings 
Other studies using similar spinal-injured samples to Bulman and Wortman (1977) 
have failed to support their findings. Schulz and Decker (1985) investigated the nature 
of the self-blame/adjustment relationship in their sample of 100 mostly male spinal 
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injured patients with a mean age of 56 years. All were recruited through agencies and 
institutions working with spinal injured persons in community settings. The authors 
found self-blame attributions to be negatively correlated with psychological well 
being (r = -0.13), and depression (r = -0.25), suggesting self-blame is not adaptive. 
Although one positive correlation was found between self-blame and life satisfaction 
(r = 0.23), this was weak in comparison to that found between self-blame and coping 
in the Bulman and Wortman study (r = 0.65). 
Nielson and MacDonald (1988) investigated the self-blame/adjustment relationship in 
a younger sample (mean age = 36 years) of 58 mostly male spinal-injured patients. 
All were recruited through a spinal cord injury unit. As in Bulman and Wortman 
(1977), the authors split the sample into high and lower self-blamers. They found high 
self-blamers to be more poorly psychologically adjusted to their injury, in terms of 
being more anxious, depressed and hostile, than low self-blamers on average 7.4 years 
after the initial injury occurred, thereby failing to support the reported beneficial role 
of self-blame. Some responsibility research has also failed to support Bulman and 
Wortman's (1977) findings. Heinemann et al (1988) employed a sample with similar 
characteristics to that in Nielson and MacDonald (1988), and found responsibility 
attributions to the self and others in their spinal-injured sample to be not associated 
with any measures of adjustment, such as disability acceptance or happiness. 
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2.3.3.5 Explanations for the Failure to Support Bulman and Wortman's (1 977) 
Findings 
Three main differences in method employed across studies may account for the failure 
to replicate Bulman and Wortman's (1977) findings. Firstly, various adjustment 
measures used may have affected the results found. Bulman and Wortman (1977) 
used a single coping measure that was completed by healthcare professionals to rate 
the coping of spinal-injured patients, while standardised self-rated adjustment 
measures were used in the other spinal-injured samples. However, even where the 
same method to Bulman and Wortman (1977) has been employed, there has been a 
failure to produce the same results. In their replication of the Bulman and Wortman 
study Sholomskas et al (1990) found self-blame to be unrelated to coping, although 
they replicated the association between other-blame and poor coping to a negative 
event. The authors attributed the failure to replicate the self-blame results to the fact 
that the level of other-blame could have been affecting the predictive power of self-
blame, and as such were stronger predictors of coping. 
Secondly, the context in which the attributions were made may have influenced their 
associations with adjustment. The Bulman and Wortman (1977) sample were 
recruited from an inpatient rehabilitation programme, while the samples in the studies 
that failed to support this study were recruited from various external agencies working 
with people who have spinal injuries. These samples may have had their own biases 
that could have influenced the attribution/adjustment associations found. In support of 
this, Rich et al (1999) found the benefits of other-blame attributions for end-stage 
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renal disease to be context-dependent. Specifically, for those who carried out their 
own dialysis treatment at home, blaming others for their condition was associated 
with anger and anxiety because this was inconsistent with the amount of autonomy 
this form of dialysis requires, resulting in conflict and poor adjustment. For those who 
had their dialysis treatment carried out by staff in hospital, blaming others for their 
situation was associated with a decrease in anxiety and minimal anger. This was 
because they were dependent on health professionals, and so blaming others for their 
condition was consistent with the realities of this type of treatment. 
Thirdly, the timing of the attribution/adjustment relationship could have contributed 
to the failure to support Bulman and Wortman's (1977) findings. In the Bulman and 
Wortman (1977) study and subsequent research in support of their findings, the 
associations between self and other-blame with adjustment were investigated up to 
one year after the injury onset. Positive self-blame/adjustment associations were 
found at this time. However, a longer time since injury onset (between 7 - 20 years) 
was used to investigate the attribution/adjustment relationship in research that failed 
to support this, finding either poor or no self-blame/adjustment associations. The 
authors in these studies proposed from this that the relationship might be stronger 
nearer the time of injury onset but become weaker the longer the time from injury 
onset. This contributes to the conclusions drawn in section 2.3.2.4 about the causal 
attribution/adjustment relationship. Together, both suggest that there may be more of 
an attribution/adjustment relationship in general and positive relationship in particular 
91 
when both are investigated for the same time, than when retrospective attributions are 
paired with current adjustment. 
Brewin (1984) found the more his sample of acutely injured industrial accident 
sufferers made attributions to themselves for their accidents, the less tense and 
anxious they felt, and the more alert and active they were. This suggests self-blame is 
associated with good adjustment around the time of injury onset. Other research, 
however, has failed to support the benefits of self-blame around the onset of a 
condition. Kiecolt-Glaser and Williams (1987) found that the more those in their 
hospitalised acute bums sample blamed themselves for their situation, the less they 
complied with nurses, and the more pain behaviour and depression they displayed. 
Additionally, interactions were found between adjustment outcomes, in that poor 
compliance with nursing staff was associated with depression and anxiety, and 
patients who were distressed also showed more pain behaviour. 
In addition to these methodological variations, one other point involving different 
types of self-blame may also help to explain the failure to replicate Bulman and 
Wortman's (1977) findings. Given that behavioural self-blame has been described as 
adaptive and characterological self-blame maladaptive (see section 2.2.3.2), it may be 
expected that any positive self-blame/adjustment associations are reflecting 
behavioural self-blame, while poor associations reflect characterological self-blame. 
In order to determine if each type of self-blame is adaptive in the way suggested, there 
is a need to investigate their independent associations with adjustment. Research 
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investigating the self-blame attributions of cancer sufferers has examined these 
associations. 
2.3.3.6 The Behavioural/Characterological Self-Blame/Adjustment Relationship 
Timko and Janoff-Bulman (1985) distinguished between behavioural and 
characterological self-blame in their study examining perceived invulnerability, and 
adjustment in 42 breast cancer sufferers recruited through 12 physicians. The mean 
age of the sample was 53 years, and all were interviewed between 1-20 months post-
mastectomy. Both types of self-blame were investigated through asking participants 
to make ratings of the extent to which they believed they got cancer because of type 
of personality they had (characterological) or because of their past behaviour 
(behavioural). Adjustment was measured using several indicators including 
depression, and through asking the extent to which the participants experienced a 
range of positive and negative emotions. Both types of self-blame were indirectly 
related to adjustment through feeling invulnerable to a recurrence of the cancer. 
Characterological self-blame attributions were negatively associated with good 
adjustment, while behavioural self-blame attributions were positively associated with 
good adjustment. 
The effects of these types of self-blame have also been investigated longitudinally. 
Malcarne et al (1995) investigated associations between these attributions and 
perceptions of control over disease progression and recurrence as predictors of 
psychological distress in a sample of 72 males and females suffering from various 
93 
forms of recently diagnosed cancer. All were recruited through cancer clinics. The 
mean age of the sample was 43 years. Each participant was interviewed twice: once 
around the time of diagnosis and a second time four months later, after treatment. 
Behavioural and characterological self-blame were measured in the same way as in 
Timko and Janoff-Bulman (1985). 
Psychological distress at the first interview was related to characterological self-blame 
at the second interview. From this, the authors suggested characterological self-blame 
appears to play a role in the psychological adjustment to cancer during the early 
months surrounding diagnosis and treatment. Additionally, characterological self-
blame and psychological distress had a reciprocal relationship in that both predicted 
each other four months later. However, there were no beneficial effects of behavioural 
self-blame. The authors explained this by suggesting that it might be naive to assume 
behavioural self-blame could be adaptive over relatively short periods of time. The 
benefits of this may only emerge as part of a larger process of coping with illness. 
Support for this idea comes from Timko and Janoff-Bulman (1985) who found 
behavioural self-blame to be associated with good adaptation up to two years after 
treatment for breast cancer. 
These findings were supported and extended by Glinder and Compas (1999) who 
found characterological self-blame predicted psychological distress up to one year 
after the initial onset of breast cancer. They also found that independently, both 
characterological and behavioural self-blame were strongly correlated with symptoms 
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of anxiety and depression. However, when simultaneously entered into regression 
analyses, behavioural self-blame was more likely to predict distress cross-sectionally, 
over different times, while characterological self-blame predicted distress 
prospectively. This finding, combined with that of Malcarne et al (1995) suggests 
characterological self-blame seems to have long-term psychological effects on 
adjustment, while behavioural self-blame is maladaptive at the moment. As in 
Malcame et al (1995), Glinder and Compas (1999) explained this latter finding by 
stating that the beneficial effects of behavioural self-blame may not be seen until 
several years after the diagnosis of cancer. 
Overall, these results support the maladaptive nature of characterological self-blame, 
suggesting that any poor self-blame/adjustment associations may be a reflection of 
this type of self-blame. However, inconsistent findings emerged about the adaptive 
nature of behavioural self-blame. Research in non-cancer samples contributes to this 
inconsistency by finding no beneficial effects of this up to one year after the onset of 
injury (Kiecolt-Glaser and Williams, 1987; Sholosmkas et al, 1990). 
2.3.3. 7 Conclusions: The Self-Blame/Adjustment Relationship 
The contradictory findings of the benefits of behavioural self-blame attributions lead 
to the conclusion that distinguishing between types of self-blame reveals nothing 
about the self-blame/adjustment relationship. Houldin, Jacobsen and Lowery (1996) 
supported this with their finding of a poor self-blame/adjustment relationship in their 
breast cancer patients regardless of the type of self-blame measured. From this the 
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authors stated that investigating two types of self-blame does not reveal anything 
more about the self-blame/adjustment relationship than using self-blame as a singular 
construct. Instead, they found differences in adjustment depending on the extent of 
self-blame attributed. Those breast cancer sufferers who attributed a high amount of 
blame for their cancer to themselves were more poorly psychosocially adjusted to 
their cancer than those who attributed a mild or moderate amount of blame. Some 
research has supported this finding (Kiecolt-Glaser and Williams, 1987; Nielson and 
MacDonald, 1988), although other studies have found high self-blame to be 
associated with better coping than low self-blame (Bulman and Wortman, 1977). 
Regardless of the direction, these results suggest it is the extent of self-blame 
attributed which may be important for adjustment to a pain/illness/injury situation, 
rather than types of self-blame (Houldin et al, 1996). Most of the reviewed studies 
used self-blame as a singular construct. Thus, the use of self-blame, combined with 
the variations in method across studies (see section 2.3.3.5) may help to explain the 
mixed self-blame/adjustment associations in the research reviewed. 
2.3.3.8 The Other-Blame/Adjustment Relationship 
Sholomskas et al (1990) found a lack of research replicating Bulman and Wortman's 
(1977) findings of a positive self-blame/adjustment association not only in 
pain/illness/injury samples, but also in variety of research domains. Indeed, of 23 
studies they reviewed, only nine were found to replicate these findings. More 
consistent support has been found for a negative association between other-blame 
attributions and adjustment. Tennen and Affleck (1990) reviewed the other-blame 
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literature and found 17 out of 25 studies they reviewed, in a variety of research 
domains, to support this association. A few studies in the present review found other-
blame attributions to be unrelated to adjustment (Brewin, 1984; Heinemann et al, 
1988). However most found them to be associated with poor adjustment to a 
pain/illness/injury situation (Bulman and Wortman, 1977; Delahanty et al, 1997; Rich 
et al, 1999; Sholomskas et al, 1990). 
Specific types of other-blame attributions have been associated with poor adjustment. 
DeGood and Kiernan (1996) examined the nature of the other-blame/adjustment 
relationship in their sample of 188 mostly female chronic pain sufferers attending a 
pain management programme. The mean age of the sample was 46 years, and the 
most frequently reported pain duration was between 1-5 years. Blame was 
investigated through asking the pain sufferers who they thought was at fault for their 
pain: themselves, their employers, another person or no one. Adjustment was 
investigated using a measure of psychological distress. In addition, current and 
anticipated average pain and activity interference were measured using a Likert scale. 
To summarise the main findings, around one-third of the sample blamed either their 
employer (n = 32), or another person (n = 41) for their pain problem. Only 11 
participants rated themselves to be at fault. Most (n = 1 04) reported their pain to be no 
one's fault. Differences were found between those who attributed fault to their 
employer and those in the other pain groups. Specifically, those who blamed their 
employer anticipated higher pain levels and more limitations in activity at the end of 
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treatment, than those who blamed another person or no one. They also reported 
greater psychological distress. Additionally, those who attributed fault at all reported 
greater psychological distress than those who did not ascribe fault. The authors 
concluded from these results that attributing fault to others for one's pain situation 
seems to be associated with responses to treatment. 
Additionally, Church and Vincent (1996) investigated the blame attributions of 
chronic pain sufferers who had been injured as a result of a variety of medical 
accidents, and found blaming doctors to result in poor psychological adjustment to the 
chronic pain condition. They proposed various explanations for this poor association, 
including that after medical accidents just world beliefs may be challenged, shattering 
the belief that the world is an orderly place. This may lead to the belief that doctors 
are fallible, and increase feelings of being unprotected. 
There are several explanations why blaming others leads to poor adjustment. Firstly, 
this could lead to feelings of anger and the need for revenge and justice. The result of 
this could be that an individual may not accept responsibility for his/her condition, 
leading to poor compliance with treatment, and ultimately poor adjustment to the 
condition (DeGood and Kiernan, 1996; Sensky, 1997; Sholomskas et al, 1990). 
Secondly, Tennen and Affleck (1990) suggested that blaming others may lead to poor 
adaptation because other people may not agree with this blaming, resulting in person 
becoming alienated from family and friends. This contrasts with the reported benefits 
of making self-blame attributions, including that self-blame allows an individual to 
98 
maintain control over a negative situation and a beliefin the world as ajust place (see 
section 2.2.4.5). 
2.3.4 Individual Differences in Attributions and Adjustment 
Section 2.2.3. 7 identified various factors that may influence the types of attributions 
made for pain/illness/injury, including education level (Pill and Stott, 1982). This was 
found in the research reviewed, where breast cancer sufferers with a high school 
education blamed themselves less for their cancer than those without (Houldin et al, 
1996). This was interpreted in terms of the fact that the more educated participants 
may have been giving socially desirable responses and so blamed themselves less for 
their cancer. Other demographic influences on making self-blame attributions 
included marital status, where those who were never married reported higher levels of 
self-blame than those who were married (Houldin et al, 1996). Additionally, 
Heinemann et al (1988) identified age effects in the responsibility attributions made in 
their spinal injured patients. Specifically, those who were younger were more likely to 
attribute responsibility for their spinal injury to themselves, and to environmental 
factors than those who were older. 
Age differences in adjustment outcomes have also been identified. Schulz and Decker 
(1985) found the younger spinal-injured patients in their study had higher levels of 
psychological well being than the older patients. Berckman and Austin (1993) found 
gender differences in the adjustment of their lung cancer patients, where males had 
poorer sexual and social relationships than females. 
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Various health, psychological and functioning outcomes have been found to interact 
with each other. These have generally involved psychological (emotional) outcomes 
interacting with the other outcomes. For example, depression and distress have been 
associated with self-reported pain severity (Church and Vincent, 1996), poor daily 
functioning and mobility (Brewin, 1984; Lowery et al, 1983), and changes in 
behaviour, specifically work (Brewin, 1984), and pain behaviour (Kiecolt-Glaser and 
Williams, 1987). 
2.3.5 Criticisms of Research Investigating the Attribution/ Adjustment 
Relationship 
Two criticisms can be made of research investigating the attribution/adjustment 
relationship in pain/illness/injury samples. Firstly, the adjustment measures adopted in 
the studies can be criticised on three levels. Firstly, combinations of health, 
psychological and functioning measures often used across studies can be criticised on 
the basis that unrelated adjustment components have been found to be unreliable 
(Turnquist et al, 1988). Secondly, while all studies discussed the reliability and 
validity of their measures, few mentioned the suitability of their adjustment measures 
to be used with their samples. For example, Berckman and Austin (1993) and Taylor 
et al (1984) reported their adjustment measures to have been validated on similar 
samples to those in their studies, while Low et al (1993) acknowledged that their 
measure of coronary risk was not designed or validated for their sample of female 
heart attack sufferers. Thirdly, the use of structured questionnaires to measure 
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adjustment limits what can be learned about adjustment to illness/injury in general, 
and pain in particular. 
The second criticism refers to the largely correlational nature of the studies reviewed. 
No clear findings have been established about the causal direction of the 
attribution/adjustment relationship, making it impossible to determine how 
attributions may impact on adjustment. This has led to various ideas about how 
attributions and adjustment relate to each other. Firstly, Macleod (1999) proposed that 
rather than certain attributions leading to adjustment outcomes, adjustment outcomes 
such as psychological distress may actually lead to attributions being made. Secondly, 
adjustment has been viewed as a consequence of attributions. Thirdly, attributions 
have been described as mediating the impact of negative events on adjustment 
(Downey, Silver and Wortman, 1990), and fourthly, attributions and adjustment have 
been seen as reflective of the same underlying phenomenon, specifically depression 
(Meana et al, 1999). 
2.3.6 Summary and Conclusions: The Attribution/Adjustment Relationship 
In summary, the reviewed research produced mixed attribution/adjustment 
relationships across cause, responsibility and blame. Some attributions were found to 
be associated with good adjustment, while others were associated with poor 
adjustment to pain/illness/injury. Additionally, in some instances attributions were 
unrelated to adjustment. Variations were also found in terms of whether or not it is 
adaptive to make attributions at all. Some research indicated those who make 
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attributions to be better adjusted to their situation than those who do not, while other 
research has found the opposite: those who do make attributions are more poorly 
adjusted to their situation than those who do not. Yet other research has suggested 
there are no differences in adjustment between those who make attributions and those 
who do not. 
This suggests there is no straightforward answer concerning whether or not making 
attributions for pain/illness/injury helps an individual to adjust to this situation. Four 
variations in methods employed across studies may help account for the differences 
found. Firstly, different types of adjustment measures were employed across studies. 
Attributions may have been associated with some outcomes and not others. Secondly, 
there was some indication in the literature that the particular relationships attributions 
have with adjustment may be dependent upon the context in which they were made. 
The participants in each of the studies reviewed were suffering from specific 
conditions, and were largely recruited from specialised treatment centres. It may be 
that issues specific to each of these treatment contexts influenced the nature of the 
attribution/adjustment relationships found (see section 2.3.3.5). 
This relates to the third methodological variation, in terms of the different samples 
employed. The attribution/adjustment relationship may be disease-specific in that 
attributions might help people adjust to some conditions but not others. This may help 
explain why in some instances attributions were unrelated to adjustment (see section 
2.3.2.4). Fourthly, various times since diagnosis of a condition were adopted across 
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studies. This meant that in some instances the attribution/adjustment relationship was 
investigated at the same time, around the time of diagnosis, while in other studies 
attributions were made for a condition several years after its initial onset, and 
investigated for their associations with current adjustment to the condition. It is likely 
this variation in timing contributed to the different attribution/adjustment relationships 
found across studies (see section 2.3.3.5). Consideration of these issues may reveal 
more about whether or not attributions are beneficial for adjustment to 
pain/illness/injury. 
In addition to these variations, three other factors may have inadvertently influenced 
the nature of the attribution/adjustment associations found. Firstly, both overt and 
undetected factors may have mediated the relationship. The second point involves 
motives for making attributions. If these include the aim to develop an understanding 
of and gain control over a negative situation (see section 2.2.3.5), then they should be 
associated with good adjustment. The fact this was not always the case suggests that 
people may give attributions for other reasons, for example because something is 
medically known about the cause of the condition. Attributions made under these 
circumstances may have fewer implications for adjustment than attributions made in 
the absence of any knowledge about causes of the situation, because these latter 
attributions might have some personal meaning to an individual (see section 2.2.3.6). 
Thirdly, most studies investigated the attribution/adjustment relationship without 
initially reporting adjustment levels. This should be considered in order to provide a 
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baseline from which to determine the exact influence attributions have on adjustment 
levels. It is possible to score higher on some adjustment questionnaires than others 
(Turnquist et al, 1988), and this may lead to different attribution/adjustment results 
being produced. The few studies reporting adjustment scores alone produced mixed 
levels of adjustment. These included poor (Lowery et al, 1993), medium (Bulman and 
Wortman, 1977; Schulz and Decker, 1985; Sholomskas et al, 1990), and good levels 
of psychosocial adjustment to pain/illness/injury (Berckman and Austin, 1993; 
Houldin et al, 1996; Lavery and Clarke, 1996). Various attribution/adjustment 
relationships were found in these studies regardless of the extent of adjustment. This 
suggests that the extent of adjustment may not influence the relationship found. 
Church and Vincent (1996) measured self-reported adjustment in their sample of 
chronic pain sufferers. They used an interview schedule to measure adjustment, and 
found their participants to report feeling numb, worried and shocked at the onset of 
their pain, due to the circumstances surrounding the pain onset. At the time of the 
interview a lot of anger, bitterness and sadness towards the situation was reported. 
This suggests a change in the emotions experienced towards the pain over time, 
supporting the point made in section 2.2.5.3, that adjustment may change over time 
(Turnquist et al, 1988). 
2.4 OVERALL SUMMARY OF CHAPTER TWO 
There were three sections to the second chapter. The first section overviewed the 
nature of pain. Gate Control Theory introduced the importance of investigating 
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psychological factors in the experience of pam, by proposing that various 
psychological factors might influence the way in which the physiological pain 
experience is interpreted (see section 2.1.5.4). There are also many psychological 
consequences of pain (see section 2.1.7). In persistent pain, a combination of these 
factors, along with cognitive and behavioural components may lead to the 
development of a "chronic pain syndrome" (see section 2.1.7). The potential overall 
impact of pain can be understood when considering that up to half of a random 
community sample can experience persistent pain at any one time (see section 2.1.4). 
People may develop beliefs specific to their own pain. These beliefs will have 
repercussions for the pain experience. For example, beliefs about pain treatment may 
affect compliance with treatment (see section 2.1. 7). This suggests that it is important 
to understand not only direct pain beliefs but also other beliefs individuals hold 
surrounding their pain, in order to gain knowledge of the possible influences of these 
beliefs on the pain experience. 
Attributions and just world beliefs were discussed in the second section of the chapter. 
These beliefs also have repercussions for the pain experience and other negative 
personal situations, in tenns of their associations with adjustment. However, four 
shortcomings of attribution literature should be addressed before their interactions 
with adjustment are investigated. Firstly, there is a lack of research empirically 
distinguishing between cause, responsibility and blame in real-life research. 
Secondly, perhaps because of the first point, all three concepts are often used 
interchangeably in research. Thirdly, structured responsibility and blame measures do 
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not allow the extent and nature of any freely made attributions to be determined. 
Fourthly, there is a lack of research investigating whether or not all three concepts 
change over the pain/illness/injury experience. The implications of these 
shortcomings were covered in section 2.2.3.9, suggesting they should be addressed. 
Similar to attributions, the just world literature is limited in that there is a scarcity of 
research investigating just world beliefs in pain sufferers. This is despite the fact that 
the impact of pain may challenge an individual's just world beliefs, and in turn affect 
adjustment to the pain (see section 2.2.4.7). This suggests that the role of just world 
beliefs in the experience of pain should be investigated. 
There was some consistency in the finding that positive pain and just world beliefs are 
adaptive in the face of a negative personal situation. However, section three produced 
less consistent results in terms of whether or not cause, responsibility and blame 
attributions are beneficial for adjustment to pain/illness/injury. This inconsistency was 
attributed to four variations method in employed across studies, in terms of the 
various adjustment measures, contexts, samples and time frames adopted across 
studies (see section 2.3.6). Additionally, the criticisms of the research outlined in 
Section 2.3.5 may also have contributed to these mixed findings. It is important to 
consider these issues in order to determine with greater clarity whether attributions are 
beneficial for adjustment to pain. 
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CHAPTER3: THE STUDY AIMS 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The aim of the study was to investigate the nature of and relationship between 
attributions, just world beliefs and adjustment to pain. Chapter 2 presented various 
methodological issues and shortcomings associated with these areas of the literature. 
This limits what can be learned about the role of these concepts in pain. The present 
study aimed to address the issues and limitations associated with attributions (Chapter 
2, section 2.2.3.9), just world beliefs (Chapter 2, section 2.2.4.7), and adjustment 
(Chapter 2, sections 2.3.5 and 2.3.6) in two phases outlined in this chapter. 
3.2 PILOT PHASE 
The first phase developed and piloted a measure to address these limitations. Not all 
shortcomings of the attribution/adjustment relationship were considered in the present 
study. Those issues that were addressed, and the means by which the tool addressed 
these and the other issues will be considered in Chapter 4 (section 4.3.3). 
3.3 MAIN STUDY PHASE 
The piloted tool provided the measure to investigate the issues and shortcomings of 
the attribution, just world belief and adjustment literature in greater detail. This was 
achieved through a series of five aims in the main phase of the study, as follows. 
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3.3.1 Aim 1: Attributions 
The first aim was to examine the cause, responsibility and blame attributions made for 
pain. There were four parts to this. The first three parts were concerned with the 
shortcomings of the attribution literature. Having taken these into account, the piloted 
measure was used to explore: 
(a) Whether cause, responsibility and blame attributions were made for pain, and the 
nature of any attributions made 
(b) Whether distinctions were made between cause, responsibility and blame 
attributions in pain 
(c) Whether cause, responsibility and blame attributions changed for different times 
in the pain experience 
The fourth part of the aim was concerned with motives for making causal attributions, 
involving both knowledge and uncertainty factors (Chapter 2, section 2.2.3.5), and 
were examined in the present study with the specific aim to explore: 
(d) Motives for making causal attributions, involving knowledge factors and 
uncertainty 
3.3.2 Aim 2: The Nature of Adjustment 
The second aim was to use the piloted tool to explore various ways of adjusting to 
pain, using the following three outcomes: 
(a) Health outcomes, involving pain management, including treatments received and 
self-management strategies 
108 
(b) Psychological outcomes (emotions). This included an exploration of whether 
adjustment to pain changed over the course of the pain experience 
(c) Functioning outcomes (physical and social) 
3.3.3 Aim 3: Interactions Between Attributions and Adjustment 
The third aim was to investigate the nature of the relationship between cause, 
responsibility and blame attributions, and adjustment to pain. There were five parts to 
this. Each will be considered in turn. 
Inconsistent findings have emerged concerning whether or not those who make causal 
attributions for their illness are better or more poorly adjusted to their illness than 
those who do not. Additionally, some research has suggested there are no differences 
in adjustment between both groups (Chapter 2, sections 2.3.2.2 and 2.3.2.3). To 
address this inconsistency, the first part of the aim was to determine: 
(a) Whether there were any differences in adjustment to pain between those who 
made causal attributions for their pain and those who did not. 
Chapter 2 (section 2.3.2) also identified a mixture of positive and negative 
relationships between causal attributions and health, psychological and functioning 
outcomes. The extent to which causal attributions were adaptive or resulted in poor 
adjustment to pain was investigated in the second part of the aim, to determine: 
(b) The nature of the relationship between causal attributions made for, and 
adjustment to pain 
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Additionally, making responsibility and blame attributions to the self have been found 
to be both adaptive and maladaptive for adjustment to pain/illness/injury (Chapter 2, 
sections 2.3.3.2 - 2.3.3.4). The extent to which these attributions resulted in good or 
poor adjustment to pain was explored, the third part of the aim being to determine: 
(c) Whether self-responsibility/blame attributions for pain were adaptive for 
adjustment to pain 
More consistently, attributing responsibility and blame for one's pain/illness/injury to 
others has been associated with poor adjustment (Chapter 2, section 2.3.3.8). To 
investigate the extent to which this was the case in the current pain sample, the fourth 
part ofthe aim was to examine: 
(d) Whether other-responsibility/blame attributions for pam resulted in poor 
adjustment to pain 
The last part of the third aim involved the timing of the attribution/adjustment 
relationship. The literature in Chapter 2 (sections 2.3.2.4 and 2.3.3.5) suggested that 
there may be more of an attribution/adjustment relationship when both are 
investigated for the same time, than when attributions made for the onset of a 
situation that occurred years earlier are paired with current adjustment to the situation. 
This was explored in the present study using the piloted tool to determine: 
(e) Whether the attribution/adjustment relationship varied for different times in the 
pain experience 
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3.3.4 Aim 4: The Belief in a Just World 
Chapter 2 (section 2.2.4. 7) highlighted the relevance of exploring the role of just 
world beliefs in the experience of pain. Having already considered this in the pilot 
study, this role was explored in greater detail in the main phase of the research. There 
were three parts to the fourth aim. The first two parts involved directly investigating 
the role of just world beliefs in pain, through: 
(a) Determining the strength of the just world beliefs held by pain sufferers 
(b) Examining differences in just world beliefs within pain-related variables. 
Specifically: 
(1) Exploring differences in the just world beliefs of different types of pain groups 
(2) Exploring differences in the just world beliefs of different pain duration groups 
The third part examined the role of attributions in maintaining just world beliefs if 
threatened by the pain experience (Chapter 2, section 2.2.4.4). This involved: 
(c) Considering the role of cause, responsibility and blame attributions in maintaining 
justice beliefs. Specifically: 
(1) Determining whether there were differences in the just world beliefs of those who 
made causal attributions for their pain and those who did not 
(2) Determining whether those who made responsibility and blame attributions to 
themselves for their pain had stronger just world beliefs, than those who made 
attributions to others 
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3.3.5 AimS: Differences in Adjustment Between Those With Differing 
Strengths of Just World Beliefs 
Research has investigated associations between high just world beliefs and adjustment 
to short-term negative personal situations (Chapter 2, section 2.2.4.6), but not longer-
term negative personal situations such as pain (Chapter 2, section 2.2.4. 7). To address 
this shortcoming, the fifth aim was to determine: 
Whether there are any differences in adjustment to pain between those with high, 
medium and low just world beliefs 
The development of the piloted tool that created the basis for these aims to be 
examined, is detailed in Chapter 4. 
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CHAPTER 4: THE STUDY METHOD 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will detail the method employed in the present study. The following will 
be considered. Firstly, design issues, specifically the nature of the study, types of 
measures used, and details of the sample, in tenns of the type, pain duration, age of 
the sample, and methods of recruitment. Secondly, the measures employed in the 
study. Thirdly, the pilot study of the interview schedule. Fourthly, the qualitative and 
quantitative analysis of the data, and summary of the analysis of the study aims. 
Fifthly, the method employed in the main phase of the study. The final section will 
summarise the chapter. 
4.2 STUDY DESIGN 
4.2.1 Design 
4.2.1.1 The Exploratory Nature of the Present Study 
Chapter 3 (section 3.1) stated the aim of the present study was to investigate the 
nature of and relationship between attributions, just world beliefs and adjustment in 
pain. To achieve this, methodological issues and shortcomings of research examining 
these concepts in pain/illness/injury were taken into account (Chapter 3, section 3.2). 
This made the present study an exploratory investigation, because attributions and 
adjustment have not been investigated in this way before in relation to pain, and just 
world beliefs have not been measured before in relation to pain perception. 
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4.2.1.2 The Measures Employed in the Present Study 
In order to examine these issues, specific questions needed to be asked of the pain 
sufferers, making an interview schedule the most appropriate tool. An unstructured 
interview schedule was inappropriate to use because it has no set questions. Instead, 
the researcher has general topics he/she wishes to discuss, and lets the conversation 
develop in this area (Robson, 2002). A structured interview schedule was also 
inappropriate because although it contains specific questions, it also contains specific 
response categories from which participants must select an answer (Robson, 2002). 
This was inappropriate because in order to explore methodological issues and 
shortcomings there was a need to obtain participants' own responses to set questions. 
A semi-structured interview format was the most suitable measure because it involves 
the creation of specific questions without limiting responses that can be given 
(Robson, 2002). These questions also contain a degree of flexibility, in that for 
example questions can be excluded or included based on what seems appropriate with 
a particular individual (Robson, 2002). 
There are several advantages and disadvantages of using interviews. Disadvantages 
include that they are time-consuming both to make arrangements for, and to conduct. 
The lack of standardisation also raises concern about reliability (Robson, 2002). 
However, as was intended in the present study, interviews can be used in the initial 
stages of research to identify areas of further exploration (Breakwell, 2000). Other 
advantages include that they are a flexible and easy way of finding things out, and 
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they allow any interesting responses to be followed-up. This made an interview the 
most appropriate measure to use in the current study. 
There were two phases to the present study, a brief pilot phase, and a main study 
phase. The usefulness of a developed semi-structured interview was tested in the pilot 
phase of the study. A revised version of the schedule was then used in the main phase 
to investigate the aims outlined in Chapter 3 (section 3.3). Two other measures, a 
standardised pain questionnaire, and non-standardised just world questionnaire were 
also used in both the pilot and main phase to measure pain and just world beliefs in 
the sample. In the same way that the development of the interview schedule was 
based on the literature reviewed in Chapter 2, the use of both questionnaires was 
dependent upon the reliability and validity of the measures discussed in Chapter 2. All 
measures will be described in section 4.3. The data was analysed using a mixture of 
qualitative and quantitative techniques (see section 4.5.4 for a discussion of the way 
in which the data was analysed). 
4.2.2 The Sample 
4.2.2.1 Sample Type 
In Chapter 2 (section 2.3.6) it was suggested one reason for the mixed 
attribution/adjustment associations found in the literature is that this relationship is 
disease-specific. This limits the ability to generalise results across samples. In order to 
avoid such restrictions and consider the exploratory results in terms of the wider pain 
community, pain sufferers with mixed pain complaints were recruited. Additionally, 
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Chapter 2 (section 2.3.2.3) indicated that attributions might not only be important for 
adjustment in chronically ill samples, but may also help recovery from acute illness 
conditions. This being the case, no limit was placed·on pain duration in the sample. 
4.2.2.2 Pain Duration Criteria 
Chapter 2 (section 2.1.2) outlined various pain duration criteria that have been used to 
distinguish between acute and chronic pain. A commonly used criterion suggests pain 
becomes chronic after three months (IASP, 1986). This criterion was adopted in the 
present study. 
4.2.2.3 Age 
The only age limitation of the study was that the pain sufferers were adults (i.e. aged 
18 years or over). This covered the age ranges of the samples studied in Chapter 2 
(section 2.3). However, in these studies the conditions experienced were age-related. 
For example, the myocardial infarction, cancer and rheumatoid arthritis sufferers 
tended to be older, with a mean age of around 50 years. Conversely, those involved in 
various accidents tended to be younger, with a mean age of around 30 years. One 
advantage of using a sample of people with mixed pain complaints is that it may lead 
to a sample of pain sufferers of various ages, rather than focussing on specific pain 
conditions that may be age-related. 
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4.2.2.4 Sample Recruitment 
In order to address the selection bias of many studies involving pain/illness/injury 
samples recruited from specialised treatment centres (Chapter 2t section 2.3.3.5), the 
sample in the present study was recruited from the community in the central belt of 
Scotland. The Research Ethics Committee of the local Health Board granted approval 
for the study to be conducted in this area. 
4.2.2.5 Methods of Recruitment 
Three recruitment methods were used to obtain a community sample. Two involved 
advertising the study. In the first method a poster was developed detailing the general 
nature of the studyt the volunteers requiredt what participation in the study would 
involvet how long it would lastt and providing information on the contact details of 
the researcher (see Appendix 1 for the poster). It was planned that the posters would 
be displayed in three main areas. Firstlyt in a local General Practice. Managers of 
General Practices in the study area were contacted by letter requesting that posters be 
displayed in their surgery waiting rooms. This resulted in a low response rate. 
Howevert with some follow-up telephone calls the response rate increased, and 
posters were subsequently sent to those General Practices who granted permission for 
the posters to be displayed. Secondlyt it was planned that the poster be displayed in a 
local shop. Subsequentlyt permission was granted by the owner of the shop for a 
poster to be displayed. Thirdly, some posters were displayed around the University 
from where the study was to be conducted. 
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The second method of recruitment planned involved the media. A meeting was 
initially held with the Public Relations Officer of the University where the study was 
based, to discuss the content of the media advertisement. This was similar to the 
content of the poster. The outcome of this meeting was the study being advertised on 
the local radio and in local newspapers. 
Both recruitment methods led to a convenience sample being obtained. Disadvantages 
of using convenience samples include that it is not known whether or not the findings 
obtained using this sample are representative. However, convenience samples can be 
used to get a feel for issues involved in a particular research area (Robson, 2002). 
This made a convenience sample appropriate to use in the present exploratory 
investigation. 
For the third recruitment method, the Practice Manager of the medical centre in the 
grounds of the university where the study was based was contacted, and permission 
sought for the researcher to attend the medical practice and approach pain sufferers to 
request their voluntary participation in the study. Permission was granted to do this, 
and so the researcher made infrequent visits to the medical centre throughout the 
period of recruitment. 
118 
4.3 STUDY INSTRUMENTS 
4.3.1 The Short-Form McGill Pain Questionnaire 
Gate Control Theory (Chapter 2, section 2.1.5.4) viewed pain as a multidimensional 
experience involving both sensory and affective components. This being the case, a 
pain measure incorporating these components was selected for the present study. The 
McGill Pain Questionnaire (MPQ) (Melzack, 1975) incorporates both factors, and has 
demonstrated reliability and validity in a variety of acute and chronic pain samples 
(see Melzack and Katz, 2001 for a review of this literature). However, this was not 
used in the present study due to the length oftime it takes to complete (5-10 minutes) 
(Melzack, 1987). This duration was considered too long because pain was 
investigated for three different times: currently, on a usual day, and when at its worst. 
A shorter version of the MPQ, the short-form McGill Pain Questionnaire (SF-MPQ) 
(Melzack, 1987) can be completed within 2-5 minutes, and thus was used in the study. 
Chapter 2 (section 2.1.6.3) discussed other advantages of the SF-MPQ, one of which 
is that it has been used to measure both acute and chronic pain. This is of particular 
relevance to the present study, given that pain was measured in a variety of acute and 
chronic pain conditions. Additionally, the SF-MPQ has been found to be useable with 
different age groups. This is an advantage because apart from the requirement that all 
participants must be of adult age, no age limitations were placed on the sample in the 
present study (see Appendix 2.1 for the SF-MPQ). 
Chapter 2 (section 2.1.6.3) provided a description of the SF-MPQ along with details 
on how it should be scored. The SF-MPQ was used in this way in the present study, 
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except for the visual analogue scale (VAS), which was not used. Instead, a pain gauge 
was employed where participants are required to move the gauge on a slope rising in 
intensity from "no pain" at the bottom of the slope, to ''worst pain ever" at the top of 
the slope, to indicate their pain level. The other side of the gauge contains a scale 
ranging from 0-100, to accurately record the reported pain intensity. This was 
favoured over the VAS because it gives participants a physical indicator of pain, and 
allows precise pain scores to be obtained. A score out of 100 was obtained on this 
scale, and divided by I 0 to convert it to a score consistent with the VAS. 
4.3.2 The Rubin and Peplau (1975) Just World Scale 
Taking into account the shortcomings of just world research (Chapter 2, section 
2.2.4. 7), the interview schedule contained questions measuring just world beliefs in 
relation to individual pain situations (see section 4.3.3.6, to be discussed). 
Additionally, general just world beliefs were measured using the Rubin and Peplau 
(1973; 1975) Just World Scale (Chapter 2, section 2.2.4.5). Although the scale has 
been criticised on several levels, the advantages of the scale made it appropriate to use 
in the present study. In addition to this, although the scale has not been used in pain 
patients before, it has been used in related, injured samples (Bulman and Wortman, 
1977; Heinemann et al, 1988; Kiecolt-Glaser and Williams, 1987). In the present 
study the Rubin and Peplau (1975) scale was completed and scored in the way 
outlined in Chapter 2 (section 2.2.4.5), with one exception. That is, given the scale is 
American, any reference to "America" in the scale items was changed to "British" 
(see Appendix 2.2 for the Just World Scale). 
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4.3.3 The Interview Schedule 
4.3.3.1 Introduction 
Section 4.2.1.2 justified the use of a semi-structured interview schedule to address the 
methodological issues and shortcomings of the literature. This section will outline the 
development of the schedule; in relation to firstly, the nature of the interview 
questions, secondly, the question topics, thirdly, the questions in each topic, and 
fourthly, the way in which the interview schedule was coded. 
4.3.3.2 The Nature of the Interview Questions 
The semi-structured interview schedule took the fonn of a series of direct questions in 
order to reduce the amount of irrelevant infonnation obtained. The development of 
the pilot questions included a pre-pilot phase where some initial questions were 
infonnally discussed with pain sufferers known to the researcher. The aim of the 
interview questions was to explore participants' beliefs, feelings and knowledge about 
their pain. Additionally, a series of possible probing questions were included in 
anticipation of responses that required greater clarity. Two time frames were included: 
the pain onset (retrospectively), and the pain now (i.e. at the time of the interview). 
The questions were ordered in such a way so as to allow the interview to progress 
naturally. Demographic questions opened the interview, as a means of warming each 
participant to it. These were followed by questions aiming to focus the participants on 
their pain, the subject of the interview. This took the form of questions concerning the 
perceived avoidability of the pain in the first place (a possible factor influencing the 
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making of responsibility and blame attributions). Having firmly established the 
subject matter, questions pertaining to the main body of the interview, the 
consequences of the pain were introduced. These began with specific beliefs in 
relation to pain, namely just world beliefs and attributions, then adjustment to the 
pain. This included questions investigating participants' feelings about their pain. To 
begin drawing the interview to a close questions about knowledge and uncertainties 
about pain (factors influencing the making of causal attributions) were asked. The 
interview closed with questions investigating each participants' expectation of pain 
duration, feelings towards this, and a question which allowed each participant to 
provide any additional information of their own about their pain. 
4.3.3.3 Question Topics 
The questions in the interview schedule were grouped into six topics, as follows: 
Topic A: Demographic information 
Topic B: Factors influencing the making of responsibility and blame attributions 
Topic C: Justice beliefs 
Topic D: Attributions 
Topic E: Adjustment 
Topic F: Factors influencing the making of causal attributions 
The questions were presented in the order of the six topics above, with a few 
exceptions. These will be discussed where they occur in the justification of the 
questions within each topic. Each question number corresponded to the order in which 
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it was presented in the interview schedule. In the following discussion of each topic, 
probing questions will be presented in brackets. 
4.3.3.4 Topic A: Demographic Information 
The interview schedule was phrased to gather information on each participant's age, 
gender, marital status, number of children, employment status, religion, type of pain, 
and duration of pain. 
4.3.3.5 Topic B: Factors Influencing the Making of Responsibility and Blame 
Attributions 
To address factors influencing the making of responsibility and blame attributions, the 
following questions were presented: 
3 Do you think the level of your pain is to be expected, considering how it started in 
the first place? 
4 When your pain first began, were you doing something that you would normally do 
at that time? (If not, what were you doing? How do you feel about this?) 
5 Were you in a place that you would normally be in at that time? (If not, where were 
you?) 
7 In general, do you think the onset of your pain could have been avoided? (How do 
you feel about this?) 
Questions three, four, five and seven investigated possible factors influencing whether 
or not the pain situation was perceived as avoidable in the first place. Justification for 
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this comes from some blame literature, specifically Bulman and Wortman (1977) who 
found that what an individual was doing at the time of the onset of a spinal injury will 
influence whether or not the person perceives he/she could have avoided the injury 
onset. Perceived avoidability was investigated in this pain sample for two reasons. 
Firstly, because these judgements might influence whether or not people attribute 
responsibility or blame for their pain to themselves. Secondly, it can directly affect 
adjustment (Bulman and Wortman, 1977) and thirdly, it can mediate the 
attribution/adjustment relationship (Bulman and Wortman, 1977). 
4.3.3.6 Topic C: Justice Beliefs 
The following questions were related to justice beliefs: 
6 Do you believe that the fact you have pain is, "just one of those things?" or do you 
think it is unfair? (If unfair, how do you feel about this?) 
34 Do you know other people who are experiencing pain similar to your own? (Who?) 
35 (If so), how well do you think you manage your pain, in comparison to those who 
have a similar pain to you? 
36 Are you able to put your pain into perspective (by saying e.g. that there are people 
worse-off than you?) 
3 7 Where does your pain feature in your life, in comparison to your other life 
experiences? (i.e. is it nothing in comparison to something else?) 
There has been a lack of research investigating the just world beliefs of pain sufferers. 
The relevance of measuring these beliefs in pain was considered in Chapter 2 (section 
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2.2.4. 7). Introducing justice beliefs into pain, question six explored whether or not 
each participant thought it was fair that he/she should suffer pain. This was included 
with questions concerning the pain onset so that the participants would consider the 
fairness of their pain in light of its onset (see Appendix 3 for the full pilot interview 
schedule). Questions 34, 35, 36 and 37 were concerned with comparison, both in 
ones' own life (question 37), and with others suffering pain (questions 34,35 and 36). 
They were separated from the question about fairness of the pain because they were 
presented in the context of other questions investigating social circumstances 
surrounding the pain. These questions were included because in addition to 
attributions, they represent one way of maintaining just world beliefs, and apply to 
various forms of victimisation, including illness, an area related to pain (Chapter 2, 
section 2.2.4.4). 
4.3.3. 7 Topic D: Attributions 
Questions measuring cause, responsibility and blame for pain were developed in a 
way which would take into account existing methodological shortcomings of this 
research in pain/illness/injury samples (Chapter 2, section 2.2.3.9). There was also a 
theoretical basis to the attribution questions. These will be discussed in individual 
cause, responsibility and blame sections. However, two general points concerning the 
shortcomings are worthy of mention here. Firstly, in an attempt to limit the 
interchangeable use of the concepts, definitions of cause, responsibility and blame 
were developed. These were developed because few studies have been found to define 
attributions to their participants, and so definitions could not be adopted from existing 
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literature. The definitions devised were based on theoretical backgrounds. However, 
they were not based on Shaver's (1985) Theory of Blame Assignment, because the 
theory requires that an individual must have intentionally produced a negative 
outcome in order for blame to be assigned, and definitions strictly incorporating this 
may confuse participants where this does not apply. Instead, the definitions were 
based on a devised tree analogy, and were drawn from the theoretical backgrounds 
discussed in Chapter 2 (section 2.2.3.2). Given the lack of previous research defining 
attributions, the definitions in the present study were exploratory. Secondly, the 
present study aimed to expand the limited available literature on whether or not 
attributions change over time (Chapter 2, section 2.2.3.8). However, this was not 
achieved through either longitudinal or cross-sectional investigations. Given time 
constraints it was not possible to do justice to a longitudinal analysis, and cross-
sectional investigations would not pennit changes in an individual's attributions over 
time to be established. Instead, attributions were examined for two different times, the 
pain onset (retrospectively), and now (i.e. current pain attributions). 
One third point, not concerned with methodological shortcomings but relevant across 
all attribution types, is that before cause, responsibility and blame questions were 
presented, a note was made to establish whether or not each participant had previously 
ever considered each type of attribution in relation to his/her pain. The justification 
for asking this comes from Gudmunsdottir et al (2001), who reported that if a person 
had not previously considered attributions, then any subsequent attributions made 
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may be unlikely to influence adjustment to the negative situation. Each type of 
attribution will be considered in turn. 
A causal attribution was defined as follows: 
"A cause can be defined as something which brings about a change e.g. a branch 
falling from a tree and hitting a person on the head. The falling of the branch is the 
cause, and the resulting headache is the change. This is an example of an impersonal 
cause, since no one was involved. A personal cause would be where e.g. someone 
threw a branch and it hit someone on the head. Whether it was intentional or not, the 
person is still the cause of the headache. " 
This definition of a cause was taken from Chapter 2 (section 2.2.3.2). The tree 
analogy was based around Heider's (1958) theoretical ideas of personal and 
environmental causality. The following causal attribution questions were presented: 
8 What, if anything, do you yourself believe caused your pain to begin in the first 
place? (Why do you think this? Is there more than one cause? Did anyone cause the 
pain to happen? If so, why do you think this? Do you believe their actions were 
intentional? Do you believe they intended the outcome to happen? How do you feel 
about this?) 
9 What, if anything, do you believe causes your pain now? (Is anyone the cause of 
this? Do you believe they acted intentionally? Do you believe they intended the 
outcome to happen? How do you feel about this?) 
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Question eight examined causal attributions for the pain onset, and question nine 
examined attributions for the pain now. Both adopted an open-ended format. This 
format is common among causal attribution measures (Chapter 2, section 2.2.3.5). 
Three questions related to causal attributions were presented. One was presented at 
the beginning of the interview schedule, and questioned: 
2 How did your pain start in the first place? 
Two other questions were presented after the causal attribution questions, in order to 
distinguish them from causal attributions. These were concerned with triggers at the 
pain onset and now, as follows: 
10 What factors triggered your pain at the start (not caused, i.e. what factors brought 
on a pain episode?) 
11 What factors trigger your pain now? 
Responsibility was defined as follows: 
"To be held responsible for something involves being held accountable for something, 
although not necessarily to blame. In the branch example, the person would be held 
directly responsible because he/she actually threw the branch, but may not be to 
blame, because the injured person may have stepped into the path of the branch, 
which was supposed to hit a tin can on a wall. A person would be indirectly 
responsible if he/she didn 't actually throw the branch, but e.g. was the parent of a 
child who threw the branch, and was responsible for the child. " 
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The idea of being held accountable for something came from Fincham and J aspars 
(1980), while direct and indirect responsibility was drawn from the first two of 
Heider's (1958) five responsibility levels: association (indirect), and causal 
responsibility (direct) (Chapter 2, section 2.2.3.2). The following responsibility 
questions were asked: 
12 Do you yourself believe that you or anyone else was directly or indirectly 
responsible for the onset of your pain in the first place? (If so, who? Why do you 
believe this? How do you feel about this?) 
13 Do you believe that this person/these people foresaw the consequences, or could 
have foreseen the consequences of their actions which led to your pain? 
14 Do you believe that he/she/they acted intentionally? Do you believe they intended 
the outcome to happen? 
15 Do you think that the behaviour that he/she/they carried out, which led to the onset 
of your pain was acceptable, considering the situation at the time? 
16 Do you believe that you or anyone else is directly or indirectly responsible for you 
still having your pain now? (Is it the same person/people? If not, who is it? How do 
you feel about this? 
17 (If different), Why do you think this person/these people are responsible for your 
pain now? 
18 (Do you believe they acted intentionally? Do you believe they intended the 
outcome to happen? (i.e. for you to still be in pain). How do you feel about this? Do 
you believe that they were able to foresee the consequences of their behaviour, which 
led to you still being in pain? Do you believe that their actions were acceptable?) 
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The semi-structured nature of questions 12, 16 and 17 measuring responsibility 
attributions for the pain onset and pain now, took account of the structured nature of 
existing responsibility measures (Chapter 2, section 2.2.3.5). They were worded in 
such a way so as to allow participants to give their own responsibility attributions, 
within the bounds of Shaver's (1985) theoretical notion that responsibility must only 
be assigned to a person. Thus, attributions could be made to anyone at all, or no one at 
all. 
Questions 13,14,15 and 18 investigated the extent to which Heider's (1958) 
responsibility levels foreseeability, intentionality and justifiability applied to 
responsibility attributed for the pain onset. In question 18 these levels served as 
probes because it was not known whether they would apply to the pain now. This is 
because their use in the present study was exploratory, given the lack of research 
making use of these levels in general (Chapter 2, section 2.2.3.2). 
Blame was defined as follows: 
"To blame someone for something involves finding fault with someone for the 
occurrence of a negative event. In the branch example, the person throwing the 
branch would be perceived to be directly to blame for the resulting injury, if e.g. 
he/she intentionally threw the branch at the other person, with the aim of hitting the 
other person. A person would be perceived as being indirectly to blame if e.g. he/she 
encouraged someone to throw the branch at the other person. " 
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Blame was defined as in Chapter 2, section 2.2.3.2. The direct and indirect blame 
distinctions were used to be consistent with direct/indirect types of responsibility. 
Additionally, intentionality was introduced to be consistent with Shaver's (1985) 
theoretical idea that the intention to create harm must be present in order for blame to 
be assigned to a person (Chapter 2, section 2.2.3.3). The following blame questions 
were asked: 
19 Do you yourself believe that you or anyone else was directly or indirectly to blame 
for the onset ofyour pain in the first place? (If so, who? Why do you think this? How 
do you feel about this?) 
20 What is it about the person that you blame e.g. their character (i.e. them as a 
person), or their behaviour? 
21 Do you believe that you or anyone else is directly or indirectly to blame for you 
still having your pain now? (If so, who? How do you feel about this?) 
22 What is it about the person that you blame, e.g. their character (i.e. them as a 
person), or their behaviour? 
Questions 19 and 21 allowed for blame to be attributed to anyone or no one at all for 
the pain onset and now. This took account of the same limitations as the responsibility 
literature, and included Shaver's (1985) theoretical idea that blame must be assigned 
to a person. Questions 20 and 22 explored the applicability of Janoff-Bulman's (1979) 
distinctions between behavioural and characterological self-blame in pain samples 
(Chapter 2, section 2.2.3.2). This was exploratory because types of self-blame have 
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not been found to be examined before in pain samples, although they have been used 
in related, cancer and bums patients (Chapter 2, section 2.2.3.2). 
Causal attributions have not only been distinguished from responsibility and blame 
attributions (Shaver, 1985), but also from reason attributions (Buss, 1978). This being 
the case reasons for pain were explored in an attempt to support this distinction. Using 
the same tree analogy applied to cause, responsibility and blame, a reason was defined 
as follows: 
"A reason can be defined as a goal or purpose of something. In the branch example, a 
reason may have been that the person threw the branch with the purpose of hitting the 
other person in an act of revenge". 
This was based on Buss's (1978) definition of a reason (Chapter 2, section 2.2.3.3). 
As with the other attribution types, any previous consideration of a reason was 
investigated before the participants were asked: 
23 Do you yourself believe that there is a reason why you have your pain? (What is 
it/are they? Does your pain have any meaning to you?) 
4.3.3.8 Topic E: Adjustment 
Chapter 2 (section 2.3.5) outlined criticisms of research investigating the 
attribution/adjustment relationship in pain/illness/injury samples, including the nature 
of the adjustment measures. One criticism of them is that they are often in a structured 
questionnaire format, which limits what can be learned about adjustment to 
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illness/injury situations in general, and pain in particular. In order to learn more about 
the adjustment to pain, the present study aimed to examine adjustment to pain in a 
semi-structured way using questions to guide topic areas, but not imposing response 
categories on participants. To develop adjustment outcomes relevant to pain, 
questions were presented that would allow the participants to define their own 
adjustment to pain using the health, psychological and functioning outcomes outlined 
in Chapter 2 (section 2.2.5.2). This was exploratory because no research has been 
found to allow pain sufferers to define their own adjustment to pain. Although the use 
of multiple adjustment measures has been criticised for being unreliable (Michela and 
Wood, 1986), the purpose of the present study was to investigate adjustment to pain in 
different areas of a person's life. 
Chapter 2 (section 2.3.6) reported that variations in the timing of the 
attribution/adjustment relationship employed across studies investigating this 
association might contribute to the mixed results found. In order to consider this, to 
determine whether attributions and adjustment are associated at some times in the 
pain experience more than others, the interview schedule contained questions 
measuring attributions and adjustment for different times in the pain experience. 
Questions measuring adjustment for the pain onset and now were developed using the 
same criteria as that for measuring attributions for these times (see section 4.3.3.7). 
Adjustment for different times was examined in relation to psychological outcomes, 
namely emotional adjustment. Emotions towards the pain were selected as the 
psychological outcome in the present study because they are commonly measured in 
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pain/illness/injury samples (Chapter 2, section 2.2.5.2). They were investigated for 
different times because some research has indicated they may change across the pain 
experience (Church and Vincent, 1996) (Chapter 2, section 2.3.6). The investigation 
of adjustment over time was exploratory because few studies have been found to 
investigate adjustment to pain/illness/injury for more than one time period. The 
following emotion questions were asked: 
24 What, if any emotions did you have towards your pain when it first began? 
25 What, if any emotions do you feel towards your pain now? 
26/n general, would you say that since the onset ofyour pain, you have experienced 
more positive or more negative emotions? (What are they? Are you still experiencing 
them?) 
The following questions were concerned with health outcomes: 
27 What treatments have you had for your pain, throughout the course of your pain? 
28 Do you yourself manage your pain in any way, over and above taking medication? 
(Do you fee/like this gives you control of your pain?) 
29 How do others manage your pain now e.g. doctors? (How effective do you find 
this?) 
30 Do you believe that your pain can be controlled? (How does this make you feel?) 
Questions 27 - 30 were centred on ways in which the participants' pain had been 
managed. This was examined because pain management is a common health outcome 
(Chapter 2, section 2.2.5.2). Question 27 explored in general various treatments for 
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pain received, while question 29 investigated how others manage the pain. Question 
28 examined whether the participants did anything themselves to manage their own 
pain. Question 30 was included to explore the extent to which the participants felt 
their pain could be controlled. 
Both social and physical functioning outcomes have been commonly measured in 
pain/illness/injury samples (Chapter, 2, section 2.2.5.2), and so were explored in the 
present study through the following questions: 
31 Has your pain limited what you are able to do on a daily basis? (In what way?) 
32 Have you had to adapt your life in any way because of your pain? 
33 How well do you feel that you have adapted to your pain? 
38 Have you received any help and/or support since the onset of your pain? (If so, 
from whom?) 
39 How helpful have you found this support? 
Question 31 investigated any physical limitations on daily life imposed by the pain 
experience, while questions 32 and 33 examined any ways the participants had to 
adapt to the pain (both physically and socially), and feelings about this. Questions 38 
and 39 explored social support as a form of social adjustment with the pain. 
4.3.3.9 Topic F: Factors Influencing the Making of Causal Attributions 
The following questions measured factors that might influence the causal attributions 
made for pain: 
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4 0 In general, do you feel you know a lot about your pain condition? 
41 Are you satisfied with the information you have about your condition? 
42 At present, are you uncertain about anything relating to your pain? 
Chapter 2 (section 2.2.3.5) identified motives for making causal attributions, 
including both knowledge and uncertainty factors. Questions 40 and 41 were 
concerned with what the participants knew about their pain, and if they were satisfied 
with this knowledge. Question 42 measured any uncertainties related to the pain. 
These questions were included as possible reasons behind any causal attributions 
made for pain. 
4.3.3.10 Miscellaneous Questions 
Two other questions, not specific to any of the six topics were asked: 
43 How long do you expect to experience your pain? (How do you feel about this?) 
44 Would you like to tell me anything else about your pain? 
Question 43 aimed to establish the extent to which each participant had a realistic 
view of his/her pain situation (e.g. after several years of pain did they still expect their 
pain situation to resolve?). Question 44 allowed the participants to add anything else 
about their pain. This interview schedule is reproduced in full in Appendix 3.1. 
4.4 PILOT STUDY 
The interview schedule was initially piloted on a sample of 12 community pain 
sufferers recruited using the poster advertisement (see Appendix 1). The results of the 
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interview schedule and other, completed questionnaire data are presented as 
frequencies and means in Appendix 3.2. The outcome of the pilot study was that some 
improvements and amendments were made to the interview schedule. These can be 
seen in Appendix 3.3. The revised interview schedule used in the main phase of the 
study can be seen in Appendix 3.4. 
4.5 DATAANALYSIS 
4.5.1 Introduction 
This section will consider the way in which the interview and questionnaire data in 
the main phase of the study was analysed, in the following sections. Firstly, the 
qualitative data analysis of the interview data, considering the way the interview data 
was transcribed, alternative ways of analysing qualitative information, and thematic 
content analysis. Secondly, the quantitative analysis of the interview and 
questionnaire data, including the database created, management of missing data, 
statistical tests performed on the data and interpreting the data, and thirdly, the data 
analysis of the study aims. 
4.5.2 Qualitative Data Analysis 
4.5.2.1 Transcribing the Interview Data 
All interviews were tape-recorded with permission from each participant. These tape 
recordings were then transcribed. Acknowledged disadvantages of transcribing 
interviews are that firstly, since the written and spoken word differ from each other, 
the written dialogue may seem disorganised (Powney and Watts, 1987). Secondly, a 
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lack of clarity in listening to a recorded conversation may result in some spoken 
words being missed (Powney and Watts, 1987), and thirdly, facial expressions may 
also be missed. However, in order to gain as much as possible from the data, and to 
recreate the interview scenario as far as possible, the following transcribing style was 
adopted. Capital letters, full-stops, quotations marks, commas, pauses, mistakes, 
repetitions, and slang were all used to represent the flow of the conversation 
(Krippendorff, 1980), although for ethical reasons the names of specific people were 
excluded. 
4.5.2.2 Methods of Analysing Interview Data 
Once transcribed, interviews can be analysed in different ways. Analysis involves 
creating codes to identify patterns in the data. Various ways of coding interview data 
exist. For example, attributions can be coded using an attributional coding scheme 
(Stratton, 1991; 1997; Stratton, Heard, Hanks, Munton, Brewin and Davidson, 1986). 
This involves coding attribution responses in a series of eight stages, including the 
following dimensions: stable/unstable; globaVspecific and controllable/uncontrollable. 
These dimensions were originally developed by Weiner, Frieze, Kulka, Reed, Rest 
and Rosenbaum (1971). They refer to the extent to which attributions are likely to 
change, whether they are likely to affect a person's whole life, or specific parts of it, 
and whether they are controllable or not. Other research investigating attributions in 
chronically ill samples has coded data into these dimensions (Lowery et al, 1983; 
1987). One advantage of this is that it provides consistent guides under which to 
analyse responses (Stratton et al, 1986), rather than researchers imposing their own 
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categories on participant responses, which may result in different researchers coding 
similar responses under different categories. However, attributional dimensions were 
not used in the present study for two reasons. Firstly, only causal attributions not 
responsibility and blame attributions have been coded into these dimensions, and a 
consistent scheme was planned for all three concepts. Secondly, it was anticipated that 
the precise nature of the original attribution responses could be obtained using 
categories created from them, not by imposing categories on them. 
In order to allow categories to emerge from the interview data, it was subjected to a 
qualitative data analysis. This allows both for the analysis of interview data in a 
purely qualitative way (e.g. Dey, 1993; Miles and Huberman, 1994; Riley, 1990), and 
for the quantification of this data, such as in thematic content analysis (Boyatzis, 
1998; Carney, 1972; Holsti, 1969; Krippendorff, 1980). This latter method of analysis 
was selected because an aim of the present study was to conduct a thematic qualitative 
analysis of the responses to the interview questions, particularly attributions (see 
section 4.5.2.3), and a quantitative analysis of all the interview data (see section 
4.5.3). 
4.5.2.3 Thematic Content Analysis 
Content analysis has been defined as, "a rigorous method of analysing text generated 
from interview transcripts" (Burnard, 1994, p.33). The aim of content analysis in 
examining text from interview transcripts is to illustrate, through the use of categories 
and subcategories, the issues discussed by interviewees during their interview. Most 
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content analysis occurs at this level, identifying either data-driven or theoretically 
driven key themes, and patterns of responses (Carney, 1972). In the present study a 
hybrid approach to thematic analysis was used to analyse responses to the interview 
questions, because although the themes developed in the analysis were data-driven, 
they were not compared across samples. It has been suggested that a hybrid approach 
requires previous research/theories to articulate meaningful themes (Boyatzis, 1998). 
However, given that the interview questions in the present study were exploratory 
because they measured attributions and adjustment in a novel way, themes emerging 
from their responses could only be analysed on their own merit, rather than on the 
basis of previous research or theories. However, this did aid the interpretation of the 
emergent themes. 
There are three main stages to conducting a data-driven thematic analysis (Boyatzis, 
1998). Firstly, sampling and design issues must be considered. In this study a 
convenience sample of community pain sufferers was selected. Although there are 
problems both with convenience sampling (see section 4.2.2.5), and with generalising 
from non-specific community samples, this was adequate for the exploratory purposes 
of the present study. The second stage involves developing themes and a code. 
However, in order to do this, the way the data is analysed must first be identified. In 
this study the unit of analysis was each pain sufferer, and the unit of coding was their 
interview schedules, in particular responses to each of the questions of the schedule, 
represented as sentences. There are several stages to developing themes and a code. 
Firstly, the raw information must be reduced. In the present study the raw information 
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was the responses to each question. For example, the question, "Who or what, if 
anything, do you yourself believe caused your pain to begin in the first place?'', 
elicited the following response: "The back, overstretching. It clicked ... I stretched too 
far" (16). This and all responses to the questions were gathered in notation form to 
determine any themes among them. 
Secondly, from this raw information thematic categories emerge, and a code 
developed to clearly identify each theme. In the present study, across responses to 
each of the cause, responsibility and blame questions, for both time periods, four main 
and four scarcely mentioned categories emerged. These latter categories involved 
attributions to "Psychological Factors" (for example stress), "God", "Something" (an 
object), and "Don't know" (of an attribution). Given their scarcity these categories 
will not be discussed. The main categories involved "Physical External Attributions", 
"Physical Internal Attributions", "Attributions to the Self', and "Attributions to 
Others". Diagram 4.1 summarises these categories and the codes used to define them, 
in terms of definitions, statements of how they should be identified from the interview 
data, and an example of each category. The precise nature of the categories will be 
considered in detail in Chapter 5. 
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Diagram 4.1: Coding attribution categories 
~ I Catego•l" \, r--______ 
r-----------~~ ~~~--------~ 
I Physical External I Physical Internal Attributions to Attributions to I Attributions l Attributions the Self Others 
Definition: 
Making attributions 
to environmental 
factors 
Identification: 
Responses: Falling; Job; 
Way of life; Medical 
treatment; Activity; 
System 
Example: 
"I would still think it 
was the, having the 
hysterectomy that 
triggered it off'. 
; 
Definition: 
Making attributions 
to physical internal 
states 
Identification: 
Responses: Heredity; 
Symptoms/name of 
condition; Height, Age; 
Post-operation stress 
Example: 
"Just joints, wear and 
tear. That was what was 
explained to me at the 
time". 
Definition: 
Making attributions 
to the self 
Identification: 
Any responses involving 
attributions to the self 
Example: 
"I don't think anyone 
else was to blame. It was 
just solely myself'. 
Definition: 
Making attributions 
to others 
Identification: 
Any responses involving 
attributions to others 
Example: 
"It was a patient who 
was delirious and who 
had a plaster cast on his 
leg who kicked me" 
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The final stage of developing themes and a code involves assessing each code for 
reliability, in order to account for researcher bias, and to help determine that the data 
coding is representative of the actual raw data (Boyatzis, 1998). Several different tests 
of reliability for interview data have been identified (Boyatzis, 1998; Krippendorff, 
1980). The method used to analyse the reliability of the interview coding was inter-
rater reliability. This refers to the extent to which a process can be recreated at 
different times, with different coders. It may involve two or three people applying the 
same recording instructions independently to the same set of data (Boyatzis, 1998; 
Krippendorff, 1980). No method of reliability is devoid of criticism, and inter-rater 
reliability is no exception. This has been criticised on the grounds that either through 
tiredness, or in an attempt to fulfill his/her commitment to the task, the independent 
rater may fail to accurately record, or bias the data (Robson, 2002). However, there 
are several means by which reliability can be increased, including through increasing 
the consistency of the setting in which the information is collected (i.e. presenting the 
interview in the same order every time) (Boyatzis, 1998), and defining the codes 
created from the transcripts rigidly and exhaustively (Holsti, 1969). Both methods 
were used in the present study to increase reliability. 
Percentage agreement was used to calculate the extent to which both the researcher 
and the independent rater agreed in their assignment of text from the transcripts to the 
codes created. Percentage agreement is calculated in the following way: 
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Percentage Agreement= The number of times both coders agree 
X 100 
The number of times agreement was possible 
This method of reliability has several disadvantages, including that some agreement 
will have occurred by chance (Rust and Cooil, 1994; Topf, 1986). Other researchers 
have taken the element of chance into account in their reliability estimations (Cohen, 
1960; Scott, 1955). Despite this, percentage agreement was used to calculate 
reliability, for two main reasons. Firstly, it is easy to calculate and understand. 
Secondly, due to the straightforward nature of the coding i.e. assigning text to codes 
which came from categories developed from responses to questions presented in the 
same order in every interview, a high level of agreement would be expected, thereby 
reducing the likelihood of any chance agreement. A level of 80% agreement is 
considered satisfactory in inter-rater reliability (Hartmann, 1977). 
A second individual was asked to code the interview data. This person was an 
experienced researcher, with no knowledge of the purpose of the study. Once 
agreement to code the data had been reached, the independent rater was allocated a 
random 10% of the interview transcripts, along with a list of codes developed from 
identified categories in the transcripts. The rater was instructed to assign the 
appropriate text to the codes. In order for there to be agreement, the same piece of text 
had to be assigned to the same code. This was represented by a score of 1. Any level 
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of disagreement was scored 0. Agreement was summed in terms of the number of 
codes in which it was possible to reach agreement. 
The third main stage of a data-driven thematic analysis involves validating the 
developed code (Boyatzis, 1998). After the reliability of the coding was achieved, 
validity was tested through ensuring the codes applied to all attribution responses. 
4.5.3 Quantitative Data Analysis 
4.5.3.1 The Database 
To quantify all of the interview data, some demographic data was coded as a category 
(gender, marital status, present employment, type of pain). The other parts of the 
coded interview transcripts were converted into a form for statistical analysis using 
presence/absence coding (Boyatzis, 1998). The most frequent three or four categories 
to emerge from responses to each interview question were scored as present or absent 
for each individual. For example, for attributions, when asked about blame for the 
pain onset, if most or a large number of participants blamed others for their pain 
onset, then attributions to "Others" would form a frequent category for that question. 
Each person who blamed others for his/her pain onset would be assigned a value of 1 
indicating the presence of this thematic category. On the other hand, those who did 
not blame others for their pain onset would be assigned a value of 0, indicating that 
they did not give this response. This procedure was applied to all of the most frequent 
categories to emerge. 
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It was possible that multiple responses could be given in response to a question, 
resulting in more than one category being scored as present for an individual. For 
example, a person blaming him/herself and others for their pain onset, which were 
common categories to emerge in response to the question about blame for the pain 
onset, would result in two categories being scored as present for that individual. 
Where participants reported multiple responses that fell into the same category, this 
was scored as present only once. For example, those who blamed their spouse and 
their employer i.e. others for their pain onset would only be scored as having blamed 
others once. 
The presence/absence data from the interview schedule, and the actual scores obtained 
on the pain and just world questionnaires were entered into SPSS (Windows) v 9.0. 
To ensure all data had been entered correctly, frequencies were obtained for the 
interview data, and descriptive statistics (means, standard deviations, minimum and 
maximum scores) were obtained for the questionnaire data. The few random errors 
made involved mistakes in keying in the data. They were identified through 
comparing frequency counts with counts in the interview data, and determining 
outlying values and skewed scores in the questionnaire means. All errors were 
corrected by referring back to the coded interviews and questionnaires and entering 
the correct values. These methods of analysis were then run again to ensure the 
reliability of the database. 
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4.5.3.2 Missing Data 
Data was missing from both the interviews and questionnaires. For questionnaire 
(scale) data, missing data has been identified as a serious problem in data analysis. 
The pattern of missing data is more important than the amount of missing data. 
Random missing values pose fewer problems than non-random values, because the 
latter affect the generalisability of the results (Tabachnik and Fidell, 1996). There are 
no firm guidelines for how much missing data can be tolerated for a sample of a given 
size, and so a 10% level was set beyond which a measure was classed as unreliable. 
No data was missing in the Just World Scale. However data was missing for two 
participants on the short-form McGill Pain Questionnaire (3.2% of the sample), due to 
the misplacement of the data. There are a variety of methods for handling missing 
data, such as deleting cases or variables, or estimating missing data (Tabachnik and 
Fidell, 1996). However, in the present study the data was scored as missing, and 
assigned a value of 46 to represent this (since the maximum score on the scale was 
45). The data was handled in this way because there were few missing values, and so 
could afford to represent the data as it was. 
Missing interview schedule data was due to researcher error, failing to ask some 
questions of participants. In total, 19% of the sample were not asked one of the 
interview questions. This is percentage is negligible when considering that there were 
24 questions asked of 64 participants in the main study (see Appendix 3.4) for the 
main study interview schedule). Using the same criteria as the quantitative data, this 
comprised less than 10% of missing data in each of the interview questions. Since the 
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absence of a response cannot be compensated for, all missing interview data was 
assigned a value of9 in the categories of missing data. 
4.5.3.3 Statistical Technique: Factor Analysis 
Factor analysis can be used to simplify data within a large correlation matrix by 
organising the data into related factors, each of which are independent of each other. 
Principal components analysis (PCA) was used in the present study to calculate the 
empirically derived subcategories of data. This produces factors that are uncorrelated 
with each other, explains all of the variance in a correlation matrix, and produces 
eigenvalues indicating how much variance each component accounts for. The factors 
initially produced are subject to rotation before they can be interpreted. The most 
appropriate type of rotation for uncorrelated factors is varimax rotation. This aims to 
maximise the variance produced (Kline, 1994, p.67). Within each factor are factor 
loadings, representing the correlation of the variables with the factors. These loadings 
indicate how much variance a factor can account for in that variable. Comrey (1973) 
considered loadings in excess of0.71 to be excellent, 0.63 to be very good, 0.55 to be 
good, 0.45 to be fair, and 0.32 to be poor. 
After rotation, the factor eigenvalues and scree plot are used to determine the number 
of factors produced in factor analysis. Factors with eigenvalues greater than 1 are 
retained (Tabachnik and Fidell, 1996, p.620). The scree test consists of eigenvalues 
plotted against each of the factors (Cattell, 1966). Eigenvalues within the scree test 
are negatively decreasing, such that the eigenvalue for the first factor is greater than 
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for the second, which is greater than for the third, and so on. The number of factors 
within a scree plot can be determined by looking at a point in the plot where a line 
drawn through the points changes slope (Tabachnik and Fidell, 1996, p.621). It is the 
factors before the change in slope which are retained. The factors identified produce 
factor scores that can be used in subsequent analyses. 
In the present study factor analysis was used to order the thematic categories into 
statistically related groups ofitems. 
4.5.3.4 Reliability of Categories and Subscales 
The reliability of the factors obtained using PCA, and of the theoretically derived 
subscales of the questionnaire data was calculated using Cronbach's alpha coefficient. 
This is a psychometrically derived means of testing commonalities among items in a 
scale, under a variety of situations. A reliability value of 0. 7 or above has been 
considered suitable for statistical analysis (Nunnally, 1978, p.425). 
4.5.3.5 Statistical Technique: Chi-Square Analysis 
Chi-square investigates whether there is a relationship/difference between variables. It 
is a test of statistical significance that allows a researcher to detennine the probability 
that the observed relationship/difference between variables may have arisen by chance 
(Bryman and Cramer, 1994, p.159). The test starts with the assumption that there is no 
relationship/difference between the variables being examined (the null hypothesis). 
To detennine if there is a relationship/difference, the null hypothesis needs to be 
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rejected. If it is confirmed, the proposition that there is a relationship/difference must 
be rejected. The chi-square statistic is then calculated by comparing the observed 
frequencies in each cell of a contingency table, with those that would be expected on 
the basis of chance alone. The greater the difference between the observed and 
expected frequencies, the larger the ensuing chi-square will be. The next stage in the 
chi-square is to determine a significance level, reflecting what may be an acceptable 
risk that the null hypothesis may be correctly rejected. This is commonly set at the 
0.05 level. There are different significance tests that can be calculated. Yates' 
Continuity Correction should be reported with a 2x2 table, because this compensates 
for the overestimation of the chi-square when a 2x2 table is used. Pearson's chi-
square should be reported with larger tables. 
Chi-square only determines if there is a relationship/difference between variables, it 
does not convey information about the strength of this. In order to determine the 
strength of a relationship from a contingency table, the Cramer's V statistic can be 
used. This derives in large part from chi-square, and provides values between 0-1, 
with higher values indicating stronger relationships between variables (Bryman and 
Cramer, 1994, p.178). 
In the present study 2x2 chi-squares were conducted to determine differences and 
associations between attribution and adjustment categorical variables. Larger chi-
squares were conducted to determine differences between demographic and pain-
related variables on attribution and adjustment categories. 
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4.5.3.6 Statistical Technique: Correlation 
Correlation analysis is used to describe the strength and direction of a relationship 
between two variables (Pallant, 2002, p.115). There are different types of correlation 
analyses. Pearson product-moment correlation can be used to determine associations 
between continuous variables. The output from this correlation provides both the 
correlation coefficient, r, and the square root of this correlation, corresponding to the 
to the proportion of the variation in values of one of the variables which can be 
predicted from variation in the other variable. If this is low, i.e. around the value of 
0.3 or less, then there is little value in continuing to investigate a relationship. In the 
present study, Pearson's product-moment correlation coefficient was calculated to 
determine the strength of the relationship between continuous variables, namely pain 
intensity and just world scores. 
4.5.3. 7 Statistical Technique: Regression 
Regression analyses can be used to determine the relationship between one dependent 
variable, and a number of independent variables (Pallant, 2001, p.134). The principles 
of regression are based on correlation, but allow for more sophisticated exploration of 
interrelationships among a set of variables. In particular, it can be used to determine 
how well a set of variables are able to predict a particular outcome; which variable 
within a set is the best predictor of an outcome, and whether a particular predictor is 
still able to predict an outcome when the effects of another variable are controlled for. 
When the dependent and independent variables are continuous, multiple regression 
analyses should be conducted. There are various different types of multiple 
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regression, and various assumptions must be met before this analysis can be 
conducted (see Tabachnik and Fidell, 1996). In stepwise regression, the order of entry 
is based on statistical criteria. Stepwise regression is useful when there is no 
theoretical rationale for determining the order in which variables should be entered 
into the equation. This procedure not only predicts the overall explained variance, but 
also assesses the unique contribution of each variable or a set of variables after taking 
account of variables already entered into the equation. In the present study stepwise 
multiple regression was used, where the statistical program used selected the 
independent variables to be entered into the analysis, and in which order, to determine 
attribution and adjustment predictors of just world and pain scores. 
Logistic regression analysis is a method for determining which of a number of 
categorical or continuous independent variables best predicts a categorical dependent 
variable (Field, 2002, p.l63). There are a number of different methods that can be 
used in logistic regression (Field, 2002, p.l68-170). In the present study the forced 
entry method was selected. In this method all of the covariates are entered in one 
block, and parameter estimates are calculated for each block (Field, 2002, p.168). The 
forced entry method was used to examine relationships between each of the health, 
psychological and functioning adjustment outcomes (see section 4.3.3.8), and causal 
attributions made and not made for the pain now. 
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4.5.3.8 Statistical Technique: Analysis of Variance 
Analysis of variance (ANOVA) is used to compare two or more means to determine if 
there are any reliable differences between them (Tabachnik and Fidell, 1996, p.35). 
Specifically, it compares the variance (variability in scores) between different groups 
(believed to be due to the independent variable), with the variability within each 
group (believed to be due to chance). The F ratio represents the variance between 
groups, divided by the variance within groups. A large F ratio suggests that there is 
more between-group than within-group variability, and if this between-group variance 
is significant, then the null hypothesis that the group means are equal can be rejected 
(Pallant, 2001, p.168). There are different types of ANOV A. One way between-
groups ANOV A is used when there is one independent grouping variable with three 
or more levels, and one continuous dependent variable (Pallant, 2001, p.187). This 
was employed in the present study to explore differences between demographic and 
pain-related variables on pain and just world scores. The two-way between-groups 
ANOV A is used when there is one continuous dependent variable, and two 
independent variables, with two groups in each variable (Pallant, 2001, p.201). This 
was used in the present study to explore differences between attribution categorical 
variables on pain and just world scores, and was expanded to three or four-way 
ANOV AS to consider individual differences in pain intensity scores. Finally, in a one-
way repeated measures ANOV A each subject is measured on the same continuous 
scale at least three times (Pallant, 2001, p.196). This was used in the present study to 
examine any differences in current, usual and worst pain intensity scores. 
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A significant ANOV A result does not reveal which of the independent groups differ 
on the dependent variable. For this, a post-hoc test must be carried out. A variety of 
post-hoc tests have been identified (see Pallant, 2001, p.173 - 175). In the present 
study two post-hoc approaches were adopted: Tukey's Honestly Significant 
Difference Test (HSD) was used in one-way ANOV A to determine specific 
differences between categorical grouping variables with more than three levels, on 
one dichotomous dependent variable. The Bonferroni procedure was used in repeated 
measures ANOV A to determine where significant differences lay between current 
pain scores, usual pain scores, and pain scores when at its worst. 
4.5.3.9 Interpreting Results: Causality 
Chapter 2 (section 2.3.5) criticised the literature reviewed for not determining the 
causal nature of the attribution/adjustment relationship. In the present study none of 
the chi-square tests of association between attribution and adjustment variables 
revealed anything about the causal nature of this relationship. However, this may be 
difficult to determine, given that various factors, both overt and hidden may mediate 
the relationship. 
4.5.3.10 Interpreting Results: Statistical and Clinical Significance 
Statistically significant results differ from results that are of clinical significance. For 
example, although it may be significant, the practical importance of a correlation of 
0.2 is limited (Pallant, 2001, p.112). Additionally, the chance of obtaining a 
statistically significant result increases with the size of a sample (Robson, 2002, 
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p.400). For these reasons, the clinical as well as statistical significance of the results 
produced in the present study was considered. 
4.5.3.11 Interpreting Results: Type 1 and Type 2 Errors 
Two types of error can be made in the interpretation of statistical analyses. Firstly, a 
Type 1 error involves thinking there is an interaction between two variables, when 
perhaps there might not be. This might be the result of conducting a large number of 
analyses, resulting in some significant results being produced by chance. This can be 
minimised through selecting an appropriate alpha level, such as 0.05. This was 
selected in the present study. The second type of error, a Type 2 error, occurs when it 
is believed that there is no interaction between two variables, but in fact there might 
be. This could be because of a lack of power or small sample size (Pallant, 2001, 
p 172-173). Both types of error were considered in the interpretation of statistical 
analyses. 
4.5.4 Data Analysis of the Study Aims 
Qualitative and statistical methods were used to analyse the aims outlined in Chapter 
3 (section 3.3). The first aim was to examine the cause, responsibility and blame 
attributions made for pain, in the ways outlined in section 3.3.1. However, before this, 
a qualitative thematic analysis was undertaken of the pain attributions made. Four 
categories emerged from this and were considered in the analysis of the aims. In terms 
of analysis, frequencies were used to represent the making and nature of the 
attributions made. Descriptive and statistical analyses were used to determine whether 
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cause, responsibility and blame were distinguished from each other. Descriptively, 
different responses being given for each concept was taken as an indication that 
distinctions were made between them. Statistical analysis took two forms. Firstly, chi-
square analyses were conducted to determine associations between pairs of concepts, 
and secondly, factor analysis determined any common groupings among similar 
responses given across all three attribution types, for both time periods. To examine 
changes in attributions, each common response across cause, responsibility and blame 
were combined, represented as frequencies, and subject to chi-square analyses 
between both time periods. Justification for adopting this method of determining 
changing attributions is provided in Chapter 5. Finally, all types of causal attributions 
made for the pain now were combined to represent the making of these attributions at 
one time, and subjected to chi-square analyses with possible motives for making 
them, involving knowledge and uncertainty factors, to determine any associations 
between them. 
The second aim was to examine ways of adjusting to pain using a variety of health, 
psychological and functioning outcomes (Chapter 3, section 3.3.2). The nature of 
adjustment reported was analysed using content analysis, and chi-square analyses 
were used to examine differences between emotions reported at the pain onset, now 
and since, to determine changes in emotions. 
The third aim was to explore the nature of the relationship between cause, 
responsibility and blame attributions, and adjustment to pain. There were five parts to 
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this (Chapter 3, section 3.3.3). Firstly, logistic regression analyses were conducted to 
determine any differences in the ability to predict adjustment between those who 
made causal attributions for their pain now (combined responses), and those who did 
not, i.e. reporting their pain is ')ust there". The literature typically examines these 
differences for the pain onset (Chapter 2, section 2.3.2), but was not possible in the 
present analysis because most participants made attributions for their pain onset. 
Secondly, chi-square analyses were conducted to determine any associations between 
the causal attribution categories "Physical External" and "Physical Internal" 
attributions, and the health, psychological and functioning adjustment outcomes. 
Thirdly, chi-square analyses were conducted to determine whether self-
responsibility/blame attributions were adaptive for adjustment to pain, and fourthly, 
whether other-responsibility/blame attributions resulted in poor adjustment to pain. 
Fifthly, chi-squares were conducted to determine whether combined responses within 
the attribution categories, "Physical External", "Physical Internal'', "Self' and 
"Others" across all three attribution types were associated with adjustment at some 
times in the pain experience more than others. 
Within the literature, attributions for the onset of pain/illness/injury are associated 
with current adjustment to the situation (Chapter 2, section 2.3). In the current 
analysis this was extended to include the attribution/adjustment relationship for the 
same time, i.e. both for the pain onset, and now. 
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The fourth aim was to explore the role of just world beliefs in the experience of pain 
(Chapter 3, section 3.3.4). There were three parts to this. Firstly, mean values were 
used to determine the strength of the just world beliefs held by the pain sufferers. 
Secondly, analysis of variance (ANOV A) techniques were used to examine 
differences in the just world scores within types and duration of pain groups. Thirdly, 
ANOV AS were conducted to determine any differences in just world scores between 
those who made causal attributions for their pain now (combined responses), and 
those who did not, and between those who attributed responsibility and blame for 
their pain to themselves, versus others. 
The final aim was to examine differences in adjustment outcomes between those with 
different strengths of just world beliefs (Chapter 3, section 3.3.5). To achieve this, the 
just world scores were converted into low, medium and high scores, representing 
different strengths of belie£ Chi-square analyses were conducted to determine any 
differences in all of the health, psychological and functioning outcomes, between 
these groups. 
The last section of the analysis was an exploratory investigation of interactions 
between pain intensity and all study variables. A variety of statistical techniques were 
adopted in this exploration. Firstly, ANOV A was conducted to determine any 
individual differences in pain intensity. Secondly, stepwise multiple regression 
techniques were used to examine the ability of the attribution categories "Self' and 
"Other" to predict pain intensity. Thirdly, Pearson's product-moment correlation 
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coefficient was calculated to determine any initial associations between pain intensity 
and just world scores. Fourthly, stepwise multiple regression analyses were used to 
determine whether any adjustment outcomes predicted pain intensity. Additional, chi-
square analyses were also conducted to determine any differences in adjustment 
between different strengths of pain intensity groups. 
4.6 MAIN STUDY METHOD 
4.6.1 Introduction 
This section will outline the method employed in the main phase of the study, in terms 
of the participants recruited and the recruitment methods, and the data collection 
procedure. A description of the demographic and pain-related characteristics of the 
sample will also be provided. 
4.6.2 Method 
4.6.2.1 Subject Selection and Recruitment 
The participants were recruited using all three methods outlined in section 4.2.2.5. 
Eleven percent of the participants were recruited through being approached in the 
medical centre. Seventy percent of those who were approached agreed to participate. 
The majority of the participants recruited into the main phase of the study contacted 
the researcher by telephone, volunteering their participation. Most of these came from 
the media advertisement (55%), while the remaining 34% of the participants were 
recruited using the poster advertisement. 
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Regardless of the method of subject recruitment, all participants indicating an interest 
in the study were given further information about the study, either in person, in the 
medical centre, or over the telephone. Following this, all participants still agreed to 
participate. Arrangements were then made to meet, either in their own homes, or the 
university department where the study was based. In total 64 pain sufferers were 
recruited into the study. 
4. 6.2.2 Procedure 
Regardless of where the data was collected, the participant and researcher were alone. 
After introductions had been made, each participant was given a Participant 
Information Sheet to read, providing more information about the study (see Appendix 
4.1 for the sheet), before signing a consent form (see Appendix 4.2 for the consent 
form). Once written consent had been obtained, data collection began. Some 
participants had multiple pain complaints, but were encouraged to focus on their 
worst complaint for the interview. Initially, the SF-MPQ was completed three times to 
investigate current, usual and worst pain intensities. The scale was completed under 
the guidance of the researcher who read aloud each of the 15 descriptors, pain word 
options, and presented participants with the pain gauge. This guidance was to ensure 
all participants completed the questionnaire with the correct pain frame in mind. The 
scale was completed using the format outlined in Chapter 2 (section 2.1.6.3), and was 
completed first to focus the participants on their pain intensity. 
The interview schedule was then introduced, with the following instruction: 
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"Before beginning the interview I would like to ask you to be as honest as possible in 
your responses, giving your own true responses. I would also like to establish if you 
have more than one type of pain, and if so, I'd like to focus on the pain that is your 
worst pain. Is any court action being taken over your pain? I'd like to assure you that 
any court action related to your pain will not be affected by your responses. Any 
information you give me will be strictly confidential. Please indicate if at any time you 
do not understand something in the interview. " 
The questions were asked in the same order throughout all interviews, and were 
conducted by each person (see Appendix 3.4 for the order of the questions). This was 
to minimise any "interviewer effects", by keeping the interviewer constant in all 
interviews (Breakwell, 2000). Each new section of questions was introduced to the 
participants. For example, the attributions section was introduced with the following 
instruction: 
"I would like to let you know that a few attribution questions may be asked more than 
once. The fact that you may be asked them more than once (it will become clear why 
this is) does not necessarily mean that you have to change your responses the second 
time. I am only looking for your true responses in each instance. Is this clear?" 
All interviews were tape-recorded with permission. 
Participants then completed the Just World Scale, introduced as a Social Opinion 
Survey, as has been done in other research to avoid any bias that may result from 
participants being aware they are completing a measure investigating justice beliefs 
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(Miller, 1977). Each participant completed the scale alone, to avoid socially desirable 
responses that may emerge from the presence of the researcher, using the fonnat 
outlined in Chapter 2 (section 2.2.4.5). 
Data collection lasted approximately 40-45 minutes. Once collected, any other 
information g1ven m social conversation was discarded, and goodbyes were 
exchanged. 
4.6.2.3 Reliability and Validity of Interview/Questionnaire Data 
In terms of the reliability of the interview data, a 91% level of agreement was found 
on the text assigned to the emergent categories, suggesting the coded data was 
reliable. In terms of the reliability of the questionnaire data, Cronbach's alpha values 
of 0.69, 0.78 and 0.87 were obtained on the combined sensory, affective and overall 
scores on the short-form McGill Pain Questionnaire (Melzack, 1987) for the present, 
usual and worst pain intensities respectively. Additionally, together the just world and 
unjust world items on the Just World Scale (Rubin and Peplau, 1975) achieved very 
low reliability. However, when these were added to the overall scores, an alpha value 
of0.75 was obtained for the scale. 
4.6.3 Demographics and Pain History of the Study Sample 
Data from two of the 64 participants could not be analysed, because one participant 
discussed multiple pain complaints, and the other participant had a speech 
impediment, which made it impossible to determine her responses when listening to 
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the tape-recording of her interview. Thus, data was analysed from 62 participants. 
Most of these participants were female, with a mean age of 51.05 years. They were 
also married with children, and were employed at the time of the study. Additionally, 
half of the subjects were religious. A variety of pain complaints were reported, the 
most frequent of which were back/spinal pain, and arthritis. The mean pain duration 
of the sample was 8.15 years. Table 4.1 summarises this information. 
Table 4.1: Summary of demographic and pain-related variables 
Measure 
Gender Male= 20 (32.3%) 
Marital Status Married= 33 (53.2%) 
Widowed= 6 (9.7%) 
Single= 12 (19.4%) 
Children No Children= 16 (25.8%) 
Present Employment Employed= 21 (33.9%) 
Retired = 22 (35.5%) 
Religion Not Religious= 31 (50%) 
Type of Pain Back/Spinal= 18 (29.0%) 
*Upper Body= 14 (22.6%) 
***Lower Body= 5 (8.1 %) 
Mean (SD) 
Age 51.05 years (15.31) 
Duration of Pain 8.15 years (8.86) 
*Upper body pain = e.g. head, neck, shoulder pain 
**Middle body pain= e.g. stomach, hip pain 
***Lower body pain =e.g. knee, ankle pain 
Female = 42 (67.7%) 
Separated= 3 (4.8%) 
Divorced= 8 (12.9%) 
Has Children= 46 (74.2%) 
Student= 8 (12.9%) 
None= 11 (17.7%) 
Religious= 31 (50%) 
Arthritis= 17 (27.4%) 
**Middle Body= 8 (12.9%) 
Range 
18-84 years 
1 month - 4 7 years 
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4.7 SUMMARY 
This chapter outlined the method employed to meet the aims of the present study 
detailed in Chapter 3. Details of, and rationales for the variables examined in the 
study, the measures used, and the study sample and method employed were provided. 
The study population consisted of a sample of adult pain sufferers recruited from the 
community. They were suffering from different pain complaints, and had pain for 
various periods of time. A rationale for these criteria was provided. 
The present study was an exploratory investigation to consider shortcomings of 
literature measuring attributions, just world beliefs and adjustment in pain. The study 
was exploratory because all three concepts have not before been measured in this way 
before. A semi-structured interview schedule was developed to consider the following 
shortcomings of the pain literature. Firstly, no research has empirically distinguished 
between cause, responsibility and blame in pain. Secondly, no studies in pain have 
defined all three concepts as a basis of distinguishing between them. Thirdly, no 
attribution measures employed in any study, including in pain research, have allowed 
its participants to make any or no cause, responsibility or blame attributions at all. 
Fourthly, few studies have examined the extent to which cause, responsibility and 
blame attributions for pain change over the pain experience. Fifthly, no studies have 
allowed pain sufferers to define their own adjustment to pain. Sixthly, few pain 
studies have examined the extent to which adjustment to pain changes over the pain 
experience. Finally, no research to date has measured just world beliefs in pain. The 
importance of addressing these issues in pain was considered in Chapter 2 (sections 
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2.2.3.9, 2.2.4.7, 2.3.5 and 2.3.6). In general, all suggest it is important to address the 
issues in order to develop a clearer understanding of the role of attributions and 
adjustment in pain, and to determine whether there is a role for just world beliefs in 
pain. 
The interview schedule was initially piloted to ensure its reliability and validity. The 
result of this was a revised interview schedule used in the main data collection phase, 
along with a pain and just world questionnaire to investigate the aims of the study. 
Details of and the rationale for these instruments were discussed, along with the way 
in which they were applied. 
The way in which the data was managed was also discussed. This included details on 
the analyses conducted on each of the aims, and the way in which the interview and 
questionnaire data were prepared for this analysis. Details of, and rationales for the 
statistical techniques adopted in the present study were given. The way in which 
errors and missing data was handled was also described, along with the way in which 
the results were interpreted. The chapter ended with a discussion of the method 
employed in the main phase of the study. 
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CHAPTER 5: MAIN STUDY RESULTS 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will outline the results of the main phase of the study, in two sections. 
The first section will present the results of a qualitative analysis considering the 
thematic content of pain attributions. The second section will present a quantitative 
analysis of the five aims listed in Chapter 3 (section 3.3). Throughout the analysis of 
these aims, demographic and pain-related variations within the variables will be 
considered, along with any potential variables mediating or moderating interactions 
found. The last section will explore interactions between pain intensity and the main 
study variables. Given the exploratory nature of the present study, it was not feasible 
to report all non-significant results from the statistical analysis. Instead, only those 
non-significant results of particular importance to the exploratory investigation were 
reported. A full interpretation of the results will be made in Chapter 6. 
5.2 QUALITATIVE RESULTS 
5.2.1 Introduction 
Chapter 4 (section 4.5.2.3) considered the method of thematic analysis of the 
attribution responses. This section will present the results of this analysis, by outlining 
the process through which each of the "Physical Internal", "Physical External", "Self' 
and "Others" categories emerged from pain attributions, in a diagram, before 
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considering the precise nature of each category in detail. This section will end with a 
summary of all categories. 
5.2.2 Summary of Process of Thematic Analysis of Pain Attributions 
Diagram 5.1 outlines the process of thematic analysis of pain attributions, starting 
from the responses given, themes emerging from the responses, and the categories 
developed from this. 
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Diagram 5.1: Process ofthematic analysis of pain attributions 
Reasons given for pain Emerging Theme 
Symptoms of condition 
Name of condition 
Post operation stress 
Height 
Age 
Heredity 
Straining activity --------
Falling - -----------._ 
--. Nature of employment ~ 
Wayoflife __ ~ 
Condition 
Specific 
EJ 
EJ 
Incidents/ 
Accidents 
Category 
Physical Internal 
Attributions 
Physical External 
Attributions 
Leisure activity-~ I Lifestyle I 
Medical treatment ,_________. / 
The system ~ Initiator/ 
Failure to obtain treatment Consequence 
Not looking after the self "" 
Hazzard avoidance ~-----~ I Omissions !-
Choosing lifestyle - ----; . . 
Sport ,__ _____ _. / 
Stretching .,. 
Posture ====-------=::: 
Employment ~ / 
Lifting and handling  
Activity 
Husband 
Patients 
Offenders 
Drivers 
Bosses 
Company 
Medical professionals 
Researchers 
Inappropriate 
Activity 
Pain Triggers 
Outsiders 
Scientists 
Attributions to the self 
Attributions to others 
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5.2.3 Category 1: Physical Internal Attributions 
Diagram 4.1 (Chapter 4, section 4.5.2.3) defined a "Physical Internal Attribution" in 
terms of physical internal states i.e. factors originating within the body. This category 
was developed from three common themes that emerged from the pain attributions 
made. The first theme to emerge, "Condition Specific", involved three different types 
of response. The first was attributions to the "Symptoms of a condition". This was 
characterised by reports that pain conditions such as arthritis, sciatica in the leg, and 
back pain originated from a variety of symptoms, including a viral infection, injury, 
nerve damage, and swelling: 
"I had a throat infection, a viral infection ... that's where they reckon the 
immune system reversed itself' (10) 
"Its been suggested that the problem actually has come about via a sports 
injury" ( 48) 
" .. The pain is caused by swelling in the back, but what started that I don 't 
know" (49) 
There were also reports of similar symptoms being reported for arthritis and back 
pain: 
"Just joints, wear and tear. That was what was explained to me at the time. 
Just wear and tear of the joints" ( 4) 
" .. It just stems back from when I was younger and .... it was just wear and tear 
ofthejoints" (24) 
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" ... through wear and tear through the ages while I was working with 
(company) doing removals. Lifting heavy gear" (14) 
An opposing type of response to this emerged, "Named condition", where attributions 
were made to the name of a condition originating within the body, instead of its 
symptoms. So, for example, instead of making attributions to ''wear and tear", 
participants would make attributions to "arthritis" itself: 
"It's just, it eh, I've got rheumatoid arthritis, that would cause it .. ./ don't 
know what caused the rheumatoid arthritis, but I'm saying that's what would 
cause the pain" (5) 
" ... I feel it was just, eh onset of arthritis which eh I have been diagnosed with 
since I was in my teens" (11) 
Other conditions mentioned included irritable bowel syndrome, and endometriosis: 
"Well ... I really thought to begin with it was just part of irritable bowel 
syndrome" {27) 
"Well, I know that the disease endometriosis causes ma pain, but em, I don't 
know what causes that disease to begin with" (55) 
A closer examination of the participants who gave both types of response revealed 
that those who made attributions to symptoms of their condition, had experienced 
pain for over double the duration (up to 15 years) of those who made attributions to a 
named condition (up to seven years). This suggests the possibility that as time goes 
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on, people focus more on their symptoms than their actual condition when discussing 
their pain. However, this was only a minor noted difference, and it may just be that 
people have different styles of explaining their pain situation. 
The third type of response was "Post-operation stress", where an attribution was made 
to internal stress as a result of surgery to treat osteoarthritis as an explanation why 
pain had not resolved at the time of interview: 
"Post-operation stress ... / can't seem to think of anything else that caused it" 
(50) 
The second theme to emerge was "Genetic", where some participants reported the 
onset of conditions such as arthritis, migraine, angina, and the spinal condition 
adhesive arachnoiditis, to originate from "Heredity'' factors in general, or from their 
family, specifically their mother. For example: 
"/do believe that it was genetic ... " {3) 
"Em... (pause) in the very first instance I think it's inherited. It's a family 
trait" (30) 
"Em, probably my mother passing on the gene, that caused this ... hereditary" 
(47) 
There was also some indication that attributions to heredity factors were made in the 
absence of an obvious explanation for the pain onset, it suddenly appeared: 
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"To begin in the first place? Well, it was genetic. I mean, all of a sudden, I 
had a really bad backache and it just didny go away ... / didny do anything for 
the pain to come. It just appeared" (17) 
The third, smaller theme to emerge was "Biology", involving participants making 
attributions for their back pain to "Height" and "Old Age". 
5.2.4 Category 2: Physical External Attributions 
Diagram 4.1 (Chapter 4, section 4.5.2.3) defined a "Physical External Attribution" in 
terms of factors outwith the body, i.e. in the environment. This category was 
developed from three common themes that emerged from the pain attributions made. 
The first theme, "Incidents/ Accidents", involved two main types of response. The first 
involved "Falling", where participants mostly suffering from back pain reported that 
falling over in a range of situations brought about their pain. There were reports of 
falling over in general: 
"/fell fifteen years ago, and broke my wrist, and /fell on my bottom, so it was 
the bottom at my spine, that took the knock. So that may have been the start of 
it" (43) 
" ..... this pain, which is a lot more than normal osteoarthritic pain, was caused 
by the fall. I did always have the arthritis, but it was aggravated by falling, I 
think" (9) 
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and falling over in various situations, including slipping up and falling over potato 
brie in a shop, falling over a hairbrush lying on the floor, being knocked over by a 
heavy goods vehicle, and falling off a ladder: 
"Em ... the cause, mmm (pause), the cause of my pain ..... was the fact that the 
ladder broke and I fell off it" (25) 
falling over while trying to arrest someone: 
"Somebody, objected to me tryin ' to arrest them. And, assaulted me, and 
durin ' the assault I landed on the ground on top of either a stone or a brick, 
which was the initial injury" (54) 
falling out of a rubber tyre being pulled along in water: 
" .... it was actually the force of me, hitting the water at great speed that caused 
the actual, physical damage to the shoulder" (42) 
and being pushed back and falling over whilst playing football: 
"Well, when it happened two of us went up to get it (the ball) and I got pushed 
back, so I landed differently than I would have done if I'd fallen on my own" 
(60) 
The second type of response within this theme, was "Straining Activity", involving 
reports that a variety of factors led to back pain, including leaning too roughly whilst 
making a bed, sneezing too vigorously, overstretching reaching for a far away object: 
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"The back. overstretching. It clicked .... ! stretched too far" (16) 
and twisting the back whilst moving a caravan: 
" .... Moving a caravan ... we were turnin ' the caravan roon aboot an' it's the 
only thing I can think of, that caused it .... Just movin ' the caravan must have 
just twisted masel" (38) 
The second theme to emerge, "Lifestyle", was characterised by three different types 
of response. The first, "Nature of Employment", was characterised by attributions for 
the pain onset made to various types of employment participants used to occupy, 
mostly involving manual labour, such as being a cleaner, floorlayer, removal person, 
and nursing assistant. Most participants who made these attributions were suffering 
from back-related pain. Some attributions were made to the job in general: 
"Just the job" (53) 
while others were made to factors that would put strain on the back, including lifting 
heavy objects: 
" ... I worked too long with lifting those heavy things instead of leaving it and 
going back to (work on the) buses when I started to get a bit older" (14) 
and bending over and standing a lot: 
"(Pause). I think it was mainly caused due to my work. Especially for long 
hours, heavy lifting, and often having to work, you know when I was on call, 
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work on my own without any help, you know difficult patients to lift, moving, 
and also bending over and just standing a lot of the time" (31) 
" .... my work, because I have to do the job I'm doing .... and it involves 
standing" (43) 
Job-related attributions were also made for the onset of arthritis, and involved getting 
wet at work: 
"I blame the hard work at the school... You know you used the big scrubbing 
machines, down on your hands and knees, constantly wet, and you don 't go 
away and dry your hands ... "(12) 
One participant reported that he was not in his normal job at the time of the accident: 
"Well, it's the job I was doing and the employment I was in. My employment 
changed because we were privatised. So you were having to do jack-ofa/1-
trades. But if I'd been in my normal job, the accident wouldn't have been 
there" (7) 
At the time of interview, one attribution for the pain not having resolved involved still 
working in the situation that brought about the pain in the first place: 
"Possibly continuing to work in the same sort of situation, lifting and getting 
into struggles (with patients)" (1) 
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The second type of response, "Way of life", involved reports by older participants i.e. 
aged 60 years or older, that previous lifestyle factors, including diet, and unhealthy 
behaviours such as smoking, drinking too much alcohol, and staying up too late at 
night brought about their pain in the first place: 
"I think probably lifestyle ... combined with a few wrong eating habits, and I 
genuinely believe that acids build up in the body, as a result of this. And only 
if those are got rid of, eh will improvement be found" (20) 
"I think it stems back to World War IL where the food was rationed, and we 
were on a very limited diet. And I don 't think the structure was put into 
children's bodies, and now it manifests itself in our older age" (18) 
"Em, my lifestyle, probably contributed to it .... " ( 40) 
"Well, the smoking" (35) 
The third type of response to fall under the "Lifestyle" theme, was "Leisure Activity", 
characterised by reports that gardening, sport and athletic activities led to pain: 
"My sporting activities" (33) 
"I have my doubts, that it may have been my enthusiasm for gardening, in my 
later years, may have started this problem of my hip joint needing repaired, 
but I do not know about that" (18) 
"I was very athletic when I was younger, a lot younger. I did a lot of gym 
work. Jumping over horses etc. that kind of thing, and I think that sometimes .. ! 
was a bit too energetic and that's what wore my joints out" ( 4) 
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The third theme to emerge was "Initiator/Consequence", which involved responses by 
participants that various types of "Medical treatment" either initiated, or led to a 
worsening of their pain. Attributions were made to a range of medical treatments, 
involving treatments for other conditions that led to the onset of the existing 
condition, such as the side-effects of medication: 
" .... what's causing it (pain) is the medication, the tablets" (11) 
wrong exercises advised by a physiotherapist: 
" .... the exercises given by the physiotherapist" (58) 
and operations that brought about pain: 
"I would still think it was the, having the hysterectomy that triggered it off'' 
{6) 
" ... it was just through my operations and that, that it's all come about" (8) 
Some participants also reported that operations to treat their original pain condition 
were the source of them still having pain at interview. This was either because they 
felt that a swab had been left in after surgery: 
" ... In my wilder moments at night when I'm in real pain I began to wonder if 
they'd left a swab in" (27) 
and because of adhesions developed as a result of surgery: 
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"Well I I believe that it's just my hard luck that I've developed adhesions, 
em ... since, the surgery" (64) 
There was also a report that a refusal to have an operation to treat angina is the reason 
why pain has not resolved: 
" ... Unless I was to go through an operation which they said could eliminate 
the pain which I said I didn't want to go through" ( 40) 
Related to "Medical Treatments", a single response, "The System" was given, where 
a report was made that pain at the time of interview was due to the having to wait for 
medical treatment: 
" .... the system for not picking up what was wrong .... the waiting lists, the fact 
that you have to wait forever to see people " (58) 
5.2.5 Category 3: Attributions to the Self 
Chapter 4 (section 4.5.2.3) defined "Attributions to the Self', as any responses made 
by participants that involved attributions to themselves. This category emerged from 
three common themes to emerge from the pain attributions made. The first, 
"Omissions, was characterised by responses that pain resulted from or was made 
worse by a failure to do certain things. Three types of response were relevant to this. 
Firstly "Hazard avoidance., where some participants made attributions to themselves 
for failing to avoid or notice situations that led to them having an accident that 
resulted in pain. This took the form of not being quick enough to move one's arm out 
178 
of the way of washing machine, not being quick enough to avoid being attacked by a 
patient at work: 
" ... I partly blame myself for not being quick, enough, to stop it" ( 45) 
and failing to notice potential hazards: 
"In part myself. . .! should have noticed it (potato brie on a floor). I wouldn't 
have slipped" (26) 
"Maybe I should have been more aware of the fact that the path was icy .. .! 
was partly to blame because eh, I should have been aware of the, icy 
conditions" (56) 
The second type of response, "Not Looking After the Self', was female-dominated, 
characterised by reports that the onset of pain was due to a failure to look after the self 
properly: 
"Yes ... ! have a tendency of not looking after myself, physically ... " (62) 
through allowing the self to become stressed, resulting in injury by falling over when 
stressed, and failing to rest, compounding an initial injury: 
"We/1 ... /'ve had a sore back since June, and I've I've had two falls before 
then, and one since then, and em ... I think I'm responsible because when it 
started .. .! was told to go off work and rest, and I didn't do it" (51) 
179 
The third type of response, "Failure to Obtain Treatment" involved participants 
making attributions to themselves for failing to obtain treatment in a variety of ways, 
including not receiving further treatment after the initial pain onset: 
"Possibly myself in not going back to the doctors" (26) 
not pushing to be treated in a particular way: 
"(Pause)... I think, two year ago, when I first complained about the pain I 
could have been helped a little .... ifthey send me to ... the Rheumatologist the 
time I complained, I quite believe I wouldny be in the state I'm in the 
day .... Well I blame myself' for no' push in 'it. I should have pushed it" (28) 
and for refusing to have treatment: 
"I don 't think anybody else was responsible for it, no, just myself. .. because I 
wouldn 't go for the operation. I could go for the operation and it would cure it 
(angina)" ( 40) 
The second theme, "Inappropriate Activity", involved six different types of response. 
The first, "Choosing lifestyle'', involved attributions to the self for maintaining 
unhealthy behaviours: 
"I believe that I was indirectly responsible ... because I do believe that it was 
lifestyle, em wrong eating habits, combined with the stress of raising a family 
and doing a very heavy full-time job n (20) 
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"Yes I think I'm fifty percent responsible for the pain, for the way I lived. My 
lifestyle. Likes if I hadn 't have smoked and been up 'till all hours, only getting 
four hours' sleep sometimes. I think all these things contributed" (40) 
The second response, "Employment" involved participants making attributions to 
themselves for having chosen the job in the first place: 
"I don 't think I could hold anyone responsible, to be quite honest. It's a 
personal choice I made ... the type ofjob" (53) 
for working too hard in the job: 
"Myself. .. Ijust worked too long, working lifting heavy stufffor (removal firm) 
and instead of leaving there I just kept on going because I had to work 
sometimes buses, sometimes (removal firm), sometimes doing other things, you 
know. Only for the sake of keeping such a big family" (14) 
"Yes, myself (sighs). Em, I'm a workaholic, push myself to the limits, not just 
occasionally, every day, before even this (condition) was diagnosed I was 
pushing myself far too hard. Em putting myself through pain barriers, when I 
was in pain. Not stopping, not considering anybody, just going through it" 
(43) 
and not following proper procedures at work, leading to pain: 
" .... In the case of me working in hospital there were facilities there which 
helped you lift heavy patients. It was not always practical. But senior staff 
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there would insist that we use ambulifts to get heavy patients in the bath, and 
took a dim view of a nurse lifting a patient without that help. But rules are 
there to be broken, which I did ... I blame myself' (18) 
The third type of response, "Lifting and handling", involved participants who had 
experienced pain for a short time, i.e. for up to one month's duration, reporting having 
experienced sudden strain through carrying or moving heavy objects, such as a 
washing machine, heavy bag, or a caravan: 
"(Pause). Em, my behaviour, in the sense of ... carrying stuff that's too heavy. 
and just on one side of my body" ( 62) 
" .. .Just masel. just masel really. It must have been masel that's ..... mavin' 
what I did (a caravan), it must just have been rough to do it" (38) 
The fourth type of response, "Sport", was male-dominated, and involved participants 
making attributions to their sporting activities for their pain onset. These activities 
were related to the conditions experienced. One participant was suffering from plantar 
fasciaitis (pain in the heels), and reported that his golfing activities (requiring him to 
spend long periods of time on his feet), led to his pain. Another participant made 
attributions to rugby for his rheumatoid arthritis: 
"Myself. .. mainly because the ... playing sports as em as intensely as I did, em, 
and playing rugby with damage to the knees when it would have been more 
judicious to rest them. But as I was a lot younger I didn't appreciate that. And 
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that really was the thin end of the wedge, and the damage has accumulated 
over twenty five years of playing rugby ... " (13) 
The last two types of response were single attributions made for back pain to 
inappropriate "Stretching" and "Posture". 
The third theme to emerge was "Pain Triggers'', and involved attributions to the self 
for pain having not resolved at the time of interview. This consisted of reports of 
"Activities" carried out that trigger bouts of pain. Some of these were unintentional: 
" ... I think because I personally have been unable to rule out every single 
trigger of migraine em I think there's a bit of self-blame in that respect. I feel 
it's always a situation that I have allowed myself to be in that's brought on the 
headache" (30) 
Others were intentional, in the sense that participants carried out activities knowing 
they would lead to pain, but doing this either because they refuse to let pain interfere 
in their lives: 
"Myself, 'cause I can sit down, and give in to it, an ' I refuse to become a 
vegetable, even though at times I suffer. But I push it to its limits still" (33) 
or because they are worried about university coursework: 
" ... ./suppose me, it's, it was, yeah ... because of the way that I've not been 
taking care of myself the way that I've been, you know things that would put 
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strain on me physically ... em .. I've been worried about my dissertation and 
I've been told not to use a PC but I have twice ... " (62) 
5.2.6 Category 4: Attributions to Others 
Chapter 4 (section 4.5.2.3) defined "Attributions to Others" as any attributions made 
by the participants to other people for their pain. This category was developed from 
four common themes to emerge from the pain attributions made. The first, "Family", 
involved females making attributions to their "Husband", who it was felt created 
stress, leading to pain: 
"Yes, l.think my husband could be accountable, for the way he treated me" 
(37) 
" .... I blame my husband ... em, being self-employed, a shopkeeper ... my 
husband doesn't work with me in the shop. He has another business and he 
didn't actually see, what was being done. He was aware of what money was 
coming in, but he didn't actually know what was involved in this .... and it was 
really quite, very tiring. And I think that was what brought everything to a 
head" (43) 
The second theme, "Outsiders", involved attributions to people not well known to the 
pain sufferers. This was characterised by attributions to "Drivers", "Offenders", and 
"Patients". Attributions to "Drivers", were made by participants who had largely 
suffered from upper body pain (neck, shoulder pain), for up to five months' duration, 
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and involved attributions to the driver of a speedboat for speeding, resulting in a 
person falling out a rubber tyre being towed by the boat: 
"The driver of the speedboat ... / was in a doughnut, being towed by a 
speedboat, and eh the driver was going too fast and went to turn and 
positioned the boat into a corner, and the doughnut was pulled behind it in a 
sharp angle at great speed, and I was thrown from the doughnut by the G-
force and hit the water and hurt my shoulder" (42) 
to other people driving recklessly and crashing into the participants' vehicles: 
" .... andjust out of the blue this car came towards us on the wrong side ofthe 
road, overtaking a car which was goin ' slow, and he accelerated into us. And I 
took, as the driver I took the brunt o' the crash, which was a head-on 
crash ... an' I feel no bitterness to the driver, at all, which I find hard to 
understand mysel ', but I feel no bitterness towards him he was a young guy. 
Thirty-six (pause) ... But he caused it, he caused it. He caused the pain wi' his 
bad drivin ' no' thinkin ', being completely stupid, but eh (pause). I dinny feel 
any bitterness towards him ... " (21) 
and to the driver of a vehicle that knocked a participant over, leading to court action: 
"It was the driver ... If it was in court it would be between in my opinion, and 
this is only my opinion, between the driver of the vehicle I was with, and the 
driver that was driving the vehicle that knocked me down " (7) 
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Although this participant was suing for his injuries sustained after being knocked 
over, neither this not any of the other attributions made involved any reported 
negative feelings towards the drivers of vehicles who caused harm. 
One attribution to an "Offender" was made by a fonner police officer who reported 
being attacked while trying to arrest someone: 
"The person who assaulted me is, responsible for the pain that I have. He had 
the choice to stop his actions and had it just been a straightforward wrestling 
match that would have been fair enough, and had he acted responsibly, he 
possibly would have given himself up .... but when you reach the point where 
you're on the ground wrestling wi' somebody and they, at that point, pull a 
knife on you, and are intent on burying the knife into you, they are wholly 
responsible" (54) 
Attributions to "Patients" were made by females who had worked in a nursing care 
environment, and reported being injured by patients through getting into struggles 
with them: 
"Patients. Well it was actually lifting patients and them not operating and 
twisting and fighting that caused one of the pains. Another one was trying to 
support a lady who was determine to go sideways onto a bed and would have 
ripped her leg at the corner of the cotside, and I was pulling against her trying 
to stop her from hurting herself' (1) 
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This person went on to attribute responsibility to the patients: 
" ... patients, because in years gone by they couldn't be held accountable 
psychiatric patients, for anything that happened. But in the say last ten or 
twelve years or so I couldn 't say for definite, you can actually sue them in a 
court of law for the injuries caused to you, even though they're mentally ill" (1) 
This attribution presents the opposite view to that of a nurse who said of a 17 -year-old 
patient who attacked her: 
" .. .!don't really blame her because I mean she didn't really understand what 
she was doing" (45) 
One other fonner nurse also reported being attacked by a patient: 
"It was a patient who was delirious, and who had a plaster cast on his leg 
who kicked me" (19) 
The third theme to emerge, "Employers", included those former nurses who made 
attributions to "Patients", also making attributions to their "Bosses". These 
attributions were made to senior staff for failing to deal appropriately with patients in 
the first place, to help avoid injury: 
" ... the consultant who put her into my ward when she should have been in a 
locked ward environment" ( 45) 
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"I still think that if the patient had been treated ... his condition wouldn't have 
developed, and the injury wouldn't have occurred ... The medical staff (were 
responsible)" (19) 
and to employers for their failure to get their employees properly treated once the 
injury had occurred: 
"When the accident happened, and I was having treatments from doctors and it 
was logged in accident reports and everything, I feel that my employing body 
could have done more about it at the time, and managed to get me 
physiotherapy, or whatever was necessary at the time to alleviate the ongoing 
pain" (1) 
Responses to "Company" also fell under the "Employers" theme, where people made 
attributions for their pain to a body of people working in the same institution. This 
included a ladder company for a person falling off a ladder injuring her wrist, a 
company in whose store someone slipped on potatoe brie, falling over and injuring his 
back, and the Council: 
"The Council for not salting the pavement , which I slipped on .. .I had a fall, 
and em slid on the ice on the pavement" (56) 
The fourth theme to emerge was "Scientists", involving attributions to "Medical 
Professionals". Many participants made attributions to a range of medical 
professionals for their pain condition, involving General Practitioners, surgeons, and 
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physiotherapists. A few attributions were made to medical professionals for the pain 
onset, including to a doctor for the nature of the delivery of a child which led to the 
development of interstitial cystitis: 
"The doctor that delivered my son. Without a doubt .... She caused the damage. 
An ' its progressively got worse since then" (34) 
An attribution was also made to a surgeon for a failed operation to treat another 
condition, which subsequently led to the development of adhesions associated with 
the current pain condition. However, unlike other participants making attributions to 
medical professionals, this participant was informed that a surgeon was the source of 
her pain: 
"The back pain would be the first surgeon I had. Em, the first four, five times 
he went in (the back), it was an older surgeon, and he didn 't know what he 
was looking for. And he just kept opening me up, which started off the 
adhesions an' that, and when my next surgeon came, from Glasgow, eh he told 
me and my husband that it was through him, opening me up these many times 
that started the bad adhesions ... " (15) 
Additionally, there was a report that through the misdiagnosis of a condition, a 
physiotherapist advised the wrong treatment, compounding the existing pain problem: 
..... at the beginnin ', I still blame the physiotherapist because she made the 
wrong diagnosis. It's a mistake she shouldn't have made" (58) 
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Despite these reports of negligence, no bad feelings towards medical professionals 
were reported at interview, and one participant, who attributed her osteoarthritis to her 
childhood doctor for failing to diagnose her with dislocated hips as a child sounded 
almost remorseful at making this attribution: 
"!think I'll just need to go back and blame this poor wee doctor. He just 
didn't, have a clue what was wrong, so he just shrugged it off' (24) 
Many more attributions were made to medical professionals for the pain having not 
resolved at the time of interview, than for the pain onset. Similar attributions to those 
for the pain onset were made, although on a larger scale. In particular, attributions to 
surgeons for failed operations to treat an existing pain problem were commonly 
reported. For example: 
"! think it's being truthful, I think it's (Dr X) orthopaedic surgeon who went 
into my spine. Because I honestly think he was awfy good wi' hips and knees 
an a ' that, but I dinny think he should have gone into my spine. I think he, he 
felt that he had, he was able to operate at levels that was really a bluff' (17) 
This participant also reported that she was unsure about having the operation in the 
first place, but felt pressurised into having it: 
" ... It's the whole medical profession together saying, "You should go an ' do 
this. One part of the medical profession is saying, "No you shouldn't", but 
your GP and your consultant surgeon are saying, "Yes". So at that stage if I 
had said, "No, I'm no' gonnie have this operation", they would have said, 
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"Well go ahead an ' live wi' this pain". So you wouldny have the backing of 
them after that, you know you were taking their advice. It was different after 
the operation when I still had the pain, then they couldn 't do enough for me" 
(17) 
Related to this uncertainty about having surgery, one participant reported that he 
wished he had sought a second opinion on his back condition before going ahead with 
surgery that made his pain worse: 
"Well, eh, I don't want to put blame on (Dr X), but I wish I'd got a second 
opinion for the neurosurgeon .... I wish I'd have got a second opinion rather 
than go in 'ahead and gettin ' the operation, the, for the first time ... " (23) 
Additionally, one participant reported that she started to sue her surgeon after an 
operation to remove her gall bladder made her pain worse. She was also convinced 
that people other than the surgeon took part in her operation: 
" .... I wouldn 't go to the point of suing my doctor unless I thought he was in 
some way responsible. I felt he was, he was responsible, not for the onset, but 
for making it worse. I'm sure, in fact, at the time I'm sure it was his assistant 
who did the operation ... She was a young girl...She was never away from my 
bed. I'd to get a lot of blood transfusions because I'd lost a lot ofblood .... And 
I have the feeling although it was never ever mentioned, that she got to do the 
operation ... no one will ever admit that, she was getting a shot a poking in" 
(27) 
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This participant went on to report that she requested further exploration of her pain, 
but was refused this: 
"I feel they could have done something for me, even an exploratory operation 
which I have asked for, and I have been told that it (the pain) would be made 
worse. How they know that is something I can never understand" (27) 
In addition to surgeons, attributions were also made to doctors, for reasons involving 
the misdiagnosis of a condition: 
"(Sighs). The first clinic I was sent to, I was misdiagnosed for almost a 
year ... The first diagnosis I was given at the (clinic) was that it was a typical 
frozen shoulder, despite the physiotherapist going to (Dr X), arguing in from 
of me that the physiotherapist said it was not typical. And the doctor said yes 
it was because it was an easier diagnosis to make .. "(19) , 
and for treating only the symptoms of a condition, not the cause of it: 
"Possibly doctors ... Because when one goes to the doctor and you say you've 
got a sore back, the doctor says, "Here's a painkiller". You go back three 
months later, you get another set of painkillers. Possibly if you'd been x-rayed 
earlier they might have noticed there was something wrong with the spine" (26) 
This participant went on to report that after unsuccessful treatment of his back pain 
from a doctor, he paid to attend a chiropractor to have his condition treated: 
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" ... chiropractor was the first person who sent me for an x-ray, and he seemed 
to me, he seemed to see what was wrong, and he has treated me for that" (26) 
An attribution was also made to a doctor for failing to treat an infection, leading to the 
development of arthritis: 
"I believe it's the doctor's fault for not curing that viral infection in the first 
place" (10) 
and for not treating a condition fast enough, leading to inactivity which resulted in 
back pain: 
"Sometimes I blame the doctors because a year-and-a-half ago, in fact three 
years ago I had this pain under the ribcage, and nothing really seemed to get 
done about it ... (had gall bladder out). The back bone, I mean it was always 
just a wee bit throbbin ' but because I've no ' been working I feel this is where 
this has all set in. And !feel that in a lot ofways it is the doctor'sfault" (2) 
One single response also fell under this theme, "Researchers", where an attribution 
was made to researchers for failing to find a cure for arthritis, and used as an 
explanation why the condition remained at the time of interview: 
" ... I would say researchers because they haven't come up with a good enough 
em .... aye, they've no ' come up with a cure yet, or a way of coping with it " (9) 
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5.2.7 Summary 
This section presented the qualitative results of the themes and categories to emerge 
from the responses to the attribution interview questions. The category "Physical 
Internal Attributions" was characterised by responses that internal states were the 
source of pain. Three themes emerged within this category, firstly "Condition 
Specific", involving attributions both to the S)Tilptoms and name of a condition. 
Closer analyses suggested that pain duration might influence which of these types of 
response is given. In particular, people with longer pain durations might make 
attributions to their S)Tilptoms, while those with shorter durations might make 
attributions to the name of their condition. The second theme, "Genetic", involved 
attributions made to heredity factors, while the third theme, "Biology", involved 
attributions to height and age factors. 
The second category, "Physical External Attributions", was characterised by factors 
occurring outwith the body, in the environment. Three themes emerged from the 
responses within this category. The first theme, "Incidents/ Accidents" involved 
attributions made to various types of accidental falls, and incidents involving straining 
activity. The second theme, "Lifestyle", involved different lifestyle factors leading to 
pain, such as the nature of employment, involving strenuous labour, way of life, 
involving unhealthy behaviours such as smoking and poor diet, and leisure activities, 
such as gardening. The third theme, "Initiator/Consequence", largely involved 
attributions to various types of medical treatments, including oral medications, 
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surgical treatments, and physiotherapy, that either led to the development of pain, or 
made it worse. 
The third category, "Attributions to the Self', involved any attributions for pain that 
involved the participants themselves. Three themes emerged from these attributions. 
The first, "Omissions", was characterised by responses that pain resulted from or was 
made worse by a failure to do certain things, either a failure to obtain treatment at the 
onset of a condition, or since its onset, a failure to look after the self properly, for 
example through pushing the self to work too hard, and a failure to avoid or notice 
potential hazards that caused harm. The second theme, "Inappropriate Activity", 
involved attributions to the self for carrying out activities that caused harm, including 
unhealthy behaviours such as smoking, sporting activities, stretching too much, poor 
posture, carrying out inappropriate behaviour or pushing oneself too hard within 
employment, and lifting and handling objects awkwardly. The third theme, "Pain 
Triggers" was exclusive to the pain having not resolved at the time of interview, and 
involved both intentional and unintentional activities that induce an episode of pain. 
The fourth category, "Attributions to Others", involved any attributions made for pain 
that involved other people. Four themes emerged from these responses, including 
firstly, "Family", where attributions were made to husbands for inducing stress that 
led to pain. Secondly, "Outsiders", involving attributions to people not known to the 
participants, either drivers of vehicles who knocked the participants over or crashed 
into their car, an offender who resisted arrest, and patients who either attacked or 
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struggled with the participants, causing injury. The third theme, "Employers", was 
characterised by reports of the negligence of bosses resulting in the participants' pain, 
or companies being held accountable for injuries sustained by participants. The fourth 
theme, "Scientists", largely involved attributions to medical professionals for the pain 
onset and/or the pain having not resolved at the time of interview. These attributions 
involved General Practitioners, surgeons and physiotherapists, and were made for the 
failure to diagnose a problem, the misdiagnosis of a problem, or for a delay in 
treatment or the wrong treatment administered, leading to a worsening of a condition. 
Within this theme one attribution was also made to researchers for failing to devise a 
cure for arthritis. 
5.3 QUANTITATIVE RESULTS 
5.3.1 Attributions 
5.3.1.1 Introduction 
The first aim of the study was to examine the cause, responsibility and blame 
attributions made for pain. There were four parts to this (Chapter 3, section 3.3.1), 
each ofwhich will be considered in tum. Following this, individual differences in the 
attributions made will be investigated, and the section summarised. 
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5.3.1.2 The Making of Attributions 
The extent to which cause, responsibility and blame were attributed for the pain onset 
and pain now, is summarised in Table 5.1. 
Table 5.1: The making of attributions for the pain onset and now 
Attribution Yes No Missing Total 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
N % N % N % N % 
Onset 
Cause 56 90.3 6 09.7 0 0.0 62 100 
Responsibility 35 56.4 27 43.5 0 0.0 62 100 
Blame 27 43.5 34 54.8 1 1.6 62 100 
Now 
Cause 48 77.4 13 21.0 1 1.6 62 100 
Responsibility 34 54.8 27 43.5 1 1.6 62 100 
Blame 25 40.3 34 54.8 3 4.8 62 100 
Most participants made causal attributions for their pain onset (90.3%), and now 
(77.4%) (Table 5.1). Those who did not make causal attributions for the onset 
reported they did not know the cause of their pain. This was also the case for the pain 
now, with the additional response that the pain is 'just there". Fewer responsibility 
and blame attributions were made. Only 54.6% of the sample attributed responsibility 
for the onset and 54.8% for the pain now. Similarly, only 43.5% of the sample 
attributed blame for the onset, and 40.3% for now. These low percentages are due to 
the high numbers of participants who did not make these attributions. Indeed, around 
one-quarter of the sample (27.4%), made no responsibility or blame attributions at all 
(not tabulated). 
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5.3.1.3 The Nature of the Attributions Made 
Section 5.2 identified four main categories of response across cause, responsibility 
and blame questions. These were attributions to "Physical External" factors, "Physical 
Internal" factors, the "Self', and "Others". Table 5.2 summarises the incidence of 
these responses. The data is based on the number of participants who made 
attributions for each time period (see Table 5.1). However, in general the numbers of 
participants exceed those in Table 5.1, due to multiple responses. For example, one 
person may have attributed a cause for his/her pain onset within both the "Physical 
External" and "Physical Internal" categories. 
Table 5.2: Number of people who made each type 
responsibility and blame for the pain onset and now 
Attribution Physical Physical The self 
Type External Internal 
of response across cause, 
Other 
People 
*Other 
Responses 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
N N N N N 
Onset 
Cause 28 16 3 10 6 
Responsibility 6 6 17 13 3 
Blame 4 1 12 12 1 
Now 
Cause 13 11 9 15 2 
Responsibility 7 0 16 13 2 
Blame 2 0 8 14 4 
"' Lesser frequent categories e.g. psychological factors, God, something 
The fact that responses to cause, responsibility and blame questions fell within these 
four categories, led to the question of whether or not the concepts were distinguished 
from each other. This was investigated on both a descriptive and statistical level. 
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5.3.1.4 Distinctions Between Cause, Responsibility and Blame 
Descriptive distinctions were based on distinctions between pairs of concepts for each 
time period. For example comparisons were made between the cause and 
responsibility attributions made by each of the 62 participants for the pain onset and 
now, respectively. As such, it was possible to distinguish between each pair 124 
times. Table 5.3 summarises the results. 
Table 5.3: The incidence of cause, responsibility and blame being distinguished from 
each other 
Attribution pairs Distinguished Not Missing 
N 
Cause/responsibility 84 
Cause/blame 90 
Responsibility/blame 32 
Distinguished Responses 
% N 
67.7 38 
72.6 29 
25.8 87 
% N 
30.6 2 
23.4 5 
70.2 5 
% 
1.6 
4.0 
4.0 
Total 
N % 
124 100 
124 100 
124 100 
Only 25.8% of the responsibility and blame attributions were distinguished from each 
other (see Table 5.3). This is because they were largely similar, in terms of the 
number and nature of attributions made. In terms of their number, 17 participants 
(27% of the sample) did not attribute responsibility or blame at all. In terms of their 
nature, responses to both largely fell within the "Self' and "Other" categories (see 
Table 5.2). Both factors created similar patterns of response between responsibility 
and blame. 
The causal attributions made were largely distinguishable from the responsibility 
{67.7%) and blame (72.6%) attributions (see Table 5.3). Distinctions again were made 
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on the basis of the number and nature of the attributions made. Many more cause than 
responsibility or blame attributions were made for both time periods, as indicated in 
Table 5 .1. Additionally, although all four categories emerged across all three 
attribution types, responses falling within the "Physical External" and "Internal" 
categories were made much more frequently as causal attributions, as indicated in 
Table 5.2. 
Responses falling within the "Self' and "Others" categories were more evenly spread 
across all three attribution types (see Table 5.2). This led to a statistical investigation 
of the extent to which the concepts were associated with each other on the basis of 
these attributions. The aim of this was to determine whether or not the concepts were 
so closely related so as to be indistinguishable from each other. Chi-square analyses 
revealed the following associations between pairs of attribution concepts, for both the 
pain onset and now. 
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Table 5.4: Associations between attribution concepts 
Variable )(2 df Cramer's V 
Self 
Onset 
Cause/responsibility 4.95* 1 0.37** 
Cause/blame 1.84 (N/S) 1 0.27* 
Responsibility/blame 13.72*** 1 0.52*** 
Now 
Cause/responsibility 19.22*** 1 0.62*** 
Cause/blame 11.75*** 1 0.52*** 
Responsibility/blame 20.32*** 1 0.65*** 
Other people 
Onset 
Cause/responsibility 29.50*** 1 0.74*** 
Cause/blame 23.17*** 1 0.67*** 
Responsibility/blame 21.85*** 1 0.65*** 
Now 
Cause/responsibility 27.53*** 1 0.72*** 
Cause/blame 13.48*** 1 0.53*** 
Responsibility/blame 33.17*** 1 0.81 *** 
*p<0.05, **p<0.005, ***p<O.OOl 
Considering the results of Table 5.4 as a whole, associations were found between 
cause, responsibility and blame. The strength of these associations varied from 0.27-
0.81. This is similar to the correlational values reported between the attribution 
concepts in other, experimental research. Critchlow (1985), and Mantler et al (2003) 
reported such correlational values to represent the conceptual closeness of the 
concepts, whilst remaining distinct. In support of this, overall slightly stronger 
associations were found between cause and responsibility, and responsibility and 
blame, than cause and blame. This may be attributable to the fact that in Shaver's 
(1985) Theory of Blame Assignment (Chapter 2, section 2.2.3.3), although attributing 
cause is a requirement for blame attributions to be made, both are conceptually closer 
to responsibility than each other. 
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The fact that associations were found between the categories "Self' and "Others" 
across cause, responsibility and blame, for both times periods, led to a principal 
components factor analysis being carried out as a means of identifying similar 
patterns across the data. Three factors emerged with eigenvalues greater than one, 
accounting for 69.7% of the total variance. Table 5.5 shows the factor loadings that 
had been subjected to varimax rotation, along with the communalities. 
Table 5.5: Varimax factor analysis of 12 items relating to attribution response (2) x 
attribution type (3) x both time periods (2) (N = 43, the number of participants who 
made attributions to the self and/or others) 
Variable Factor 1 
Others cause of onset I 
The self cause of onset .581 
Others cause now I 
The self cause now .806 
Others responsible onset I 
The self responsible onset . 775 
Others responsible now I 
The self responsible now .843 
Others blame onset I 
The selfblame onset .706 
Others blame now I 
The self blame now . 717 
Eigenvalue 
%variance 
4.74 
37.3 
Factor 2 
.882 
I 
I 
I 
.831 
I 
I 
I 
.774 
I 
I 
I 
2.87 
23.9 
Factor 3 
I 
I 
.822 
I 
I 
I 
.822 
I 
I 
I 
.669 
I 
1.01 
8.5 
Communality 
.827 
.389 
.750 
.669 
.770 
.621 
.850 
.802 
.750 
.565 
.743 
.628 
A cut-off point of 0.5 was used for the inclusion of loadings in the interpretation of 
the factors (Comrey, 1978). Each variable loaded on only one factor and no variable 
failed to load on any factor. The first factor, accounting for 37.3% of the variance 
attracted high positive loadings from the category "Self', across all three attribution 
types, for both time periods. It was named, "Attributions to the self'. Factor 2 
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accounted for 23.9% of the variance, and attracted loadings from the category 
"Others" for the pain onset, for all three attribution types. This was named, 
"Attributions to others for the pain onset". The third factor accounted for 8.5% of the 
variance, and attracted high loadings from the category "Others" for the pain now, for 
all three attribution types, and so was called, "Attributions to others for the pain now". 
Combined, the items in each factor produced a Cronbach's alpha coefficient score of 
0.71. These factor scores were retained for further analysis. 
The finding that attributions for both the pain onset and now fell under the same 
factor for the category "Self' but loaded on separate factors for the category "Others", 
can be explained by the nature of the responses that fell under both categories. This 
will be considered in the next section, on the extent to which attribution responses 
changed over time. 
5.3.1.5 Changes in Pain Attributions 
The original aim of this analysis was to consider the extent to which individually, 
cause, responsibility and blame changed for different times in the pain experience. 
However, this analysis was compromised by finding that there was a lack of 
responsibility and blame attributions being made for both times (see Table 5.1). This, 
combined with the fact that similar responses were given across all three attribution 
types, and all three attribution types loaded on the same factors for the categories 
"Self' and "Others", led instead to an investigation of the extent to which attribution 
responses changed over time. 
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This analysis quantifies the nature of the attributions made within each of "Physical 
External", "Physical Internal", "Self', and "Others" categories discussed in section 
5.2. For each table of results in this analysis, N represents the summed number of 
responses for each category in Table 5.2. 
Table 5.6 summarises the attribution responses within the category "Self'. 
Table 5.6: Pain attributions within the category "Self' 
Response Onset Now 
-------------------------------------------------
N % N % 
Choosing lifestyle 6 18.8 4 12.1 
Lifting and handling 5 15.6 4 12.1 
Hazard avoidance 5 15.6 2 06.1 
Not looking after the self 4 12.5 2 06.1 
Employment 4 12.5 4 12.1 
Sport 3 09.4 0 0.00 
Stretching 1 03.1 0 0.00 
Posture 1 03.1 0 0.00 
Activity 0 00.0 6 18.2 
Failure to obtain treatment 0 00.0 3 09.1 
Unstated origin of self-attribution 3 09.4 8 24.2 
Total responses 32 100 33 100 
As can be seen in Table 5.6, similar types of attributions were reported for both the 
pain onset and now. This was also the case for the nature of the responses within the 
"Physical External", and "Physical Internal" attribution categories, as can be seen in 
Tables 5.7, and 5.8. 
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Table 5. 7: Pain attributions within the category "Physical External Attributions" 
Response Onset Now 
-------------------------------------------------------------------
N % N % 
Falling 10 26.3 4 18.2 
Nature of employment 7 18.4 8 36.4 
Medical treatment 6 15.8 7 31.8 
Way oflife 6 15.8 1 04.5 
Straining activity 5 13.2 0 0.00 
Leisure activity 4 10.5 1 04.5 
The system 0 0.00 1 04.5 
Total responses 38 100 22 100 
Table 5.8: Pain attributions within the category "Physical Internal Attributions" 
Response Onset Now 
----------------------------------------------------------
N % N % 
Hereditary 9 39.1 0 0.00 
Symptoms of condition 7 30.4 5 45.4 
Named condition 5 21.7 4 36.4 
Height 2 8.70 0 09.1 
Age 0 0.00 1 09.1 
Post-operation stress 0 0.00 1 09.1 
Total responses 23 100 11 100 
Although, as Tables 5. 7 and 5.8 indicate, fewer responses within the "Physical 
External" and "Physical Internal" categories were made for the pain now than the pain 
onset, those responses which were made for the pain now were to the same factors as 
the pain onset. As with responses within the "Self' category, this suggests that both 
time periods were not distinguished from each other. Statistically significant 
associations between both time periods supported this idea within the categories 
"Self' (XZ, 21.71, df= 1, p<0.001), and "Physical External Attributions" (XZ, 3.28; df 
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= 1; p<O.OS), but not "Physical Internal Attributions" (Xl, 1.29, df= 1, p = N/S). This 
is likely to be due to the fact that there were less than half the number of responses 
within this category for the pain now than the pain onset. Despite this, overall the 
descriptive and statistical associations between the pain onset and now indicate that 
both time periods were not distinguished from each other. This could explain why 
both time periods loaded on the factor "Attributions to the Self' (see section 5.2.4.3). 
Table 5.9 summarises the attribution responses within the category, "Others". 
Table 5.9: Pain attributions within the category "Others" 
Response Onset Now 
----------------------------------------------------------
N* N % 
Drivers 11 9 20.9 
Medical professionals 8 19 44.2 
Patients 8 5 11.6 
Offenders 1 0 0.00 
Bosses 6 1 02.3 
Company 5 7 16.3 
Husband 1 1 02.3 
Researchers 0 1 02.3 
Total responses 40 43 100 
*N> the number of participants who made attributions to others in Table 5.2 because 
a few participants made attributions to more than one other person. 
As with the nature of the attribution responses in the other categories, similar types of 
attributions were made for the pain onset and now within the category "Others", and 
both time periods were statistically related (..\'2, 11.58, df = 1, p<O.OOl), again 
suggesting they were not distinguished from each other. However, nearly half of the 
attribution responses made to others for the pain now were to medical professionals, 
and the majority of these were for things which had happened in the time between the 
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pain onset, and the present time. This indicates that there was some change in the 
attributions made, perhaps explaining why responses within the category "Others" fell 
under separate factors, for the pain onset, and now (see section 5.3.1.4). 
5.3.1.6 Motives for Making Causal Attributions 
Chi-square analyses to determine relationships between making attributions for the 
pain now (combined causal responses), and knowledge and uncertainty factors, were 
non-significant (not tabulated). This suggests that causal attributions were not 
associated with possible motives for making them. 
5.3.1. 7 Individual Differences in Pain Attributions 
Chi-square analyses were conducted to determine any pain and demographic-related 
differences in the attributions made. In order to do this, some continuous data was 
collapsed into groups. In particular, pain duration was split into three groups using 
percentile ranges to form short (1 month- 2.5 years), medium (3- 9 years), and long 
(9.5+ years) pain duration groups. Using the same criteria, age was also split into 
younger (18 - 43 years), middle-aged (44 - 59 years) and older (60+ years) age 
groups. Table 5.10 summarises the nature of the individual differences found. For 
each difference, the table produces significance levels, indicates where within each 
group the differences lie, and provides information on the extent to which the 
subgroups within each group reported and did not give responses within each type of 
attribution category. 
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Table 5.10: Individual differences in pain attributions 
Individual Difference 
Type of pain 
Back/spinal 
Arthritis 
Upper body 
Middle body 
Lower body 
Total 
Statistical significance 
*Statistical difference 
Pain Duration 
1 month-2.5 years 
3-9 years 
9.5+years 
Total 
Statistical significance 
*Statistical difference 
Gender 
Male 
Female 
Total 
Statistical significance 
Statistical difference 
Age 
18-43 years 
44-59 years 
60+years 
Total 
Statistical significance 
*Statistical difference 
Employment status 
Employed 
Retired 
Student 
None 
Total 
Attribution Type 
Others onset (combined)** 
Report(%) None(%) 
31.3 28.9 
06.3 33.3 
43.8* 15.6* 
18.8 11.1 
0.0 11.1 
100 100 
XJ, 0.04, df= 4, p<O.OS 
)(J, 4.0, df= 1, p = 0.05 
Just there {cause of pain now) 
Report(%) 
07.7 
23.1 
69.2* 
100 
None(%) 
39.6 
37.5 
22.9* 
100 
XJ, 10.48, df= 2, p<0.05 
XJ, 6.54, df = 1, p<O.OS 
Self onset (combined) 
Report(%) 
50.0 
50.0 
100 
None(%) 
22.0 
78.0 
100 
)(J, 3.71, df= 1, p = 0.05 
N/S 
Others onset (combined) 
Others responsible now 
Report(%) None(%) 
23.1 31.3 
07.7 33.3 
38.5 18.8 
30.8* 06.3* 
0.0 10.4 
100 100 
)(J' 0.03, df = 4, p<0.05 
)(J, 5.30, df = 1, p<0.05 
Self now (combined) 
---------------------------------------------------------------------
Report(%) 
56.3 
37.5 
06.3* 
100 
None{%) 
26.7 
37.8 
35.6* 
100 
XJ, 6.64, df = 2, p<O.OS 
)(J, 3. 7, df = 1, p = 0.05 
Self onset (combined) 
Report(%) 
18.8 
62.5* 
18.8 
100 
None(%) 
41.5 
26.8* 
31.7 
100 
XJ, 6.35, df- 2, p<0.05 
)(J, 3.96, df = 1, p=0.05 
Self now (combined) 
------------------------------------------------------------------------
Report(%) None(%) Report(%) None(%) 
55.0* 24.4* 62.5* 24.4* 
30.0 36.6 18.8 41.5 
15.0 12.2 18.8 12.2 
0.0 26.8 0.0 22.0 
100 100 100 100 
Statistical significance XJ, 9.27, df = 3, p<0.05 )(J, 1 0.32, df = 3, p<0.05 
*Statistical difference XJ, 3.63, df = 1, p=0.06 XJ, 4.80, df = 1, p<0.05 
**Refers to responses combined across cause, responsibility and blame attributions 
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As can be seen from Table 5.10, differences in the attributions made were found 
across a range of individual difference variables, and were largely concerned with the 
categories "Self' and "Others". In terms of pain-related variables those with upper 
body pain (e.g. head, neck, shoulder), were more likely than the other types of pain 
groups to make attributions to other people for their pain. This involved making these 
attributions (across attribution types) for the pain onset (43.8%), and reporting others 
responsible for their pain now (38.5%). Additionally, those with the longest pain 
duration (9.5+ years) were more likely than the other pain duration groups to refrain 
from making causal attributions for their pain now, instead reporting their pain to be 
'just there" (69.2%). 
In terms of the other individual difference variables, those in the youngest age group 
(18 - 43 years) were more likely than those in the other age groups to make 
attributions to others (across attribution types) for their pain onset (56.3%). Those in 
the middle age group (44 - 59 years) were more likely than the other age groups to 
make attributions to themselves (across attribution types) for their pain now (62.5%). 
Additionally, those who were employed were more likely than those in the other 
employment status categories to make attributions to themselves (across attribution 
types) for both their pain onset (55.0%) and now (62.5%). 
5.3.1.8 Summary 
One aim of the present study was to examine the cause, responsibility and blame 
attributions made for pain. In terms of the making of attributions, the results indicated 
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that the majority of the pain sufferers made causal attributions for both their pain 
onset (90.3%) and now (77.4%). Fewer responsibility and blame attributions were 
made for both times. Around half of the sample attributed responsibility for their pain 
(54.6% for the pain onset, and 54.8% for now), with just under half attributing blame 
(43.5% for the pain onset, and 40.3% for now). 
Four attribution categories emerged across cause, responsibility and blame. These 
involved attributions to "Physical External", "Physical Internal", "Selr' and "Other" 
factors. Although common across all three concepts, responses within the "Physical 
External" and "Physical Internal" categories were more common as causal 
attributions, and there was a slight tendency for attribution responses within the 
"Selr' and "Others" categories to be made more commonly as responsibility and 
blame attributions. 
This difference in the distribution of attribution responses across all three concepts, 
combined with the number of people who made each type of attribution for each time 
period, formed the basis of descriptive distinctions between cause, responsibility and 
blame. The led to the conclusion that the pain sufferers in the present study 
distinguished causal attributions from responsibility and blame attributions, but not 
these latter two types of attributions from each other. However, on a statistical level 
these distinctions were not so clear-cut. Associations between the "Selr' and "Others" 
categories revealed strong associations between all three concepts. The few available 
empirical interpretations of these associations are in conflict, making it impossible to 
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draw any firm conclusions about the nature of the associations. This will be 
considered further in Chapter 6. 
In terms of whether or not attributions changed for different times in the pain 
experience, descriptive and statistical analyses between types of attribution responses 
for the pain onset and now largely revealed that the pain sufferers did not change the 
attributions they made about their pain. 
The final attribution finding was that in the current pain sample, knowledge and 
uncertainty factors held no associations with making causal attributions. 
The literature reviewed in Chapter 2 discussed few individual differences in 
attributions made (Chapter, 2, section 2.3.4). One of the reported differences 
contradicted what was found in the present study. Specifically, Heinemann et al 
(1988) found their younger spinal injured patients attributed more responsibility for 
their condition to themselves. In the present study the younger pain sufferers were 
more likely to make attributions to others overall for their pain onset, while the 
middle-aged pain sufferers made more attributions to themselves overall for their pain 
now. These differences are likely to be a function of both the timing of the 
attributions, and the types of conditions experienced in both studies. 
211 
5.3.2 Adjustment 
5.3.2.1 Introduction 
Chapter 3 (section 3.3.2) stated the second aim of the present study was to explore 
various ways of adjusting to pain using health, psychological and functioning 
measures. This section will report the nature of the adjustment reported, along with 
changes in psychological adjustment, the nature of adjustment interactions, and 
individual differences in adjustment. The section will end with a summary of 
adjustment. 
5.3.2.2 The Nature of and Changes in Adjustment 
Table 5.11 defines the most common types of adjustment reported, that were entered 
into statistical analysis, and presents the number of responses given for each type of 
adjustment. Less common types of reported adjustment can be seen in Appendix 5. 
212 
Table 5.11: Reported types of adjustment to pain 
Type of adjustment N 
Health 
Treatments 
Oral medications 
Physiotherapy 
Complementary treatment 
Surgery 
Self-management strategies 
Physical 
Psychological 
Do what is required by health 
Professionals 
Psychological (emotions) 
Negative emotions 
*Positive statements 
Now 
Negative emotions 
Positive statements 
Since 
Negative emotions 
Positive statements 
Functioning 
Physical 
Loss of ability to carry out leisure/ 
social activities 
Loss of ability to carry out daily 
activities 
Methods of adaptation 
Social Support 
Family 
Friends 
Social life with pain 
Social activities limited 
Social life unaffected 
55 
28 
19 
12 
32 
15 
11 
43 
8 
37 
24 
34 
30 
33 
19 
19 
33 
18 
39 
18 
Adapted social life 7 
"'Positive statements rather than emotions reported 
Definition of common outcomes 
Rest, exercise, heat, 
Distraction, mind-over-matter 
Take advice of health profession 
General upset/distress; anger; 
fear/worry 
Felt pain would resolve; 
acceptance ofpain 
Anger; irritation/frustration; 
hatred/resentment 
Acceptance of pain; general 
positive feeling; live with it 
Depression; feeling down; fear/ 
worry 
Coping; refuse to get down 
Unable to pursue exercise/social 
interests e.g. sports, holidays; 
attend cinema 
Unable to work/do daily tasks e.g. 
shopping, household tasks 
Adapted life activities e.g. use 
special implements/alter activities 
Practical/emotional support 
Practical/emotional support 
Physical/social limitations e.g. 
cannot stand long so cannot dance 
Little social life/no interference in 
usual activities 
Develop alternative interests 
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As can be seen from Table 5.11t the participants reported a range of ways they had 
adjusted to their pain, along with the negative impact pain had on their lives. The 
table also indicates a change in the number and nature of emotions reported. In 
particular, there were changes in the most frequent negative emotions reported 
towards pain for each time period, and several, non-tabulated reasons for these 
emotions for these emotions emerged. General upset and distress were more common 
at the pain onset, as the participants tried to understand what had happened to them. 
Irritation/frustration and hatred/resentment were more common now, due to the 
ongoing nature of pain, and depression and feeling down were more common since 
the pain onsett due to limitations imposed on life by pain. None of the differences 
reported were statistically significant between the negative emotions reported for the 
pain onset with now (Xl, 0.01, df= It p = 0.93), and since (.Xl, 0.00, df= 1, p = 1.00), 
and between the negative emotions reported now with since (.Xl, 2.31, df = 1 t p = 
0.13). 
In terms of positive feelings, many more participants reported feeling positively 
towards their pain now and since the pain onset, than at the pain onset. Additionally, 
the nature of the positive statements reported changedt from believing the pain would 
go away at its onset, to accepting and feeling more positively towards the pain now, 
combined with refusing to let the pain get one down since its onset. Reasons for these 
feelings included accepting the pain will not resolve, complying with its limitations, 
and doing what one can still do, despite pain (not tabulated). As with negative 
emotions, no statistically significant findings emerged between the pain onset and 
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now (Xl, 0.14, df= 1, p = 0.70), and pain onset with since (Xl, 0.11, df= 1, p = 0.74). 
However, there were significant differences between the number of people who 
reported positive statements towards their pain now, and overall since the pain onset 
(Xl, 4.90, df= 1, p<O.OS). 
The fact that the majority of participants reported both physical and social limitations 
of their pain is inconsistent with reports of half of the sample reporting feeling 
positively towards their pain since its onset (Table 5.11). It would be expected that 
reports of pain limitations would result in the vast majority of participants feeling 
negatively towards their pain. One explanation for this apparent inconsistency is that 
the adjustment outcomes are independent of each other. This will now be investigated. 
5.3.2.3 The Nature of Adjustment Interactions 
Chi-square analyses across each of the categories in the health, psychological and 
functioning domains revealed no associations between the adjustment outcomes (not 
tabulated). This contrasts the reported associations between psychological outcomes, 
and the health and functioning outcomes reported in Chapter 2 (section 2.3.4). 
The fact that the adjustment outcomes were not associated with each other suggests 
they are independent adjustment outcomes, in that adjustment in one domain has no 
bearing upon adjustment in another domain. The use of independent adjustment 
outcomes has been criticised on the basis that they create problems in evaluating the 
overall adjustment of one person (Michela and Wood, 1986). However, the use of 
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multiple independent adjustment measures was not problematic in the present study, 
for two reasons. Firstly, the aim was to investigate the participants' adjustment to pain 
on different levels, before secondly, considering their independent associations with 
attributions and just world beliefs. Before considering this, individual differences in 
adjustment outcomes will be investigated. 
5.3.2.4 Individual Differences in Adjustment 
Chi-square analyses were conducted to determine individual differences in both pain 
and demographic-related variables on the adjustment outcomes. Table 5.12 
summarises the differences in adjustment within type of pain and pain duration 
groups. For each individual difference, the table produces significance levels, 
indicates where within each group the differences lie, and provides information on the 
extent to which the subgroups within each group reported and did not report each type 
of adjustment. 
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Table 5.12: Individual differences in adjustment between Eain-related variables 
Outcome Individual difference 
Type of pain (%) 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Back Arthritis Upper Middle Lower 
/spinal body body body 
HEALTH 
Treatment 
Ph1;:siotherau1:: 
(Xl, 13.01 **, df= 4) 
Reported: 39.3 17.9 21.4 03.6* 17.9 
Not reported: 20.6 35.3 23.5 20.6* 0.0 
(*Xl, 3.41, df= 1, 
p = 0.06) 
Self-management 
Ps1;:choloa:ical 
(Xl, 12.73**, df= 4) 
Reported: 06.7 60.0* 20.0 13.3 0.0 
Not Reported: 36.2 17.0* 23.4 23.4 0.0 
(*Xl, 7.72**, df= 1) 
PSYCHOLOGICAL 
Pain onset 
Nea:ative emotions 
(Xl, 14.44***, df= 4) 
Reported: 30.2 34.9 23.3 11.6 0.0 
Not reported: 26.3 10.5 21.1 15.8 26.3 
(Xl N/S) 
Pain now 
Nea:ative emotions 
(Xl, 10.21 **, df= 4) 
Reported: 32.4 13.5* 27.0 18.9 8.1 
Not reported: 24.0 48.0* 16.0 04.0 8.0 
(*XZ, 5.57**, df= 1) 
Positive statements 
(Xl, 9.55, df= 4 
p = 0.05) 
Reported: 26.1 47.8* 17.4 08.7 0.0 
Not reported: 30.8 15.4* 25.6 15.4 12.8 
(*XZ, 5.57***, df= 4) 
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Table 5.12 (continued): Individual differences in adjustment between pain-related 
variables 
Outcome Individual difference 
Pain duration(%) 
1 month-2.5 years 3-9 years 9.5+ years 
HEALTH 
Treatment 
Phl:siotheram: 
(Xl, 6.47**, df= 2) 
Reported: 50.0* 21.4 28.6 
Not reported: 20.6* 44.1 35.3 
(*Xl, 3.89, df= 1 
p = 0.05) 
Surgery 
(Xl' 6.00, df = 2 
p= 0.05) 
Reported: 33.3 08.3 58.3 
Not reported 34.0 40.0 26.0 
(Xl N/S) 
PSYCHOLOGICAL 
Since nain onset 
Positive statements 
(XZ, 6.47**, df= 2) 
Reported: 20.0* 36.7 43.3 
Not reported: 48.4* 32.3 19.4 
(*Xl, 3.52, df= 1, p = 0.06) 
"'*p<0.05, *"'*p<0.01 
Differences were found between pain-related variables, and health and psychological 
outcomes (Table 5.12). In terms of types of pain groups, the back/spinal pain sufferers 
more frequently reported the use of physiotherapy as treatment for their pain (39.3%), 
and more frequently reported experiencing negative emotions towards their pain now 
(32.4%) than the other type of pain groups. Additionally, the arthritis sufferers more 
frequently reported the use of psychological self-management techniques (60%), 
experiencing negative emotions towards their pain at its onset (34.9%), and made 
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more positive statements towards their pain now (47.8%), than the other type of pain 
groups. 
In terms of pain duration groups, those with the lowest pain duration (1 month - 2.5 
years) more frequently reported the use of physiotherapy as treatment for their pain 
f 
(50%). Those with the longest pain duration (9.5+ years) more frequently reported the 
use of surgery as treatment for their pain (58.3%). Additionally, this group most 
frequently reported positive statements towards their pain overall since its onset 
(43.3%). 
Table 5.13 summarises the nature of the differences m adjustment between 
demographic groups. 
219 
Table 5.13: Demographic differences in adjustment outcomes 
Outcome Individual difference 
Age 
18-43 years 44-59 years 
FUNCTIONING 
Physical 
Leisure/social 
activity losses 
Reported: 33.3 24.2 
Not reported: 37.0 48.1 
Statistical significance: X2, 6.26**, df= 2 
*Statistical difference: X2, 3.78, df= 1, p = 0.05 
Marital status 
HEALTH 
Treatments 
Oral medications 
(X2, 9.88**, df= 4) 
Married 
Reported: 58.2 
Not reported: 14.3 
(X2 N/S) 
Self-management 
Psychological 
(X2, 10.55**, df= 4) 
Reported: 53.3 
Not reported: 53.2 
(X2 N/S) 
**p<0.05 
Separated 
03.6 
14.3 
20.0 
0.0 
Widowed 
07.3 
28.6 
06.7 
10.6 
60+ years 
42.4* 
14.8* 
Single Divorced 
16.4 
42.9 
13.3 
21.3 
14.5 
0.0 
06.7 
14.9 
There were differences in adjustment outcomes within the age and marital status 
variables {Table 5.13). In terms of age, those who were older (60+ years) more 
frequently reported their social/leisure activities were limited by their pain (42.4%) 
than the other age groups. Age-related effects have also been found on psychological 
adjustment. Schulz and Decker (1985) found younger spinal-injured patients to have 
higher levels of psychological well being than older patients. Both age effects suggest 
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that adjustment to these conditions may become more difficult as time goes on, 
probably as a function of various factors interacting with age. Additionally, those who 
were married more frequently reported the use of oral medications (58.2%), and 
psychological techniques to self-manage their pain (53.3%), than those in the other 
marital status groups. 
5.3.2.5 Summary 
In summary, a range of ways of adjusting to pain in terms of health, psychological 
and functioning outcomes were reported. The participants reported receiving or 
having received various medical treatments, specifically oral medications, 
physiotherapy, complementary treatment, and surgery. Additionally, two main self-
management strategies were reported, namely physical strategies, involving the use of 
rest, exercise and heat treatments to manage pain, and psychological strategies, 
including distraction and mind-over-matter techniques. Various positive statements 
and negative emotions were reported towards pain, and the nature and number of 
these emotions changed for different times in the pain experience, although these 
differences were largely statistically non-significant. In terms of functioning, most 
participants reported being limited in their daily and social activities by their pain, 
rather than reporting ways they had adapted to their pain, although there were some 
reports both of adapting to achieve activities around pain, and that pain did not 
interfere in one's life. 
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The fact that there were reports of positive adjustment in some domains but not others 
led to an investigation of associations between adjustment outcomes. Few were found, 
suggesting that the health, psychological and functioning outcomes were independent 
of each other. Individual differences in adjustment were found between some pain and 
demographic-related variables. 
5.3.3 Interactions Between Attributions and Adjustment 
5.3.3.1 Introduction 
The third aim of the study was to investigate the nature of the relationship between 
cause, responsibility and blame attributions, and adjustment to pain, in tenns of the 
outcomes covered in section 5.3.2. There were five parts to this (Chapter 3, section 
3.3.3), each of which will be considered in turn, before the section is summarised. 
5.3.3.2 Differences in Adjustment Between Making/Not Making Causal Attributions 
Logistic regression analyses were conducted to detennine whether making causal 
attributions for the pain now predicted more adjustment outcomes than not making 
causal attributions, to establish any differences between both groups. All analyses 
between these independent variables and each of the health, psychological and 
functioning dependent variables (see Table 5.11), were non-significant (not 
tabulated). This suggests that neither making attributions as a whole, nor refraining 
from making them, predicted any of the adjustment outcomes, indicating they did not 
differ in their ability to predict adjustment. 
222 
5.3.3.3 Type 1 error 
Many chi-square tests were conducted to explore associations between pairs of 
attribution and adjustment variables, in addition to detennining any subgroup effects 
within these associations. As such, the results produced might be prone to a Type I 
error. This was controlled for as far as possible by setting a 0.05 significance level, 
below which results were considered to be significant, and around which results were 
considered to be approaching significance. In tenns of subgroup effects, only those 
consistently occurring effects were reported, because they may be less prone to a 
Type I error than more random effects. However, on occasion interesting random 
effects emerged, and were reported. 
5.3.3.4 The Causal Attribution/Adjustment Relationship 
Chi-square analyses to detennine whether the common causal attribution categories, 
"Physical External" and "Physical Internal" attributions were associated with 
adjustment produced few associations. Table 5.14 summarises those that were found. 
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Table 5.14: Associations between causal attributions and adjustment outcomes 
Associations )(l df Cramer's V 
Health outcomes 
Physiotherapy 
Physical internal attributions (onset) 7.60* 1 0.39* 
Psychological outcomes 
Negative emotions (onset) 
Physical external attributions (onset) N/S 0.24** 
Functioning 
Social support: 
Support from family 
Physical internal attributions (now) N/S 0.25* 
Social life: 
Social life adapted 
Physical internal attributions (onset) N/S 0.27** 
*p<0.05; **p = 0.06 
Four global causal attribution/adjustment associations were found (Table 5.14). Only 
one significant chi-square was found, between the category, "Physical Internal 
Attributions" for the pain onset, and the use of physiotherapy treatment. Cramer's V 
values indicated that the remainder of the results involved attributions being weakly 
associated or approaching significance in being weakly associated with adjustment. 
Further exploratory analyses revealed two subgroup effects within the association 
between the category "Physical External Attributions" for the pain onset with 
negative emotions towards the pain at its onset, for those who were middle-aged 
{X2,4.08; df= 1; p<O.OS; Cramer's V= 0.52, p<0.05), and married (XZ,4.14, df= 1, 
p<0.05; Cramer's V= 0.42, p<0.05). 
5.3.3.5 The Adaptive/Maladaptive Nature of the Adjustment Outcomes 
The next two parts of the aim consider whether making responsibility and/or blame 
attributions within the category "Self' was adaptive for adjustment to pain, and 
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whether making responsibility and blame attributions within the category, "Other" 
resulted in poor adjustment to pain. However, before answering these questions there 
is a need to consider which adjustment outcomes were adaptive and which were 
maladaptive. The adaptive nature of the outcomes was determined both from the 
participants responses, and from the literature reviewed in Chapter 2. These are 
summarised in the following table. 
Table 5.15: The adaptiveness/maladaptiveness ofthe adjustment outcomes 
Outcome Adaptive Maladaptive Neither 
Health 
Treatments 
Oral medications 
Physiotherapy 
Complementary treatment 
Surgery 
Self-management 
Physical x 
Psychological x 
Do what is required by 
health professionals 
Psycholoe:ical 
Positive statements 
(Onset, now & since) x 
Negative emotions 
(Onset, now & since) 
Functioning 
Social: 
Support 
From family x 
From friends x 
Life 
Unaffected x 
Adapted x 
Limited 
Physical 
Leisure/social limitations 
Daily limitations 
Adapted ability to function x 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
X 
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Some adjustment outcomes were neither adaptive nor maladaptive (Table 5.15). Pain 
treatments were neither, because they may be either effective or ineffective. 
Additionally, doing what health professionals require does not represent a self-pain 
management strategy. While this may help alleviate pain, making it adaptive, it does 
not represent adaptive strategies initiated by the participants themselves to alleviate 
pain. For this reason it was neither adaptive nor maladaptive. 
The rest of the adjustment outcomes in Table 5.15 were more obviously adaptive or 
maladaptive. Physical and psychological self-management of the pain were adaptive, 
because they represent methods initiated by the participants to alleviate their pain, and 
while they may be ineffective, they at least represent some attempt to control pain. In 
tenns of psychological outcomes, positive statements were adaptive, because they 
represent positive ways the sufferers have adapted to their pain. Negative emotions, 
on the other hand, represent negative reactions to the pain, and so are maladaptive. 
The adjustment outcomes reported in Chapter 2 have been considered in this way, i.e. 
negative emotions have been taken to reflect poor adjustment. Support from family 
and friends were adaptive, given that they were reported in a positive way, in terms of 
receiving practical and emotional support. Additionally, any social and physical 
functioning limitations were maladaptive in the sense that they interfered with the 
individual's life. Any ways in which the pain either did not adversely affect the 
individual's life, or ways in which the individual had adapted his/her life around the 
pain, were adaptive, in that they represented a continuing with normal life, despite 
pain. 
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5.3.3.6 The Adaptiveness of Responsibility/Blame Attributions Within "Self' 
In order to determine the adaptiveness of attributions within the "Self' category, 
initial analyses were conducted between these attributions, and the maladaptive 
outcomes identified in Table 5.15, to determine whether these attributions could be 
maladaptive as well. All chi-square analyses were non-significant, suggesting this was 
not the case. Chi-square analyses did indicate, however, that self-blame approached 
significance in being associated with three adaptive outcomes outlined in Table 5.15. 
Firstly, self-blame attributions for the pain onset approached significance in being 
associated with reports of receiving support from the family (Xl, 3.49, df = 1, p = 
0.06; Cramer's V = 0.29, p<O.OS). Secondly, a self-blame/support from family 
association was also found for the pain now (Xl, 3.73, df= 1, p = 0.05, Cramer's V= 
0.31, p<0.02). This was significant for the middle-aged participants (Xl,4.73, df= 1, 
p<0.05; Cramer's V = 0.59, p = 0.007). Thirdly, self-blame attributions for the pain 
now approached significance in being associated with reports of more positive 
statements than negative emotions reported towards the pain overall since its onset 
(Xl, 3.63, df = 1, p = 0.06, Cramer's V = 0.30, p<O.OS). This association was 
particularly significant for the middle-aged (Xl, 4.59, df = 1, p<O.OS; Cramer's V = 
0.56, p = 0.009), and employed participants (Xl,4.27, df = 1, p<O.OS; Cramer's V = 
0.58, p<O.OS). These associations suggest that attributing blame within the category 
"Self', is adaptive for adjustment to pain, especially for particular subgroups of 
participants. 
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5.3.3. 7 The Maladaptiveness of Responsibility/Blame Attributions Within "Other" 
In order to determine the maladaptiveness of attributions within the "Others" 
category, initial analyses were conducted between these attributions, and the adaptive 
outcomes identified in Table 5.15, to determine whether these attributions could be 
adaptive as well. All chi-square analyses were non-significant, suggesting this was not 
the case. Chi-square analyses revealed one global association between attributing 
responsibility within the category "Other", and the maladaptive outcomes in Table 
5.15. Specifically, attributing responsibility to others for the pain now was associated 
with reports of more negative emotions than positive statements being made overall 
towards the pain since its onset (.XZ, 4.45, df= 1, p<0.05, Cramer's V= 0.31, p<0.05). 
Two subgroup effects emerged, within this, for the divorced (.XZ, 4.4, df= 1, p<O.OS; 
Cramer's V= 1.000, p = 0.005), and retired participants in the sample (.XZ, 3.7, df= 1, 
p=O.OS; Cramer's V= 0.53, p<O.OS). Although this is a single finding, it does suggest 
that attributing responsibility within the category, "Other", leads to poor adjustment to 
pain. 
5.3.3.8 The Changing Nature of the Attribution/Adjustment Relationship 
The results so far indicate there are few attribution/adjustment associations. A closer 
investigation of their global associations at different times in the pain experience 
using combined categories of response across all three attribution types supported 
these findings. Those few associations found are summarised in the following table. 
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Table 5.16: Summary of the attribution/adjustment relationships found for different 
times in the pain experience 
Variables )(2 df Cramer's V 
Health outcomes 
Treatment* 
Physiotherapy 
Attributions to the self(onset) 5.59** 1 
Physical internal attributions (onset) 4.49** 1 
Complementary 
Attributions to the self (onset) 4.83** 1 
Attributions to the self (now) 5.08** 1 
Attributions to others (onset) N/S 
Physical external attributions (onset) N/S 
Psychological outcomes 
Positive statements (Onset) 
Physical internal attributions (onset) N/S 
Negative emotions (Onset) 
Physical external attributions (onset) 5.28** 1 
Functioning outcomes 
Support from friends 
Physical external attributions (now) 3.84*** 1 
Support from family 
Physical internal attributions (now) N/S 
*Treatment may be currently received/and/or received in the past 
**p<0.05, ***p = 0.06 
0.34** 
0.31 ** 
0.32** 
0.34** 
0.24*** 
0.24*** 
0.25*** 
0.33** 
0.31** 
0.25*** 
Many of the attribution/adjustment associations found were weak {Table 5.16). 
Additionally, since few associations were found, nothing can be concluded about the 
timing of the attribution/adjustment relationship. Little can be inferred from the nature 
of the relationships that were found, because they largely involved physiotherapy and 
complementary treatment, both of which can be undertaken at any time in the pain 
experience, interacting with attribution categories (Table 5.16). However, the other 
associations suggest that attributions and adjustment are associated when both are 
made for the same time period i.e. the pain onset or now, regardless of the direction of 
the relationship. These include that Cramer's V associations indicated that responses 
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within the category "Physical Internal Attributions" for the pain onset were associated 
with positive statements made towards the pain for its onset. Additionally, responses 
within the category "Physical External Attributions" for the pain onset were 
associated with negative emotions towards the pain at its onset. This indicates that 
physical internal attributions are adaptive, while physical external attributions result 
in poor adjustment to pain. 
Several subgroup effects emerged within the global associations between attribution 
categories and the reported pain treatments. Firstly, the association between 
physiotherapy treatment and the category attributions to the "Self' for the pain onset 
was particularly significant for married (X2,5.05, df= 1, p<O.OS; Cramer's V = 0.46, p 
= 0.009), and employed participants in the sample (X2,10.70, df = 1, p<O.OOS; 
Cramer's V = 0.81, p = 0.000). Secondly, the association between physiotherapy and 
"Physical Internal Attributions" for the pain onset, was significant for the married 
participants (X2,5.37, df = 1, p<O.OS; Cramer's V = 0.47, p = 0.007). Thirdly, the 
association between complementary treatment, and the attribution category, "Self', 
for the pain onset was significant for married participants (XZ, 5.37, df = 1, p<O.OS; 
Cramer's V = 0.47, p = 0.007). Fourthly, the association between complementary 
treatment and the category attributions to "Self' for the pain now was significant for 
the middle-aged (X2,6.90, df = 1, p = 0.009; Cramer's V = 0.67, p<O.OOS), married 
(XZ,9.79, df = 1, p<O.OOS; Cramer's V = 0.63, p = 0.000) and employed participants 
(X2,4.27, df= 1, p<O.OS; Cramer's V = 0.58, p<O.Ol). 
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The most common subgroup effects involved the married, middle-aged and employed 
participants of the sample. This might have been the case because these were frequent 
sample characteristics (see Chapter 4, section 4.6.3). Interesting attribution/adjustment 
subgroup effects emerged within the categories "Self' and "Others". These will be 
discussed in Chapter 6. 
5.3.3.9 Summary 
This aim investigated the nature of the relationship between cause, responsibility and 
blame attributions for pain, and adjustment to pain. There were five parts to the aim. 
The first part was concerned with differences in the ability to predict adjustment 
between those who made causal attributions for their pain, and those who did not. No 
differences were found. The rest of the analyses were concerned with the adaptive and 
maladaptive nature of attributions, and the timing of the attribution/adjustment 
relationship. Few attribution/adjustment associations found at all, making it 
impossible to draw any conclusions about the timing of the relationship. However, the 
few associations found between adjustment and the categories "Self' and "Other" 
indicated making attributions to the self is adaptive, while attributing responsibility to 
others results in poor adjustment to pain. 
One surprising finding to emerge from the data is that there was some indication 
physical internal attributions may be adaptive, while physical external attributions 
may result in poor adjustment to pain. This is because physical internal attributions 
tended to be more associated with adaptive outcomes (social life adapted to pain, 
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social support and positive statements towards the pain at its onset), albeit weakly. 
Physical external attributions, on the other hand, were more associated with negative 
outcomes (negative emotions towards the pain at its onset). One explanation for these 
results may be that the physical internal attributions were adaptive because they were 
made to factors that could be considered to be outwith the control of the pain sufferers 
e.g. hereditary factors (section 5.2). This could be adaptive because the pain sufferers 
could then feel they had no role in the development of their condition. However, 
physical external attributions by their nature were more controllable e.g. leisure 
activities (section 5.2), and so the participants did have some role to play in the 
development of their condition. This could result in poor adjustment to pain. 
Further exploratory analyses revealed several subgroup effects within the global 
attribution/adjustment associations found, most of which involved the middle-aged, 
married and employed participants. 
5.3.4 The Belief in a Just World 
5.3.4.1 Introduction 
The fourth aim of the study was to explore the role of the belief in ajust world in the 
experience of pain. There were three parts to this (Chapter 3, section 3.3.4), each of 
which will be considered in turn, before the section is summarised. 
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5.3.4.2 The Just World Beliefs of Pain Sufferers 
The mean just world score for the pain sample was 67.56, out of a possible maximum 
score of 120. The standard deviation was 9.22, with scores ranging between 45- 90. 
This score is comparable to that obtained in related, spinal-injured samples, and 
experimental student groups. These scores are summarised in Table 5.17. 
Table 5.17: Mean just world scores obtained on the Rubin and Peplau (1975) Just 
World Scale 
Study Mean Just World Score (Maximum= 120) 
Spinal-injured samples 
Bulman and Wortman (1977) 0.5* 
Heinemann et al (1988) 58.4 
Kiecolt-Glaser and Williams (1987) 76.7 
Experimental student samples 
Lipkus et al (1996) 70.2 
Rubin and Peplau (1975) 03.1 * 
Tanaka (1999) 66.7 
Tomaka and Blascovich (1994) 78.4 
*Scores based on mean values not actual scores 
Table 5.17 indicates all scores fell within a similar range, from 58.4-78.4. The 
distribution ofthejust world scores of the pain sample can be seen in Figure 5.1. 
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Figure 5.1: Distribution of just world scores 
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Distribution of Just World Scores 
Figure 5.1 shows that the just world scores of the pain sample were approximately 
normally distributed. 
5.3.4.3 Differences in Just World Beliefs Within Pain- Related Variables 
ANOV A was used to determine any differences in just world scores between the 
different type of pain and pain duration groups. No differences were found between 
the type of pain groups (E(4,57) = 1.5, p = 0.21), but ANOVA comparing the just 
world scores of different pain duration groups produced a significant result (.E(2, 59) 
= 4.26, 12 = 0.01 ). This indicated a difference in the strength of just world beliefs 
between the pain duration groups. There was a large difference in the mean scores 
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between groups. The effect size, calculated using eta squared, was 0.13. Post-hoc 
comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that the mean score for the 1 month -
2.5 years pain duration group (M = 71.95, SD = 10.27) was significantly di fferent 
from the second, 3 - 9 years pain duration group (M = 64.33, SD = 7.70). The third 
pain duration group, 9.5+ years (M = 66.35, SD = 9.22), did not significantly differ 
from either of the other two pain duration groups. The results indicate that those who 
had pain for the shortest length of time had stronger beliefs that the world is a just 
place, than those who had suffered pain for the middle pain duration. The effect 
seemed to level out after 9 years' pain duration. This can be seen in Figure 5.2. 
Figure 5.2: Mean just world scores across pain duration groups 
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Further ANOV A were conducted to determine any demographic factors that might 
interact with pain duration in its effect on just world belief scores. The results of this 
analysis can be seen in Table 5.18. 
Table 5.18: Demographic influences on just world scores 
Group df F 
Independent effects 
Pain duration 
Employment status 
Marital status 
Gender 
Age 
Interaction effects 
2 
3 
4 
1 
2 
Pain duration/employment 3 
Pain duration/marital status 1 
Pain duration/gender 1 
Pain duration/age 1 
2.90 
2.93 
2.34 
2.73 
1.15 
0.56 
0.15 
0.55 
0.47 
p 
0.09 
0.07 
0.11 
0.12 
0.35 
0.65 
0.31 
0.47 
0.51 
Table 5.18 indicates that there were no significant differences between employment, 
marital status, gender and age groups, on just world scores, and differences between 
pain duration groups were cancelled out when these other variables were entered into 
the analysis. Additionally, none of the demographic variables interacted with pain 
duration to influence just world scores. These results suggest that not only did 
demographic variables fail to influence the effect of pain duration on just world 
scores, but also there were no demographic differences on just world scores. 
5.3.4.4 The Role of Attributions in Maintaining Just World Beliefs 
ANOV A to determine any differences in just world scores between those who made 
causal attributions for the pain now and those who did not (reporting their pain to be 
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"just there") revealed non-significant main effects for making attributions (E(1,57) = 
2.46, J! == 0.12), not making them (E(l,57) = 0.92, 11 = 0.43), and interactions between 
them (E(1,57) = 0.65, I!= 0.43). This suggests both groups did not differ in their just 
world scores. Additional ANOV A to determine whether those who attributed 
responsibility or blame to themselves differed in their just world beliefs from those 
who made these attributions to others revealed non-significant main effects for 
attributing responsibility to the self (E(l,57) = 0.003, 11 = 0.96), others (E(l,57) = 
0.72, I!== 0.79), or interactions between them (.E(l,57) = 0.01, J! = 0.93). There were 
also no main effects for attributing blame to the self (F(1,55) = 0.25, p = 0.62), others 
(F(l,SS) = 0.002, p = 0.97), or interaction effects between them (F(l,SS) = 0.31, p = 
0.58). These results suggest there were no differences in just world scores between 
those who made attributions to themselves versus others. 
Further exploratory analyses using multiple regression techniques to determine the 
ability of attributions in general to predict just world beliefs were non-significant (not 
tabulated), suggesting that beyond no differences in just world beliefs being found 
between attribution groups, attributions did not interact with just world beliefs at all. 
5.3.4.5 Summary 
This aim explored the role of just world beliefs in the experience of pain. The mean 
just world score obtained, 67.56 is just above the midpoint of the scale. Scores around 
the midpoint have been interpreted as reflecting a belief in a random world (Fumham, 
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1998). Being just above the midpoint of the scale, the score indicates that the pain 
sufferers hold some belief that the world is a just place. 
ANOV A produced no differences in the just world beliefs of those with different 
types of pain. However, differences were found for pain duration. Those with the 
shortest pain duration were found to have significantly stronger just world beliefs than 
those who had pain for between 3 - 9 years' duration. This effect seemed to level out 
after nine years' pain duration. ANOVA also indicated that attributions have no role 
to play in maintaining just world beliefs. There were no differences in just world 
beliefs of those who made causal attributions for their pain now, and those who did 
not. Additionaily, there were no differences in just world beliefs between those who 
attributed responsibility and blame to themselves versus others for their pain. No 
individual differences were found in just world scores. 
5.3.5 Differences in Adjustment Between Those With Differing Strengths of 
Just World Beliefs 
Having explored just world beliefs in pain, the final aim was to determine any 
differences in adjustment to pain between those with differing strengths of just world 
beliefs (Chapter 3, section 3.3.5). Justification for this analysis comes from a review 
of the just world literature in Chapter 2 (section 2.2.4.6) which suggested that stronger 
just world believers adapt better to a range of situation than weaker just world 
believers. In order to examine this, percentile ranges were used to convert the just 
world scores into low {0-65), medium (65-71) and high (72+) scores. Chi-square 
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analyses revealed non-significant differences between these groups on each of the 
health, psychological and functioning outcomes (not tabulated), suggesting they did 
not differ in their adjustment to pain. 
Further exploratory analyses using multiple regression techniques to determine the 
ability of the health, psychological and functioning outcomes to predict just world 
beliefs were non-significant (not tabulated), suggesting that in the present study 
adjustment did not interact with just world beliefs at all. 
5.3.6 Exploring Interactions Between Pain Intensity and Main Study Variables 
5.3.6.1 Introduction 
Previous sections have addressed the aims of the study outlined in Chapter 3. These 
analyses established that attributions interacted with adjustment and pain and 
demographic variables, but not just world scores, while adjustment interacted with 
pain and demographic-related variables, but not just world scores. Indeed, just world 
scores only interacted with one pain-related variable, pain duration. One important 
variable associated with the study sample, pain intensity, has yet to be considered. 
Given that the present study is an exploratory investigation, the next section will 
examine interactions between pain intensity and the main study variables. 
Interactions between pain intensity and the main study variables will be considered in 
the following sections. Firstly, the pain intensity of the sample. Secondly, individual 
differences in pain intensity. Thirdly, the ability of attributions to predict pain 
239 
intensity. Fourthly, associations between pain intensity and just world beliefs. Fifthly, 
differences between pain intensity groups on adjustment outcomes. 
5.3.6.2 Pain Intensity 
Some outlying values on the sensory, affective and overall scores on the subscales of 
the SF-MPQ created positive skewness. This was resolved through the mean score of 
the sample on each subscale being assigned to correct for the skewness, resulting in 
normally distributed scores being obtained. This happened for the sensory present 
pain intensity score (reducing skewness from 1.55 to 0.22), and the sensory usual pain 
intensity score (reducing skewness from 0.37 to -0.20). Other pain scores required to 
be transformed to correct for skewness. However, given the difficulty in interpreting 
data from transformed scores (Tabachnik and Fidell, 1996), only untransformed 
scores were used in subsequent analyses. Table 5.19 summarises the mean combined 
sensory and affective scores on the SF-MPQ for each of the three time periods, along 
with the means of their corresponding pain scale scores. 
Table 5.19: Mean pain scores for present pain, usual pain and pain at its worst *(N = 
60 
Pain Time Mean 
Present (Combined)** 8.13 
Present (Scale)*** 04.2 
Usual (Combined) 18.42 
Usual (Scale) 6.01 
Pain at Worst (Combined) 25.42 
Pain at Worst (Scale) 8.75 
*Data was missing from two participants 
**Maximum combined score = 45 
***Maximum scale score= 10 
Std Dev 
6.16 
2.50 
9.46 
2.08 
10.35 
01.5 
Min 
0.0 
0.0 
4.0 
0.9 
3.0 
3.5 
Max 
22.0 
10.0 
44.0 
10.0 
42.0 
10.0 
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The overall mean pain intensity scores were lower at the time of the interview (8.13), 
than on a usual day (18.42), and when the pain was at its worst (25.42) (Table 5.19). 
ANOVA revealed significant differences between the pain scores, Wilks's Lambda= 
0.21, (E(2, 58) = 108.12, g<O.OOl), multivariate eta squared = 0.79. A post-hoc 
analysis using the Bonferroni procedure revealed each of the overall present, usual 
and worst pain intensity scores to be significantly different from each other. 
Table 5.19 also indicates inconsistencies in the pain scores obtained. The pain scale 
scores for each of the three time periods did not parallel their corresponding combined 
sensory and affective scores. Instead, they were higher, reaching values around the 
midpoint of the scale for present pain (4.20), and higher than the midpoint of the scale 
for usual pain (6.01), and pain at its worst (8.75). However, despite these 
inconsistencies, each pain scale score was correlated with its corresponding overall 
score, such that for present pain intensity r = -0.23, n = 60, p = 0.01, for usual pain 
intensity r = 0.61, n = 60, p = 0.01, and for pain at its worst r = 0.57, n = 60, p = 0.01. 
For the purpose of subsequent analyses, only usual pain intensity will be considered 
because this best represented the participants' pain experiences. The overall pain 
descriptor score was used rather than the pain scale score, because this presented a 
more detailed evaluation of the sensory and affective components of pain intensity. 
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5.3.6.3 Individual Differences in Usual Pain Intensity 
An exploration of individual differences in usual pain intensity produced both 
demographic and pain-related differences. These differences and their significant 
interaction effects are summarised in Table 5.20. 
Table 5.20: Individual differences in usual pain intensity 
Group df 
Independent effects 
Pain Duration 2 
Employment 3 
Marital status 4 
Gender 1 
Age 2 
Interaction effects 
Pain duration and gender 1 
Marital status and gender 2 
***p<0.005; **p<0.01; *p<O.OS 
F 
14.12*** 
0.35 
8.25*** 
5.04* 
6.49* 
10.38** 
8.28** 
Four independent effects emerged {Table 5.20). A post-hoc test could not be 
conducted for gender because there were only two groups, but an analysis of mean 
scores indicated that males (M = 19.12; SD = 1.25), and females (M = 19.02; SO= 
0.85) were similar in their usual pain intensity. In terms of age, a post-hoc comparison 
using the Tukey HSD test indicated that none of young (M = 19.12; SO = 1.20), 
middle-aged (M = 20.66; SD = 1.18), and older age groups (M = 17 .26; SD = 1.27) 
differed significantly from each other on their usual pain intensity scores. They all 
have an effect on usual pain intensity. 
In terms of pain duration groups, a post hoc test indicated that those with pain for 
between three to nine years' duration had significantly different pain scores from 
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those who had pain for over nine years' duration. An examination of mean scores 
indicated that those with pain for between three to nine years' duration had higher 
pain scores (M = 21.67, SD = 1.20) than those with pain for over nine years' duration 
(M = 15.53, SD = 1.21). This difference can be seen in Figure 5.3. 
Figure 5.3: Differences in usual pain intensity between pain duration groups 
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In tenns of marital status groups, a post-hoc test indicated that those who were single 
had significantly different usual pain intensity scores from those who were married, 
and divorced . An examination of mean scores indicated that those who were single 
had significantly lower pain scores (M = 11.81 , SD = 1.73), than those who were 
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married (M = 20.58, SD = 0.95), and divorced CM 23.50, SD 1.82). This 
difference can be seen in Figure 5.4. 
Figure 5.4: Differences in usual pain intensity between marital status groups 
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An examination of interaction effects indicated that gender interacted both with pain 
duration and marital status in their effects on usual pain intensity scores (Table 5.20). 
The interaction between pain duration and gender can be seen in Figure 5.5. 
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Figure 5.5: Interaction between pain duration and gender on usual pain intensity 
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The graph indicates that males with pain for between three to nine years' duration had 
higher pain scores than the males in the other pain duration groups, and the females of 
the sample. Additionally, females within this pain duration had higher usual pain 
intensity scores than the females in the other groups. Further exploration of these 
gender differences using ANOV A suggested that the observed differences in pain 
intensity between male pain duration groups was non-significant (£(2,16) = 2.31, n = 
0.13), as were those for the female pain duration groups (£(2,38) = 0.34, n = 0.71). 
The interaction between marital status and gender can be seen in Figure 5.6. 
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Figure 5.6: Interaction between marital status and gender on usual pain intensity 
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The graph indicates that divorced males had higher usual pain intensity scores than 
married, separated or single males, and the females of the sample. Additionally, 
widowed females had higher usual pain intensity scores than females in the other 
marital status groups. Further exploration of these gender differences using ANOV A 
indicated that the observed difference in usual pain intensity between females marital 
status groups was non-significant (E(2,36) = 2.21, 12 = 0.09), but the observed 
differences between male marital status groups was statistically significant (.E(3,15) = 
3.34, 12 == 0.05). Post hoc analyses using the Tukey HSD test indicated that divorced 
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males had significantly higher pain intensity scores (M = 35.00, SD = 12.73), than 
single males (M = 6.50, SD = 0.71). 
5.3.6.4 Pain Intensity and Attributions 
A stepwise multiple regression was conducted to detennine whether any of the 
independent variable, attribution factors, "Attributions to the Self', "Attributions to 
others for the pain onset", and "Attributions to others for the pain now" predicted the 
dependent variable, usual pain intensity. Only the factor "Attributions to others for the 
pain onset" was significant (£(1,52) = 8.12, ll = 0.006). However, R2 was only 13.5%, 
indicating this factor only explained a small amount of the variance of usual pain 
intensity. As such, it is possible that other factors might be related to the dependent 
variable. Further regression analyses indicated that none of the age, gender, pain 
duration, marital or employment status variables, or just world beliefs interacted with 
attributions in their effect on pain intensity. 
5.3.6.5 Pain Intensity and Just World Scores 
A Pearson's correlation coefficient was calculated to detennine whether pain intensity 
and just world scores were correlated with each other. This was significant (r = -
0.227, n = 60, p = 0.04, one-tailed), providing some indication that pain intensity and 
just world scores are associated with each other. However, further exploratory 
multiple regression analyses using all present, usual and worst pain intensities 
suggested that pain intensity does not predict just world scores. 
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5.3.6.6 Pain Intensity and Adjustment 
Stepwise multiple regression analyses to examine whether any types of adjustment 
predicted usual pain intensity, indicated that types of treatment predicted pain 
intensity. These are listed in Table 5.21. 
5.21: Treatment predictors of usual pain intensity 
Variable Rz ~Rz fJ final t final p final 
Physiotherapy 0.141 0.127 -0.389 -3.376 0.001 
Oral medications 0.225 0.198 0.345 2.956 0.005 
Do what is required 
by health profession 0.281 0.242 0.246 2.087 0.041 
Stepwise procedures entered physiotherapy first, and this alone predicted 14.1% of 
the variance in usual pain intensity. When oral medications was entered, together this 
predicted 22.5% of the variance, and when "Do what is required by health 
professionals" was entered, all three variables together predicted 28.1% of the 
variance in usual pain intensity (Table 5.21). 
Further analyses were conducted to determine any differences in treatment between 
participants with different intensities of pain. To achieve this, the sample was split 
into those with lower (0 - 14); medium (15 - 22) and higher (23+) usual pain 
intensities, based on percentile ranges. Chi-square analyses indicated that the groups 
differed in their pain management techniques. The nature of these differences are 
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summarised in the following table. For each difference, the table produces 
significance levels, indicates where within each group the differences lie, and 
provides information on the extent to which the three pain duration groups did and did 
not use each pain management technique. 
Table 5.22: Differences in health adjustment outcomes between usual pain intensity 
Adjustment outcome 
Pain treatments 
Physiotherapy 
Lower (0-14) 
Medium (15-22) 
Higher (23+) 
Total 
Statistical significance Xl, 9.68, df= 2, p<O.Ol 
*Statistical difference Xl, 5.50, df= 1, p<0.05 
Complementary 
Lower (0-14) 
Medium (15-22) 
Higher (23+) 
Total 
Statistical significance Xl, 8.94, df= 2, p<0.05 
*Statistical difference Xl, 5.13, df = 1, p<0.05 
Self-management of pain 
Psychological 
Lower (0-14) 
Medium (15-22) 
Higher (23+) 
Total 
Statistical significance Xl, 9.58, df = 2, p<0.01 
*Statistical difference Xl, 6.37, df= 1, p<0.05 
Do what is required by health professionals 
Lower (0-14) 
Medium (15-22) 
Higher (23+) 
Total 
Statistical significance X'-, 7.38, df= 2, p<O.Ol 
*Statistical difference Xl, 3.57, df= 2, p = 0.06 
Reported(%) Not reported(%) 
57.1 * 20.6* 
25.0 32.4 
17.9 47.1 
100 100 
10.5* 
47.4 
42.1 
100 
26.7 
60.0* 
13.3 
100 
36.4 
0.0 
63.6* 
100 
48.8* 
20.9 
30.2 
100 
40.4 
19.1 * 
40.4 
100 
37.3 
35.3 
27.5* 
100 
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Differences were found between usual pain intensity groups in both pain treatment 
and self-management techniques (Table 5.22). Specifically, those with the lower usual 
pain intensity most frequently reported receiving/having received physiotherapy as 
treatment for their pain (57.1 %) than the other pain duration groups. Those with the 
medium usual pain intensity most frequently reported using both complementary 
treatments (47.4%), and psychological self-management techniques (60.0%). Those 
with the higher pain intensity more frequently reported doing what was required by 
their health professionals to manage their pain (63.6%). 
5.3.6.7 Summary 
The results of this section indicated that each of the overall present, usual and worst 
pain intensities were statistically different from each other. An exploration of 
interactions between usual pain intensity and other study variables indicated four 
things. Firstly, there were individual differences in usual pain intensity scores 
between gender, age, marital status and pain duration, the latter two of which were 
mediated by gender. Secondly, making attributions within the category "Others" for 
the pain onset predicted usual pain intensity. Thirdly, usual pain intensity and just 
world scores were weakly associated with each other, and fourthly, there were 
differences between those with low, medium and high usual pain intensity scores on 
their pain management techniques. 
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5.4 SUMMARY OF CHAPTER 
This chapter presented the results of the study, in two main sections. The first section 
presented the results of a qualitative analysis of the thematic content of pain 
attributions. Four thematic categories emerged from these attributions: "Physical 
Internal Attributions", "Physical External Attributions", "Attributions to the Self', 
and "Attributions to Others". The second section presented the results of the analysis 
of the five study aims outlined in Chapter 3 (section 3.3). 
Three aims of the study were concerned with attributions, adjustment, and their 
interactions in pain. In terms of attributions, most participants made causal 
attributions for their pain, while around half the sample attributed responsibility, and 
just under half attributed blame for their pain. Statistical associations between the 
concepts created ambiguity about whether or not the concepts were distinguished 
from each other, although descriptively, differences in magnitude suggested that 
causal attributions were distinguished from responsibility and blame, which were 
indistinguishable from each other. Descriptive and statistical analyses indicated that 
the attributions made largely did not change between the pain onset and now (at 
interview). Finally, causal attributions were not associated with possible motives for 
making them. 
A second aim involved reported types of adjustment to pain, in relation to health, 
psychological and functioning outcomes, each of which were found to be independent 
of each other. Participants reported a range of positive and negative ways in which 
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they had adjusted to their pain. Positive adjustment included feeling positively about 
pain in general, and being able to function in daily and social activities, despite pain, 
as well as adapt one's life around pain. Negative adjustment was more common and 
was characterised by a range of negative feeling about pain, as well as daily and social 
limitations placed on one's life, by pain. On a descriptive level, the nature and number 
of the reported positive and negative feelings changed for different times in the pain 
experience, although these were largely statistically non-significant. 
Few interactions between attributions and adjustment emerged. However, the results 
from this analysis indicated three main things. Firstly, making causal attributions and 
not making them do not differ in their ability to predict adjustment. Secondly, making 
attributions to the self for one's pain is adaptive for adjustment to pain, and thirdly, 
making attributions to others for one's pain leads to poor adjustment to pain. 
The last two aims of the study were concerned with the role of just world beliefs in 
pain, in terms of interactions between these beliefs and pain-related variables, and 
differences in adjustment between high, medium and low just world belief groups. 
The results indicated that there were differences in just world scores between pain 
duration groups, where those who had experienced pain for between 1 month-2.5 
years' duration had significantly stronger just world beliefs, than those who had 
experienced pain for between 3-9 years' duration. However, no type of pain 
differences emerged. The results also indicated that attributions have no role to play in 
252 
maintaining just world beliefs. Finally, no differences in adjustment emerged between 
the just world belief groups. 
The quantitative section of the results also presented the results of an exploratory 
analysis of interactions between the main study variables with an important pain 
variable, pain intensity. The results indicated that firstly, there are individual 
differences in pain intensity, some of which interact with each other. Secondly, 
making attributions to other people for the pain onset is a predictor of pain intensity. 
Thirdly, pain intensity and just world beliefs are associated with each other, and 
fourthly, different pain intensity groups vary in their pain management strategies. 
Overall this exploratory study revealed several interactions between the main study 
variables. Firstly, attributions interacted with adjustment, pain intensity, and other 
pain and demographic-related variables, but not just world beliefs. Secondly, in 
addition to attributions, adjustment interacted with pain and demographic-related 
variables, and pain intensity, but not just world beliefs. Thirdly, in addition to 
attributions and adjustment, just world beliefs did not interact with demographic 
variables, but did interact with pain duration and intensity. Fourthly, in addition to 
attributions, adjustment and just world beliefs, pain intensity interacted with other 
pain and demographic variables. 
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CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION OF RESULTS AND CONCLUSIONS 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will discuss the main results of the study from Chapter 5. The discussion 
will be undertaken in the following five sections. Firstly, a summary of the study 
rationale will be provided in terms of the general purpose of the study, theoretical 
background, the study sample employed, the phases of the study, and the specific 
research aims of the study. Secondly, a description of the study results in relation to 
the five aims outlined will be provided. Contributions to the literature will be 
considered in relation to the results. Thirdly, the results of an exploration of 
relationships between pain intensity and the main study variables will be described. 
Fourthly, limitations of the study will be discussed, and finally future studies 
following from the study will be detailed. 
6.2 SUMMARY OF THE STUDY RATIONALE 
6.2.1 General Purpose of the Study 
The present study was undertaken to address methodological issues and shortcomings 
of research examining attributions, just world beliefs and adjustment in pain. Taking 
these issues into account made the study an exploratory investigation, because the 
concepts have not been measured in this way before in pain. 
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6.2.2 Theoretical Background to the Study 
Three independent theoretical backgrounds informed the research in the present study. 
The first is Gate Control Theory (Melzack and Wall, 1965). This was the first pain 
theory to consider not only the physiological experience of pain, but also 
psychological mechanisms that can affect individual perceptions and interpretations 
of the pain experience. The theory holds that there is a "gating" mechanism in the 
dorsal horns of the spinal cord that can be opened or closed to modulate incoming 
pain signals before they reach the brain. The route from the periphery to the brain 
passes through a series of physiological stages. Once pain information has reached the 
brain, several psychological factors such as emotion, past experience, and attention 
can influence how the pain is perceived. Psychological factors can also open and close 
the gate in descending inhibitory controls from the brain, suggesting the existence of a 
feedback loop, from the spinal cord to the brain, and back to the spinal cord (Chapter 
2, section 2.1.5.4). Several criticisms have been made of this theory. Despite this, 
being the first theory to discuss the physiological and psychological components of 
pain together, it remains the most influential working model for pain researchers. Gate 
Control Theory formed part of the theoretical background to the present study because 
it highlighted the role of psychological processes in the pain experience. 
The second theoretical framework was Shaver's (1985) Theory of Blame Assignment. 
The central tenet of the theory is that cause, responsibility and blame are related but 
conceptually distinct from each other. Specific criteria must be fulfilled before blame 
can be assigned. To summarise the criteria, an individual must have intentionally 
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caused a negative outcome, leading to the assignment of responsibility to the person. 
Once found responsible, certain conditions must be met before blame is assigned. 
These are that the intention to create hann, with a full knowledge of the consequences 
of the behaviour must be present. Additionally, the actions taken to produce the 
negative consequences must be voluntary, and the individual must have had a nonnal 
capacity to understand what he/she was doing. There must also be an absence of a 
good excuse or justification for the behaviour (Chapter 2, section 2.2.3.3). 
This theory has been criticised on the basis that people may not assign blame in this 
way. Instead, they might blame others through recklessness rather than intentional 
action, and may even assign blame when they know it is not warranted, because to do 
this serves some psychological purpose for them (Shaver, 1992). It has also been 
suggested that such conceptually sophisticated distinctions should not be imposed on 
the lay perceiver. Instead, they should be allowed to make their own conceptual errors 
when distinguishing between the concepts (Lalljee, 1981). Most of the research 
reviewed in Chapter 2 adopted this strategy when measuring attributions. Few studies 
have been found to define the concepts. Thus, Shaver's (1985) conceptual distinctions 
have had little opportunity to be empirically tested. Although Shaver's (1985) 
conceptual distinctions were not used in the present study to define the concepts, for 
the reasons given in Chapter 4 (section 4.3.3.7), the theory did provide a framework 
for distinguishing between cause, responsibility and blame. As such, it was relevant to 
use as a reference against which to compare any empirical distinctions found between 
the concepts in the present study. 
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The third theoretical framework of the study involved Just World Theory (Lerner, 
1980). This is based on the just world hypothesis, which states that people have a 
need to live in a world where people get what they deserve and deserve what they get. 
The belief allows people to view their environment as stable and orderly, creating a 
predictable and manageable world (Chapter 2, section 2.2.4.2). The extent to which 
people believe the world to be a just place can be threatened by situations of personal 
suffering, and there are various ways that just world beliefs can be maintained in these 
situations (Chapter 2, section 2.2.4.4). However, the use of Just World Theory in 
situations of personal suffering is limited, since just world beliefs and reactions to 
one's own suffering is a relatively new area of research (Hafer and Olson, 1998). The 
available literature on this has measured just world beliefs in situations of 
experimental suffering, and in real-life cases of short-term loss e.g. loss of 
employment. Just World Theory has not been found to be applied to real-life pain 
situations, hence the exploratory nature of the present study. 
6.2.3 The Study Sample 
The study was conducted on a sample of working age adults suffering from mixed 
pain complaints of various pain durations in the community. The selection of this 
sample was based on the shortcomings of the pain/illness/injury patients recruited into 
the studies reviewed in Chapter 2. The specific nature of the samples recruited into 
these studies limits the extent to which the results produced are generalisable across 
samples. In order to avoid such restrictions and explore the possible wider 
applicability of the study findings, people suffering from mixed pain complaints were 
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recruited. Another advantage of using a mixed pain sample is that people of varying 
ages are more likely to be recruited than in a specific condition that may be age-
related, as in the studies reviewed in Chapter 2. Additionally, a community pain 
sample was used in the present study to control for the selection bias ofthese samples. 
6.2.4 The Phases of the Study 
In order to take account of the methodological issues and shortcomings of the 
attribution, just world and adjustment literature, the research undertaken in the present 
study was in two phases. The first phase involved a brief study to pilot a semi-
structured interview schedule devised to take these issues into account. The second 
phase was the main phase of the study, using a revised version of the piloted schedule 
to investigate these issues in a series of aims. Justification for the questions in the 
interview schedule will be considered in the description of the main study findings, in 
section 6.3. The next section will outline the research aims of the study. Given that the 
aims were based on the shortcomings of the literature addressed using the interview 
schedule, justification for their investigation in the present study will be made in 
section 6.3. 
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6.2.5 The Research Aims 
There were five aims of the present study, as follows. 
1. To examine the cause, responsibility and blame attributions made for pain. 
Specifically, to determine whether or not these attributions were made, their 
nature, whether or not distinctions were made between them, whether or not 
they changed for different times in the pain experience, and to explore 
particular motives for making them, in the form of knowledge and uncertainty 
factors. 
2. To explore various ways of adjusting to pain, using health, psychological and 
functioning outcomes. 
3. To investigate the nature of the relationship between cause, responsibility and 
blame attributions, and adjustment to pain. There were five parts to this. 
Firstly, to determine whether there were any differences in adjustment to pain 
between those who made causal attributions for their pain, and those who did 
not. Secondly, to determine the nature of the relationship between causal 
attributions made for, and adjustment to pain. Thirdly, to determine whether or 
not attributing responsibility and blame to the self was adaptive for adjustment 
to pain. Fourthly, to determine whether or not attributing responsibility and 
blame to other people resulted in poor adjustment to pain. Fifthly, to determine 
whether or not the attribution/adjustment relationship varied for different 
times in the pain experience. 
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4. To explore the role of just world beliefs in the experience of pain, specifically 
determining the strength of the just world beliefs held by pain sufferers, and 
exploring differences in just world beliefs between different types of pain and 
pain duration groups. Additionally, the role of cause, responsibility and blame 
attributions in maintaining just world beliefs was considered. 
5. To determine differences in adjustment between those with differing strengths 
of just world beliefs. 
6.3 DISCUSSION OF MAIN STUDY FINDINGS AND CONTRIBUTIONS 
TO THE LITERATURE 
6.3.1 The Role of Cause, Responsibility and Blame Attributions in Pain 
The first aim was based on the shortcomings of attribution literature in 
pain/illness/injury samples. Four shortcomings were addressed. Firstly, there is a lack 
of research empirically distinguishing between cause, responsibility and blame. This 
is important on both a conceptual and empirical level. Conceptually, it means that 
empirical distinctions between the concepts have fallen behind theoretical 
distinctions. Empirically, it limits what can be learned about whether or not the 
concepts are distinguished from each other, and thus if it is important to examine all 
three concepts independently in pain situations. There were also practical implications 
of this, related to the second criticism of attribution research. That is, despite having 
been theoretically distinguished from each other, researchers often use the concepts 
interchangeably. This creates problems in interpreting the nature of any 
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attribution/adjustment associations found in studies, and thus, which types of 
attributions result in poor adjustment to pain. 
The third criticism concerns the structured nature of attribution measures. Causal 
attribution measures are often unstructured, allowing participants to make any or no 
causal attributions at all (Chapter 2, section 2.2.3.5). However, the structured nature 
of responsibility and blame measures often fail to give people the option to refrain 
from making these attributions. Additionally, they largely dictate the types of 
attributions that can be made. This is important to address because it limits what can 
be learned about the extent to which pain sufferers make responsibility and blame 
attributions about their pain, and the nature of these attributions made. 
The final criticism of attribution research in pain/illness/injury samples is that there is 
a lack of longitudinal research examining the extent to which cause, responsibility and 
blame attributions change over time. Conflicting findings have emerged among the 
limited available literature that has investigated this, producing no firm indication 
about whether or not attributions do change over time. This is important to address for 
two reasons. Firstly, the variable nature of pain suggests that a person's beliefs about 
his/her situation may change over the course of pain. Secondly, pain may last for 
several years, and as such it cannot be expected that beliefs about it will remain stable 
overtime. 
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In order to address these four criticisms of attribution research, cause, responsibility 
and blame attributions were measured as questions in the semi-structured interview 
schedule (see Chapter 4, section 4.3.3.7 for a full justification of the questions). 
Definitions of each concept were provided to make distinctions between them. These 
distinctions, and the attribution questions that accompanied them, were worded in 
such a way that they would not limit the participants in whether or not they made 
attributions, and the types of attributions made. At least two attribution questions 
accompanied their corresponding definition in the interview schedule. One question 
measured attributions made for the pain onset, while the other question measured 
attributions for the pain now. The aim of this was to examine whether attributions 
changed for different times in the pain experience. The interview schedule also 
measured motives for making causal attributions, involving questions relating to 
knowledge and uncertainties about causes of the pain (Chapter 2, section 2.2.3.5). 
Investigating attributions in this way contributed to the exploratory nature of the 
study, because no literature has been found to investigate them in pain in the same 
way as the present study. 
In tenns of the results produced, the majority of the participants made causal 
attributions for their pain onset, while around half of the sample attributed 
responsibility and just under half attributed blame for this time. The fact that the 
majority of the participants made causal attributions for their pain onset supports two 
things. Firstly, the estimated 69-95% of illness patients who attribute causes for their 
illness onset (Turnquist et al, 1988). Secondly, the extent to which causal attributions 
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were made for the onset of illness in the studies reviewed in Chapter 2. These 
percentages are based on disease-specific samples drawn from specialised treatment 
centres. In the present study the percentages were based on community pain sufferers 
suffering from mixed pain complaints. This suggests that regardless of disease type or 
recruitment method, people largely do attribute causes for their pain or illness 
situations. Additionally, the fact that up to half of the participants attributed 
responsibility and blame for the onset of their pain when given the opportunity not to 
do so contributes to a literature lacking in free response measures. In particular, 
responsibility and blame measures typically either provide response options from 
which participants must select attributions, or allow participants to refrain from 
making attributions only in relation to that being measured e.g. making attributions to 
the self or not (Chapter 2, section 2.2.3.7). Attributions to chance factors are 
commonly made using the first measure, and no attributions are commonly made 
using the second measure. Both suggest a tendency to refrain from making 
attributions. This was partially supported in the present study by the finding that 
around half of the participants did not attribute responsibility and/or blame for their 
pain onset. 
There are two possible explanations for this. Firstly, it may not have been relevant for 
some of the pain sufferers to attribute responsibility and blame for their pain. The 
literature reviewed in Chapter 2 largely discussed responsibility and blame in the 
context of people who have been injured as a result of accidents. These are situations 
that may warrant the making of responsibility and blame attributions more than, for 
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example the onset of arthritis or some other disease-related pain condition. Secondly, 
even where pain situations may have warranted the making of responsibility and 
blame attributions, some participants may not have made them because they would 
have felt uncomfortable doing this, viewing it as a socially undesirable thing to do. In 
support of this, some of the literature reviewed in Chapter 2 suggested that people 
may be motivated to refrain from attributing responsibility and blame for this reason 
(Lloyd-Bostock, 1991). The fact that people do refrain from making attributions 
suggests that future measures of responsibility and blame should not restrict 
participants in the types of attributions they can and cannot make. 
However, some participants did attribute responsibility and blame for their pain onset. 
These results make two important contributions to the illness/injury literature in 
general and pain literature in particular. Firstly, they demonstrate that people do make 
these attributions when given the opportunity not to do so. Secondly, they indicate 
that making responsibility and blame attributions may be important and/or relevant 
for some pain sufferers. Given the high incidence of causal attributions, it may also be 
important and/or relevant for the pain sufferers to attribute a cause for their pain 
onset. Chapter 2 (section 2.2.3.5) considered other reasons why attributions may be 
made, involving various motives for making them. Specific motives, namely 
knowledge and uncertainty were unrelated to causal attributions, suggesting that it is 
more likely that attributions were made out of importance or relevance to individual 
pain situations, rather than because of particular motives. These individual pain 
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situations may include demographic variables, because Chapter 5 (section 5.3.1.7) 
found demographic differences in the attributions made among the pain sample. 
Other potential influences on whether or not certain attributions are made include 
dispositional factors. For example, people who believe that they are in control of their 
pain might not choose to attribute responsibility or blame to anyone, and instead 
refrain from making these attributions. This supports the idea suggested in Chapter 2 
(section 2.2.2) that people tend to have their own "attributional style", a particular 
way of explaining events in their lives. While this is possible, in the present study, 
given that individual differences in attributions emerged, it seems more plausible that 
attributions were made out of relevance to individual pain situations, rather than 
dispositional factors. 
Similar numbers of participants attributed cause, responsibility and blame for the pain 
now, as the pain onset. On the surface, the fact that people made current attributions 
for their pain contributes to a literature largely concerned with retrospective 
attributions. However, an examination of the nature of the attributions made for the 
pain now, revealed that largely the same attributions were made for this time, as the 
pain onset. This suggests that there is little value in measuring current pain 
attributions, because the pain sufferers did not change their pain attributions over 
time. 
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There are two possible explanations why attributions did not change. Firstly, this may 
have been a function of the questions asked. The participants were asked about 
attributions for the pain onset and now at the same time. This may have led them to 
produce similar responses, without having time to think between the questions. 
Perhaps a different method using a longitudinal investigation would have produced 
different results. However, given time constraints, it was not possible to conduct a 
longitudinal investigation in the present study. Secondly, attributions may be 
unimportant for the current pain experience, leading to the same attributions for the 
pain onset being repeated for now (Mumma and McCorkle, 1982-83). In support of 
this idea, as indicated in Chapter 5 (section 5.3.1.2), some participants reported their 
pain to be 'just there" now, but had given a causal attribution for the pain onset. An 
examination of individual differences indicated that these participants had suffered 
pain for over nine years' duration (section 5.3.1.7), suggesting that the longer the 
length of time since diagnosis, the less important attributions may be. The fact that 
attributions did not change supports the limited available literature reviewed in 
Chapter 2 (section 2.2.3.8), that found causal attributions do not change over the 
course of the acute illness experience, and extends it to the chronic pain experience. 
In terms ofthe nature of the attributions made, four thematic categories emerged from 
a qualitative analysis of the pain attributions made across cause, responsibility and 
blame questions, for both time periods. The first category, "Physical Internal 
Attributions", involved attributions to physical internal states, and was characterised 
by two main themes. The first, "Condition Specific" theme, was dominated by 
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attributions to either the symptoms or the name of a condition. There was some 
indication that people who made attributions to the symptoms of their condition had 
suffered pain for a longer duration (up to 15 years), than those who made attributions 
to the name of their condition (up to seven years). Attributions to hereditary factors 
were made within the second, "Genetic" theme, and there was some indication that 
these were made in the absence of an alternative explanation for the sudden onset of 
pain. 
The second, "Physical External Attributions" category was characterised by 
attributions to environmental factors, and two key themes emerged from the pain 
attributions made. The first, "Incidents/ Accidents" theme was dominated by 
attributions made by back pain sufferers that falling over in a range of situations, and 
being involved in straining activity, such as over-stretching and twisting led to the 
development of their pain. Back pain sufferers also made attributions within the 
second, "Lifestyle" theme, to the strenuous nature of their employment, involving 
lifting, bending, and standing, which they felt contributed to their pain. Together, 
these responses suggest that people suffering from back pain conceptualised their pain 
in terms of various types of strain. The "Lifestyle" theme also involved reports by 
older participants i.e. aged 60 years or over, that previous lifestyle factors such as diet, 
and unhealthy behaviours such as smoking and drinking alcohol, led to the onset of 
their pain several years later. 
267 
The responses within the "Physical Internal" and "Physical External" categories 
suggest that individual difference variables such as pain duration, age, and type of 
pain may influence the attributions made for pain. Although this is not new in and of 
itself, it does contribute to a literature that scarcely mentions factors influencing the 
attributions that people make for a variety of conditions. There is little against which 
to compare the responses, given the fact that pain attributions have scarcely been 
examined before. However, the types of attributions made, for example to lifestyle 
factors, the environment and hereditary factors, by people suffering from various 
types of pain, including arthritis, reflect those made in other arthritis samples (Chapter 
2, section 2.2.3. 7). 
Attributions made within the category, "Attributions to the Self', also supported those 
made in the illness literature. Two main themes emerged from the responses within 
this category. These were "Omissions" and "Inappropriate Activity", and involved a 
failure to do certain things, such as avoid potential hazards, look after the self 
properly, and obtain treatment for the pain condition, as well as maintain unhealthy 
behaviour such as smoking, work too hard, and lift heavy objects. These attributions 
are similar to those made in other, cancer samples for their illness onset, including 
past behaviours, one's own negligence, and a failure to preserve one's health (Abrams 
and Finesinger, 1953; Bard and Dyk, 1956; Moses and Cividali, 1966). 
The fourth category, "Attributions to Others" comprised four themes. The first two 
were small themes, and involved attributions to "Husbands" for inducing stress that 
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resulted in pain, and "Bosses", for failing to take appropriate action to prevent 
employees being injured. The third theme, "Outsiders" involved attributions to a 
range of people not known to the participants, such as offenders and patients for 
attacking the participants, or drivers of vehicles who typically either knocked the 
participants over, or were involved in vehicle collisions with them. People who made 
these attributions were suffering from upper body pain, such as neck pain. Within an 
examination of individual differences in attributions, these participants emerged as 
most likely to make attributions to other people for their pain onset (Chapter 5, 
section 5.3.1.7). 
No negative emotions were reported towards these other people, despite obvious 
reports of negligence resulting in pain. This was also characteristic of the fourth 
theme, "Scientists", which was the most common of all themes involving attributions 
to others. This involved attributions to a range of medical professionals including 
General Practitioners, surgeons, and physiotherapists for negligence associated with 
treating or failing to treat pain. Most of these attributions were for surgical treatments 
that were perceived to have gone wrong, worsening the existing pain problem. 
Making attributions such as these to medical professionals is not uncommon (Church 
and Vincent, 1996; Eccleston et al, 1997), and it has been suggested that attributions 
to authority figures such as medical professionals increase when they were present at 
the time of the incident (Tennen and Affleck, 1990). However, what is surprising is 
that there were no reported negative emotions towards them, and there was even some 
indication of remorse at making such an attribution. This contrasts the suggestion that 
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these attributions can lead to poor adjustment because they lead to the belief that 
doctors are fallible, and increase feelings of being unprotected by the people who are 
supposed to protect them (Church and Vincent, 1996). 
There are two possible explanations for this lack of reported negative feelings towards 
other people in general and medical professionals in particular. Firstly, for a large 
number of participants the onset of pain occurred several years earlier, and so it may 
be possible that any negative feelings resided with time. Secondly, given the ongoing 
nature of their pain, many participants would still be reliant on medical professionals 
for their pain treatment, and so to avoid feeling any dissonance that might result from 
an inconsistency between their attitude (negative feelings) and behaviour (attending 
for treatment), they simply avoided reporting feeling negatively. 
Although each of the "Physical External", "Physical Internal", "Self', and "Others" 
thematic categories emerged across cause, responsibility and blame, responses within 
the "Self' and "Others" categories were more common as responsibility and blame 
attributions. This support's Shaver's (1985) Theory of Blame Assignment, which 
states that responsibility and blame must be attributed to people (Chapter 2, section 
2.2.3.3). It also supports the structured nature of responsibility and blame measures 
(Chapter 2, section 2.2.3.5), by demonstrating that these attributions are made to the 
self and other people. Attributions to the "Self' and "Others" are not commonly made 
in the causal attribution literature. Their mention in the present study is likely to be a 
function of the nature of the causal questions in the interview schedule, which asked 
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participants who or what, if anything they believed caused their pain onset/now. This 
contrasts existing causal attribution measures that tend to investigate causes in 
general, without indicating any nature of the cause. Despite this, responses within the 
"Physical External" and "Physical Internal" categories were more common as causal 
attributions. 
Differences in the frequencies of the attributions made across cause, responsibility 
and blame, combined with differences in the number of each type of attribution made, 
suggests that the pain sufferers descriptively distinguished cause from responsibility 
and blame, but not these latter two types of attributions from each other. On a 
statistical level, however, these distinctions were not so clear-cut. Strong associations 
were found between all three concepts, although these generally tended to be stronger 
between responsibility and blame, than between responsibility or blame, and cause. 
The limited available literature statistically distinguishing between all three concepts, 
in non-pain situations, has conflicted in their interpretation of high correlations 
between the concepts. Some literature has interpreted this as a reflection of the 
indistinguishable nature of the concepts (Borek and Shaver, 1988; Sholomskas et al, 
1990). Other literature has interpreted this as reflecting the close, but distinct nature of 
the concepts (Critchlow, 1985; Mantler et al, 2003). This latter interpretation is 
consistent with Shaver's (1985) Theory of Blame Assignment that proposes all three 
concepts to be closely related but distinct. This interpretation of the concepts seems 
more plausible when considering that, as in the present study, Mantler et al (2003) 
271 
found differences in the magnitude of the attributions made, with more cause than 
responsibility and blame, and more responsibility than blame attributions being made. 
Together, both the descriptive and statistical analyses suggest that cause is more 
distinguishable from responsibility and blame, than these attributions are from each 
other. This indicates that it is at least worthwhile to measure causal attributions in 
pain separately from responsibility and blame, although it may not be worthwhile to 
measure these latter attributions as separate components. The fact that the nature and 
number of responsibility and blame attributions made were so similar, despite 
definitions being provided of each, supports the point made in Chapter 2 (section 
2.2.3.3), that even when attribution definitions are provided, people may fail to 
distinguish between them (Tennen and Affleck, 1990). This may be because people 
have their own motives for making attributions and ignore the definitions (Shaver, 
1992), or because their understanding of the distinctions is different from the 
conceptually sophisticated distinctions made between them. Indeed, it has been 
suggested that lay perceivers' conceptual errors in making attributions should be 
interpreted by researchers (Lalljee, 1981), rather than imposing definitions of 
attribution concepts. 
However, the advantages of defining attribution concepts outweigh any problems 
associated with them. The first is that it ensures that both researcher and participant 
have a similar understanding of what each concept means. This is essential because 
researchers often use cause, responsibility and blame interchangeably in their 
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interpretation of attribution results. This leads to the second advantage, that it may 
allow the outcome of associations between attributions and other variables to be 
clearly interpreted. The third advantage is that it might deter future studies from using 
the concepts interchangeably. For example, the fact that cause was distinguished from 
responsibility and blame provides the basis for future research to distinguish between 
the concepts, specifically to stop using cause interchangeably with responsibility and 
blame. 
In summary, this exploratory investigation of attributions in the present pain sample 
has revealed four main things. Firstly, pain sufferers make attributions for their pain 
to a range of internal states, environmental factors, themselves, and other people. 
Secondly, it is more important or relevant for pain sufferers to make causal 
attributions for their pain, rather than responsibility and blame attributions, although 
these attributions are important for some pain sufferers, given that around half of the 
sample made these attributions when given the opportunity not to do so. Thirdly, pain 
sufferers seem able to clearly distinguish causal attributions more from responsibility 
and blame, than these latter two types of attributions from each other. This suggests a 
value in examining causal attributions for pain, but questions the value of measuring 
responsibility and blame attributions independently in pain. Fourthly, attributions for 
pain did not change in the present sample. This result may be due to the way in which 
the changing nature of attributions was measured, and as such requires further 
exploration using a longitudinal analysis to establish with any certainty whether or not 
attributions change in pain. 
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6.3.2 The Nature of Adjustment in Pain 
The second aim of the present study was to investigate adjustment to pain. This was 
achieved using health, psychological and functional outcomes that have been 
commonly used to measure adjustment to pain/illness/injury situations (Chapter 2, 
section 2.2.5.2). However, the way in which they were applied took account of some 
criticisms and methodological differences of research investigating the 
attribution/adjustment relationship in pain/illness/injury samples, outlined in Chapter 
2. One of the criticisms of this literature involved the means by which adjustment was 
measured in the studies reviewed. That is, the structured questionnaire format of most 
measures limits what can be learned about adjustment to illness/injury situations in 
general, and pain in particular (Chapter 2, section 2.3.5). In the present study 
adjustment was measured in the semi-structured interview schedule using questions to 
guide each of the health, psychological and functioning outcomes, but allowing 
participants to define their own adjustment to pain using these outcomes, rather than 
imposing response categories on them. The aim of this was to learn something about 
the way in which pain sufferers adjust to their pain. The health-related adjustment 
questions measured ways in which the participants' pain had been and was being 
treated and self-managed. Psychological outcomes involved questions measuring 
emotions towards the pain at its onset, now, and overall since its onset. Functional 
questions measured both physical and social functioning with the pain (see Chapter 4, 
section 4.3.3.8 for a full justification of the questions). 
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Chapter 2 (section 2.3.6) also reported that variations in the timing of the 
attribution/adjustment relationship might contribute to the mixed 
attribution/adjustment associations found in the literature reviewed. In order to 
explore the variable nature of this relationship, it was investigated for different times 
in the pain experience. Questions measuring emotional adjustment for the pain onset 
and now were developed in the interview schedule using the same criteria as that for 
measuring attributions for these times (Chapter 4, section 4.3. 7). Emotional 
adjustment was examined for change because there is some indication in the literature 
that emotions may change across the pain experience (Church and Vincent, 1996). 
With the exception of Church and Vincent (1996), none of the studies reviewed in 
Chapter 2 allowed pain sufferers to define their own adjustment to pain. Additionally, 
none of the studies examined adjustment to pain/illness/injury for more than one time 
period. The fact that the present study does both of these things contributes to the 
exploratory nature of the study. 
In terms of health outcomes, various ways of treating and self-managing the pain were 
reported. The most commonly reported treatments were oral medications, 
physiotherapy, complementary treatment and surgery. Additionally, both physical 
(rest, exercise, heat) and psychological (distraction, mind-over-matter) self-
management techniques were reported. In terms of psychological adjustment, a range 
of negative emotions and positive statements were reported towards pain, for each of 
the pain onset, now and since time periods. The fact that participants reported feeling 
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positively as well as negatively towards their pain contributes to a literature largely 
concerned with investigating the extent of negative emotional adjustment to a 
situation. 
There were changes in the nature of negative emotions and number of the positive 
statements reported towards the pain across each time period. Although statistically 
non-significant, descriptive analyses suggested that particular negative emotions were 
more commonly reported at each time period. General upset/distress and 
shock/disbelief were commonly reported emotions towards the pain at its onset, as the 
participants tried to understand what had happened to them. There were more reports 
of irritation/frustration and hatred/resentment towards the pain now, because the pain 
had not resolved, and concerns were expressed about one's future with pain. Since the 
pain onset, the participants more frequently reported depression and feeling down, 
largely due to the limitations placed on their lives by the pain. Similar reports of 
feeling shock at the pain onset, and anger and sadness after the onset have been made 
in other chronic pain sufferers experiencing pain of a similar duration (Church and 
Vincent, 1996). This provides some support for the validity of the present exploratory 
finding. 
In terms of the number of positive statements made towards the pain, many more 
participants reported feeling positively towards their pain now and since the pain 
onset, than at the pain onset. Current positive statements included a general 
acceptance of and coping with the pain, combined with a refusal to let pain get one 
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down overall since its onset. Reasons for these positive statements included accepting 
that the pain will not resolve, complying with its limitations, and acknowledging that 
things can still be done, despite the pain. 
These changes in the nature and number of attributions made support the assertion 
that adjustment may change at different times in an illness/injury experience. 
Turnquist et al (1988) proposed that at the onset of these situations, issues of 
emotional adjustment are strongest, while issues of functioning become more 
important during recovery. The present study did not investigate whether different 
types of adjustment change over time, but did find that emotional adjustment may 
change in emphasis over time. Turnquist et al's (1988) assertions were based on 
longitudinal analyses and the present findings were based on reports of adjustment for 
two different times being made at the same time. Longitudinal analyses are required 
to determine whether the same results would be produced over time. However, the 
fact that similar types of emotions were reported in longitudinal investigations with 
other chronic pain samples (Church and Vincent, 1996) supports the idea that this 
might be the case. 
The results of an examination of individual differences in adjustment suggested that 
the methods used to treat pain might influence the way in which people feel towards 
their pain. In particular, there was some indication that using psychological strategies 
such as distraction and mind-over-matter techniques to self-manage pain might be 
linked to current positive feelings about pain, because the arthritis sufferers in the 
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sample reported both types of adjustment more than the other type of pain groups. 
Additionally, the back pain sufferers of the sample reported feeling more negatively 
towards their pain at interview than the other type of pain groups, and more frequently 
reported receiving physiotherapy to treat their pain. Together, these results suggest the 
possibility that self-managing pain in general, and using psychological self-
management techniques in particular, might be linked to positive feelings towards 
pain, while failing to self-manage pain, or receiving physiotherapy might be linked 
with feeling negatively towards pain. 
In terms of physical and social adjustment to pain, more participants reported ways 
they had been limited by their pain, rather than ways they had adapted to it. These 
were largely concerned with an inability to carry out sociaVIeisure and daily activities, 
such as their employment. This concern with employment supports the use of 
structured measures of work functioning as adjustment indicators in illness studies 
(Bar-on, 1987). Some participants also reported an inability to carry out such daily 
tasks as doing shopping and household chores. Daily functioning and living skills 
have been used as structured adjustment measures in illness samples (e.g. Berckman 
and Austin, 1993; Lowery et al, 1983). The fact that these issues emerged through 
interview supports their use as measures of adjustment to illness, as well as providing 
some support for the validity of the present exploratory findings. 
The use of independent adjustment outcomes has been criticised on the basis that they 
create problems in evaluating the overall adjustment of one person (Michela and 
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Wood, 1986). However, the aim of the present study was not to evaluate overall 
adjustment, but to investigate adjustment to pain in specific domains. The fact that all 
three health, psychological and functioning outcomes were not associated with each 
other supports the idea that they are independent domains. 
6.3.3 The Nature of the Attribution/Adjustment Relationship in Pain 
The third aim of the study was to investigate the nature of the relationship between 
cause, responsibility and blame attributions, and adjustment to pain. There were five 
parts to this aim, based on the literature reviewed in Chapter 2 on the nature of the 
attribution/adjustment relationship in pain/illness/injury situations. Firstly, conflicting 
findings have emerged about whether or not there are differences in adjustment 
between those who make causal attributions, and those who do not. The literature has 
also produced mixed findings about secondly, the adaptive nature of causal 
attributions in general, and thirdly, the adaptive nature of attributing responsibility 
and blame to the self. These three conflicting findings were investigated in the present 
study using the mixed community sample of pain sufferers. Fourthly, consistent 
findings have suggested that attributing responsibility and blame to other people 
results in poor adjustment to pain/illness/injury. Whether or not making these 
attributions resulted in poor adjustment to pain was investigated in the present study. 
The fifth part of the aim involved the timing of the attribution/adjustment relationship. 
The literature reviewed in Chapter 2 (sections 2.3.2.4 and 2.3.3.5} has suggested that 
there may be more of an attribution/adjustment relationship when both are 
279 
investigated for the same time, than when attribut,ions made for the onset of a 
condition that occurred years earlier are paired with current adjustment to the 
situation. The variable nature of the attribution/adjustment relationship was addressed 
in the present study, through investigating their associations both at the same time and 
for different times in the pain experience. The development of questions in the semi-
structured interview schedule to measure attributions and adjustment for different 
times in the pain experience allowed for this analysis to be conducted. 
The fourth aim was addressed using the attribution and self-defined adjustment 
outcomes outlined in sections 6.3.1 and 6.3.2. The fact that the present study used 
adjustment outcomes defined by the pain sufferers, while the literature reviewed in 
Chapter 2 used standardised adjustment questionnaires in their associations with 
attributions, contributes to the exploratory nature of the present study. This is because 
no literature has been found to associate self-defined adjustment with attributions in 
pain. 
Additionally, the present study was exploratory because of the time frames of the 
attribution/adjustment relationship investigated. The literature reviewed in Chapter 2 
largely investigated associations between retrospective attributions and current 
adjustment to pain/illness/injury. This time frame was also adopted in the present 
study, along with two additional time frames. These involved attributions and 
adjustment being paired for the same time period, i.e. the pain onset, and now. 
Although by the short-term nature of the acute illness experience, the 
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attribution/adjustment relationship has been investigated for similar time frames in 
acute illness situations (see Chapter 2, section 2.3.2.3), it has not been investigated for 
the same time in the chronic illness experience. This again, contributes to the 
exploratory nature of the study. 
The results produced five main outcomes in relation to each parts of the aim. Firstly, 
there were no differences in the ability to predict adjustment between those who made 
and did not make causal attributions for their pain now. Despite the different time 
frames adopted in the current analysis and in the literature (see Chapter 4, section 
4.5.4), the present findings support those of literature which have found no 
differences in adjustment between those who do and do not make causal attributions. 
This has occurred in arthritis (Lowery et al, 1987), and breast cancer samples (Lavery 
and Clarke, 1996; Lowery et al, 1993; Taylor et al, 1984). 
However, the current results fail to support evidence from other arthritis (Lowery et 
al, 1987), myocardial infarction (Lowery et al, 1987), and acute surgical illness 
patients (DuCette and Keane, 1984). This literature suggests that people who make 
causal attributions for their illness are better adjusted to their situation than those who 
do not. These contradictory findings may be due to variations in the samples 
employed across studies. For some patients (largely breast cancer) there were no 
differences in adjustment between those who made causal attributions and those who 
did not. This may be because causal attributions were not important for this sample. 
Indeed, it was suggested that issues of control were important for adjustment to breast 
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cancer, rather than attributions (Taylor et al, 1984). For other, acutely ill myocardial 
infarction and surgical samples, causal attributions may be more important for 
recovery, making these attributions more adaptive than not making them. In support 
of this, some evidence has found positive associations between causal attributions and 
subsequent health behaviour change following a myocardial infarction, to offset 
another myocardial infarction (DeValle and Norman, 1992). To the extent that 
differences in adjustment between those who make/do not make causal attributions is 
a function of the importance of making causal attributions, the results of the present 
analysis suggest that causal attributions were not relevant or important for the pain 
sufferers' adjustment to their pain. 
Support for this idea comes from the second mam finding, that few causal 
attribution/adjustment associations were found at all. Ofthose found, responses within 
the category, "Physical External Attributions" for the pain onset were weakly but 
positively associated with negative emotions for the pain onset. This association 
makes sense when considering that some of the attributions within this category 
involved sudden incidents or accidents, such as straining the self, or falling over 
(section 5.2.4), both of which might be expected to lead to the negative emotions 
general upset/distress or fear/worry (Chapter 5, section 5.3.1.2) at the onset of pain. 
Although different time frames were adopted here, and in the literature reviewed in 
Chapter 2, in general these results support the associations found between causal 
attributions and poor emotional functioning in a variety of il1ness samples {Faller et 
al, 1995; Lowery et al, 1983; Meana et al, 1999). 
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The category "Physical Internal Attributions" was also associated with adjustment 
outcomes. Specifically, "Physical Internal Attributions" for the pain onset were 
positively associated with receiving physiotherapy treatment. This association makes 
sense when considering that some of the attributions made within this category were 
to symptoms of ''wear and tear", that might require physiotherapy (Chapter 5, section 
5.2.3). To date no literature has been found to associate causal or any attributions for 
pain with physiotherapy or any other treatment for pain. This may be attributable to 
the fact that the treatment was defined by the pain sample, instead of being 
investigated using a standardised measure. Additionally, "Physical Internal 
Attributions" for the pain onset were weakly but positively associated with reports of 
support from the family, and approached significance in being associated with reports 
of one's social life having adapted to pain. Again, these causal attribution/adjustment 
associations have not been found elsewhere because the pain sufferers themselves 
defined their own specific adjustment outcomes, but they do suggest that responses 
within this category are adaptive for adjustment to pain, while responses within the 
"Physical External Attributions" category result in poor adjustment to pain. An 
examination of the nature of the attributions made indicated that this might be the case 
because attributions within the "Physical Internal" category were made to factors that 
could be considered to be outwith the control of the participants, such as genetic 
factors (Chapter 5, section 5.2.3), suggesting that the onset of pain could not have 
been prevented by the individual. However, the attributions made within the "Physical 
External" category were more controllable, e.g. being made to leisure activities, 
straining activity (Chapter 5, section 5.2.4), meaning the participants had some role to 
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play in the development of their condition, and this might result in poorer adjustment 
to pain. 
The third main finding of the analysis was that attributing blame within the category 
"Self', for the pain now was weakly but positively associated with reports of more 
positive than negative feelings being reported overall since the pain onset. These 
attributions might be adaptive because they were controllable, in that the participants 
could have avoided bringing harm on themselves by, for example, taking care of 
themselves, not indulging in inappropriate activity and avoiding lifting heavy objects 
that might cause harm (Chapter 5, section 5.2.5). Part of this control involves the 
knowledge that one can avoid inflicting further pain through avoiding such activities, 
and this way making such attributions is adaptive. This contrasts the maladaptive 
nature of the controllable "Physical External Attributions.. because these latter 
attributions were not made to the self, and as such there is no direct link to the future 
avoidability of harm, i.e. the self avoiding pain-inducing activity. 
The fourth finding was that attributing responsibility within the category "Others .. for 
the pain now was positively associated with more negative than positive feelings 
reported towards the pain overall since its onset. There are several reasons why 
making attributions to others might lead to poor adjustment (Chapter 2, section 
2.3.3.8). One important reason is that by their nature they suggest that pain sufferers 
have no control over the pain inflicted upon themselves, and are unable to control the 
possibility of future harm being inflicted by others. It is this that is maladaptive. 
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Additionally, most of the attributions within the category "Others" for the pain now 
were to medical professionals for various acts of negligence in the treatment of pain, 
from the time of its onset, to interview (Chapter 5, section 5.2.6). These attributions in 
themselves might lead to the feelings of depression and "feeling down" reported 
towards the pain overall since its onset (Chapter 5, section 5.3.2.1), because they 
suggest a failure of the people relied upon by the pain sufferers to treat their pain. 
Although there were no reported negative feelings towards the medical professionals 
(section 6.3.1), the fact that these attributions were associated with negative emotions 
suggests the possibility that they were more emotive than reported. 
Interesting subgroup effects emerged within the adaptive/maladaptive 
attribution/adjustment associations. Specifically, the self-blame/positive feelings 
association was particularly significant for the employed participants, while the other-
responsibility/negative emotions association was particularly significant for the 
retired, and divorced participants of the sample. These effects can be explained in 
different ways. Being employed creates the opportunity for interacting with others 
who might be able to provide support. This might lead to an environment in which a 
person feels able to take positive control of his/her life through perhaps being able to 
blame him/herself, in the absence of feeling threatened by others, and this in itself 
could be adaptive for adjustment to pain. However, retirement and being divorced 
suggest the possibility of a lack of support from other people, through perhaps having 
less social contact. This could lead to feelings of being under threat by others, 
resulting in making these attributions being maladaptive for adjustment to pain. 
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Despite the differing time frames ofthe current analysis, and the literature reviewed in 
Chapter 2 (see Chapter 4, section 4.5.4), together both suggest that self-blame 
attributions are adaptive, and attributing responsibility to others results in poor 
adjustment to pain/illness/injury. In particular, the current results support reports of 
self-blame attributions being associated with low negative affect (Delahanty et al, 
1997; Lambert and Falconer, 2001; Moulton et al, 1987), and other 
responsibility/blame attributions being associated with high negative affect (Church 
and Vincent, 1996; DeGood and Kiernan, 1996). 
The fifth part of the aim was to determine whether or not the attribution/adjustment 
relationship varied for different times in the pain experience. Those few 
attribution/adjustment associations found made it difficult to consider this 
relationship. This is because a large number of the associations were between 
attributions and health, specifically treatment outcomes, which can be received 
throughout the course of a pain experience, not necessarily at any one time. Some 
associations were found, however, between attributions and adjustment reported for 
the same time period, across an analysis of all five aims. This provides some support 
for the suggestion made in Chapter 2 (section 2.3.3.5), that attributions and 
adjustment interact with each other when made for a similar time period. However, 
given the few attribution/adjustment associations found overall, no conclusions can be 
drawn from these results about whether or not attributions and adjustment better 
associated with each other at some times in the pain experience more than others. 
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One other suggestion was made in Chapter 2 about when in the pain/illness/injury 
experience the attribution/adjustment relationship is strongest and most adaptive. 
Some literature has suggested this may be around the onset of a pain/illness/injury 
situation i.e. up to one year after the onset (Bulman and Wortman, 1977; Delahanty et 
al, 1997; Lambert and Falconer, 2001; Moulton et al, 1987). However, other literature 
has suggested attributions may be more adaptive the longer the length of time since 
diagnosis, i.e. longer than one year after the initial onset of the condition (Glinder and 
Compas, 1999; Malcarne et al, 1995). In the present study, the fact that few 
attribution/adjustment associations were found in a pain sample whose mean pain 
duration was 8.15 years, suggests that attributions may have fewer associations with 
adjustment the longer the length of time since diagnosis. 
In summary the results from the analysis of the attribution/adjustment relationship in 
pain suggest several things. Firstly, the fact that attributions were largely unrelated to 
adjustment indicates that they may be of little importance for adjustment to pain. 
Some of the literature in Chapter 2 found factors other than attributions to be 
important for adjustment to disease-specific conditions such as cancer. It may be the 
case that other factors are important for adjustment to pain. However, there are two 
factors that might explain this poor association. Firstly, adjustment was measured 
using interview schedule techniques, rather than standardised measures. It may be that 
standardised measures would produce more associations because they make use of 
Likert scales that allow the strength of a relationship to be established, rather than the 
interview schedule that only determines the presence or absence of a relationship. 
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Secondly, given the sample size, the data might have been subject to a Type 2 error. A 
larger sample size might not only have produced more associations, but also increased 
the power of those found. Both factors suggest that rather than questioning the use of 
attributions, future research should examine the attribution/adjustment relationship in 
pain using standardised measures, and a larger sample size. 
Secondly, although the measurement of adjustment can be criticised on the basis 
described above, two interesting attribution/adjustment interactions emerged, that may 
not have been detected by more structured adjustment measures. Firstly, attributions 
were often associated with the use of particular pain treatments. This suggests that 
perhaps pain treatments should be tailored to what people believe about their pain, in 
order to increase compliance with treatment. Secondly, the fact that participants 
reported feeling positively as well as negatively towards their pain, and this interacted 
with attributions, suggests that future research should consider positive adjustment in 
order to determine the true adaptive nature of attributions, instead of inferring this 
from their associations with low negative affect. Additionally, the fact that positive 
adjustment emerged from participant reports of adjustment to pain suggests that there 
may be a value in allowing particular samples to define their own adjustment, because 
there may be aspects of adjustment important to them, not detected by more structured 
measures, that interact with attributions. 
Thirdly, of the associations found, some attributions emerged as more adaptive than 
others. In particular, there was some indication that attributions made within the 
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"Physical Internal" and "Self' categories were adaptive for adjustment to pain, while 
attributions within the "Physical External" and "Others" categories resulted in poor 
adjustment. This suggests that in addition to pain beliefs, further research should 
consider pain attributions, in order to determine and treat any that might result in poor 
adjustment to pain. 
6.3.4 The Role of Just World Beliefs in the Pain Experience 
The fourth aim of the present study was based on the shortcomings of just world 
research outlined in Chapter 2 (section 2.2.4.7). That is, just world beliefs have not 
been measured in real-life pain, despite the tremendous challenge the pain experience 
may present to a sufferer's belief that the world is a fair and just place. This is because 
it may have a physical, social, economical and psychological impact on an individual. 
One explanation for this lack of research is that the investigation of just world beliefs 
and reactions to one's own personal suffering is a relatively new area of research 
(Hafer and Olson, 1998). Beyond the relevance of measuring just world beliefs in 
pain, it is important to do this because, like general pain beliefs and attributions, just 
world beliefs have implications for adjustment to real-life negative personal 
situations. These have tended to be potentially short-term situations such as the loss of 
employment (Benson and Ritter, 1990; Ritter et al, 1990), and reactions to poor 
student grades (Hafer and Olson, 1998). In the present study the just world beliefs of 
the pain sufferers were measured using the Just World Scale (Rubin and Peplau, 
1975) (see Chapter 2, section 2.1.6.3). Given that the measurement of just world 
beliefs in the present study was exploratory, specific pain variables were considered 
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for their interactions with just world beliefs. In particular, differences in just world 
beliefs between type of pain and pain duration groups were examined. 
The results found the mean just world score to be marginally above the midpoint of 
the scale, indicating the pain sufferers had some belief that the world is a fair and just 
place. This score is comparable to that obtained in related, spinal-injured patients 
(Bulman and Wortman, 1977; Heinemann et al 1988; Kiecolt-Glaser and Williams, 
1987), and other, unrelated experimental studies largely comprised of student samples 
free from pain (Lipkus et al, 1996; Rubin and Peplau, 1975; Tomaka and Blascovich, 
1994; Tanaka, 1999). Given this comparability to the just world scores of pain-free 
samples, it could be suggested that the pain experience did not influence the just 
world beliefs of the sample. The results indicated this to be the case, where there were 
no differences in just world beliefs between those with different types of pain. 
However, this might have been the case because the experience of pain has the same 
effects on sufferers' life, regardless of the type of pain condition experienced. 
There were differences in the strength of the just world beliefs held by different pain 
duration groups. Those with the shortest pain duration (1 month - 2.5 years) had 
stronger just world beliefs than those who had pain for between 3 - 9 years' duration. 
None of the age, gender, employment or marital status demographic variables 
mediated the effects of pain duration on just world beliefs. Since this is a new finding 
in the pain literature, there are no readily available explanations for it. One possible 
interpretation is that during the first few years of pain, the pain is treated in an attempt 
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to resolve it. This may not alter the extent to which the pain sufferers' believe the 
world to be a fair and just place. However, after this time when it becomes clear that 
the pain cannot be resolved, and its sufferers will have to learn to live with it, there 
may be a period of adjustment to the new situation. Part of this adjustment might 
involve the pain sufferer feeling that it is unfair he/she has to suffer in this way. This 
may influence the extent to which he/she feels the world is a just place. 
However, after a while (nine years in the current sample), it is possible that some 
people may have accepted and learned to live with their situation, the result of which 
being that his/her just world beliefs may again be unaffected by the pain experience. 
Support for this idea of an association between pain duration and positive feelings 
comes from an examination of individual differences in adjustment. This suggested 
that those who had suffered pain for over nine years' duration more commonly than 
the other pain duration groups reported feeling more positively than negatively 
towards their pain overall since its onset (Chapter 5, section 5.3.2.4). 
These results suggest that, as Just World Theory indicates, an individual's just world 
beliefs may be challenged by the experience of personal suffering. However, the 
present results indicate that this challenge to just world beliefs is not ongoing 
throughout the pain experience. It may only occur during periods when an individual 
feels threatened or victimised by his/her pain. This contributes to Just World Theory, 
by proposing that just world beliefs may not necessarily be threatened by the negative 
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experience in general, but may be threatened at specific times in the experience, 
especially if it is long-term. 
Beyond contributing to Just World Theory, the above results also contribute to the 
pain literature, because the just world beliefs of long-term pain sufferers have not 
been investigated before. On a personal level, the results indicate that a pain sufferers' 
view of the world is affected by his/her pain experience. This is likely to be 
attributable to the consequences of pain in terms of the physical, social, economical 
and psychological impact that pain may have on a person's life (Chapter 2, section 
2.1.7). 
No individual differences in just world scores were found. This is surprising, because 
it would be expected that disadvantaged groups, such as people who were 
unemployed or medically retired would have different just world scores to those who 
were employed. The fact that this was not the case suggests one of two things. Firstly, 
people who were unemployed or medically retired did not view their situation in a 
negative way, perhaps because of any benefits they received, and so their just world 
scores would not differ from any other employment group. Secondly, the data was 
subject to a Type 2 error, and the marginally insignificant result found (p = 0.07), may 
have been more significant with a larger sample size, revealing differences between 
the groups. 
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In addition to measuring the just world beliefs of the pain sufferers, possible ways of 
maintaining just world beliefs in the face of personal suffering were considered. This 
involved the cause, responsibility and blame attributions made in the first aim. 
Justification for their consideration as possible factors that may help maintain just 
world beliefs in situations of personal suffering was considered in Chapter 2 (section 
2.2.4.4). The results indicated that none of the attributions had a role to play in 
maintaining just world beliefs. There were no differences in the just world beliefs of 
those who made causal attributions for their pain and those who did not. This fails to 
support the reported beneficial role of making causal attributions in maintaining 
justice beliefs (Kidd and Utne, 1978; Utne and Kidd, 1980). Similarly, the fact that 
there were no differences in just world beliefs between those who attributed 
responsibility and blame to themselves versus others for their pain, fails to support the 
role of attributions to the self maintaining justice beliefs, and attributions to others 
resulting in feelings of injustice (Montada, 1992). The failure to find responsibility 
and blame attributions helpful in maintaining just world beliefs may be due to the fact 
that some pain sufferers made attributions both to themselves and other people for 
their pain. This suggests the participants would not be making these attributions as a 
means of maintaining their just world beliefs. 
The fact that attributions and just world beliefs did not interact with each other at all 
in the present study suggests that they are different types of beliefs. However, the 
small sample size may have restricted their interactions. Future research into their 
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interactions, using a larger sample size may produce different results, and indicate that 
certain pain attributions do interact with just world beliefs. 
6.3.5 The Nature of the Just World Belief/Adjustment Interactions in Pain 
Section 6.3.4 highlighted the importance of measuring the just world beliefs of pain 
sufferers. This included the fact that just world beliefs have implications for short-
term negative personal situations, such as the loss of a job, and as such may also be 
expected to have implications for longer-term negative situations, such as pain. This 
was explored in the present study's fifth and final aim. Just world beliefs were 
measured using the Just World Scale (Rubin and Peplau, 1975). and the pain 
sufferers' scores on this were split into high, medium and low just world beliefs based 
on percentile ranges. These groups were investigated for differences in the self-
defined adjustment outcomes. This was exploratory not only in tenns of the fact that 
differences in strengths of just world beliefs have not been investigated before in 
situations of adjustment to pain, but also because of the self-defined nature of 
adjustment in the present study. 
The results produced no differences in health, psychological, physical and social 
adjustment to pain between those with stronger, medium and weaker just world 
beliefs. This contradicts the results of previous experimental and real-life studies. 
These studies have found differences in that stronger just world beliefs have been 
found to be both more adaptive (Benson and Ritter, 1990; Lipkus et al, 1996; Ritter et 
al, 1990), and less adaptive (Hafer and Olson, 1998), than weaker just world beliefs. 
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There are two possible explanations for these differences. The first point involves the 
timing of this relationship. In the experimental and real-life research reviewed above, 
just world beliefs were investigated in the face of a short-term negative situation. In 
the real-life situations this involved the loss of a job (Benson and Ritter, 1990; Ritter 
et al, 1990). However, in the present study the adaptiveness of different strengths of 
just world beliefs was investigated in a longer-term negative person situation. It may 
be that stronger just world beliefs have more implications for adjustment to a negative 
personal situation on a short-term than long-term basis. 
The second point involves the nature of the adjustment measures. In the literature 
reviewed in Chapter 2, standardised adjustment measures were used. This allows just 
world beliefs to be graded along varying intensities of the adjustment measure. For 
example, stronger just world beliefs have been associated with less depression than 
weaker just world beliefs (Lipkus et al, 1996). This was not possible to determine in 
the present study because the participants defined their own adjustment, creating 
categorical data. All that could be determined was whether or not different strengths 
of just world beliefs differed in their associations with the adjustment outcomes. 
It has been suggested that high just world beliefs are adaptive, because they help a 
person deal with daily struggles (Dalbert, 1998). This being the case, future research 
using standardised adjustment measures might reveal more differences in adjustment 
to one particular daily struggle, pain, between those with high, medium and low just 
world beliefs. Specifically, there is a need to establish whether people who have 
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higher just world beliefs adapt better to their pain in terms of, for example, accepting 
what they have to live with, functioning better, and doing more to self-manage their 
own pain, rather than being dependent on medical professionals. This would be useful 
to know in order to target for cognitive-behavioural treatment not only people who 
have maladaptive beliefs about their pain, but also pain sufferers who view the world 
as unfair. 
6.4 EXPLORING INTERACTIONS BETWEEN PAIN AND MAIN STUDY 
VARIABLES 
The previous section presented the results of the analysis of the five aims outlined in 
Chapter 3. This section will present the results of an exploration of interactions 
between the main study variables, and one important variable associated with the 
study sample, pain intensity. Pain intensity for three different times in the pain 
experience: present pain, usual pain and pain when at its worst, was measured using 
the Short-Form McGill Pain Questionnaire (Melzack, 1987) (see Chapter 2, section 
2.2.4.5). 
The results indicated that the present, usual and worst pain intensity scores were 
significantly different from each other, being lower at the time of the interview, and 
higher when at its worst, as would be expected. No other studies have been found to 
use the Short-Form McGill Pain Questionnaire to measure usual and worst pain 
intensities as in the present study. However, the mean present pain intensity score 
obtained is comparable to current pain intensity reports in other pain samples involved 
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in medical accidents (Church and Vincent, 1996), and suffering from cancer pain 
(Dudgeon et al, 1993). This provides some support for the validity of the current 
findings. 
There were two reasons for investigating current, usual and worst pain intensity 
reports in the present study. Firstly, to understand pain intensity at different times in 
the pain experience. Secondly, to ensure as far as possible that the participants gave 
accurate pain intensity reports. This may be less likely to happen where only current 
pain reports were investigated and participants were keen to convey the extent of their 
pain. The fact that all three pain scores were significantly different from each other 
suggests two things. Firstly, that it is likely the participants were being honest in their 
pain reports, since they did not report pain intensity at the time of the interview to be 
high. Secondly, it suggests that the participants' memories for their pain intensities 
were fairly accurate, given that it would be expected that pain levels on a usual day 
would be significantly lower than when the pain was at its worst. 
The pain scale scores obtained were consistently higher than their corresponding 
combined sensory and affective word scores. This may be because some of the pain 
descriptors were not used, either because they were not relevant, or because the 
participants did not understand their meaning. In support of this, there was some 
confusion concerning the meaning of such words as "splitting". This was introduced 
into the short-fonn McGill Pain Questionnaire to describe types of dental pain, which 
none of the participants experienced. This would create a lower overall pain 
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descriptor score against which to compare a higher pain scale score. One additional 
interpretation of these results is that the participants found it easier to describe their 
pain in quantitative rather than qualitative terms. 
However, despite these explanations for inconsistent scores, all three of the present, 
usual and worse pain scale scores were significantly correlated with their 
corresponding combined sensory and affective score. This may be explained in terms 
of the fact that regardless of the scores obtained, they were made for the same time 
period, and so they would be expected to be correlated with each other. 
To explore interactions between pain intensity and the main study variables, only 
usual pain intensity was considered, because this best represented the participants' 
pain experiences. The overall pain descriptor rather than pain scale score was used in 
this analysis, because it presented a more detailed evaluation of the sensory and 
affective components of pain intensity. Exploratory analyses revealed several things. 
Some individual differences in usual pain intensity emerged. The main differences 
involved pain duration and marital status groups. In terms of pain duration, those with 
pain for between three to nine years' duration had significantly higher usual pain 
intensity scores, than those with pain for over nine years' duration. Gender mediated 
the effect of pain duration on usual pain intensity, and although not significant, 
suggested that males with pain for between three to nine years' duration had higher 
pain scores than males with pain in the other pain duration groups, and all three 
female pain duration groups. This finding is interesting when considering that people 
298 
with pain for three to nine years' duration also had weaker just world beliefs than 
those in the other pain duration groups. Although gender did not mediate the effects 
of pain duration on just world scores, together these results suggest that the most 
problematic period in pain appears to be this middle time period, especially for males. 
As stated in section 6.3.4, this could be because pain has continued longer than 
expected, and there might be realisation that it will not disappear, perhaps combined 
with a refusal to accept this fact. A result of this could be feeling that life is unfair, 
and increased negative emotions that perhaps are vented more in males than females, 
increasing pain intensity. Although it has to be acknowledged that this can be the case 
at any time in the pain experience, at least for the present sample of pain sufferers it 
appeared to be especially relevant during this time period. 
In terms of marital status groups, those who were single had significantly lower usual 
pain intensity scores, than those who were married, and divorced. Gender mediated 
the effects of marital status on pain intensity, and within-sex differences were found, 
where divorced males had significantly higher pain intensity scores, than single 
males. These results can be interpreted in terms of stress, such that being married and 
being divorced might be perceived as more stressful than being single, and this, 
combined with the fact that chronic pain itself has been regarded as a stressful 
experience (Jensen et al, 1991), could lead to increased pain intensity. 
The fact that individual differences in pain intensity emerged, together with the 
reported physical, social and psychological impacts of pain (Chapter 5, section 
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5.3.2.1), supports the individual and complex nature of the pain experience. An 
exploration of differences in adjustment between low, medium and high pain intensity 
groups revealed differences between these groups in their methods used to treat pain. 
Of particular interest here is that those with a moderate level of pain were more likely 
than the other pain intensity groups to report using complementary treatment to 
manage their pain, while those with the highest pain intensity were more likely to take 
the advice of medical professionals. These results indicate that in the present study 
sample, people with moderate levels of pain were able to consider alternative forms of 
treatment more than people with severe pain. This has potential implications for 
educating people to self-manage their pain, perhaps highlighting the particular 
educational needs of people with severe pain. 
A surprising result was that the pain intensity groups did not differ in their levels of 
functioning or emotions reported towards pain. It is reasonable to expect that the 
reported impacts of pain (see Chapter 2, section 2.1. 7) would worsen with increased 
pain intensity. There are two possible explanations why this was not the case in the 
present study. Firstly, as has been suggested for a failure to find significant 
interactions between adjustment and other study variables, the presence/absence 
nature of the self-defined adjustment in the present study limited the opportunity for 
adjustment to establish varying degrees of interactions with other variables. A second 
explanation is that usual pain intensity reports relied on memory estimates of what 
pain feels like on a usual day. This reliance on memory, combined with the fact that 
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the mean score for the sample was not particularly high (see Chapter 5, section 
5.3.6.2), could have reduced the impact this pain intensity might have on adjustment. 
An examination of interactions between pain intensity with pain attributions and the 
just world beliefs of pain sufferers was particularly exploratory, because there is a 
lack of research investigating the role of both variables in the pain experience. 
Correlational analyses revealed that just world beliefs and pain intensity were weakly 
associated with each other. This, combined with the finding that there were 
differences in the just world scores of pain duration groups, suggests that the beliefs a 
person has about the world being fair or unfair interacts with his/her experience of 
pain. This suggests a value in future research examining the role of just world beliefs 
in pain. Future research ideas are considered in section 6. 7. 
Attributions were also found to interact with pain intensity. In particular, making 
attributions to other people for the pain onset was found to predict a small amount of 
variance in usual pain intensity scores. Although not a large finding, this does suggest 
that in addition to pain beliefs, which have been found to interact with pain intensity 
through adjustment (Jensen and Karoly, 1991; 1992; Jensen et al, 1999), the 
attributions a person makes about his/her pain can predict the intensity of pain he/she 
experiences. This finding contributes to the earlier finding that making attributions to 
others was associated with poor emotional adjustment to pain (see section 6.3.3), and 
together both highlight the maladaptive nature of these attributions in the present pain 
sample. It is interesting that only attributions to others for the pain onset predicted 
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pain intensity, not now, especially given that most of these latter attributions were 
made to medical professionals for various acts ofnegligence. One explanation for this 
difference is that regardless of incidents since the pain onset, other people created 
harm in the first place, and it is the pain from this harm that remains with the 
participants, the knowledge of which perhaps serves to influence their pain intensity. 
This alone suggests a value in examining pain attributions, in order to target 
maladaptive attributions for treatment. 
In summary, the results from this exploratory analysis of attributions, just world 
beliefs and adjustment in pain revealed several interesting interactions between these 
main study variables. These are summarised in Diagram 6.1. 
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Diagram 6.1: Summary of interactions between main study variables 
+ l Attributions Adjustment 
+ + + 
+ Pain -
+ + 
Demographics Just World Beliefs 
-
-
Diagram 6.1 indicates that firstlyt attributions interacted with demographict pain and 
adjustment variables, but not just world beliefs. Secondly, in addition to attributions, 
adjustment interacted with pain and demographic variables, but not just world beliefs. 
Thirdly, just world beliefs interacted with pain, specifically pain intensity and 
duration, and fourthly, in addition to attribution, adjustment and just world variables, 
pain also interacted with demographic variables. 
6.5 LIMITATIONS OF THE PRESENT STUDY 
The present study has four main limitations. Firstly, a large part of the data was 
collected using a devised interview schedule. There are two main issues associated 
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with this. Firstly, it cannot be ruled out that the questions of the interview schedule 
may have led the responses given. However, this was controlled for as far as possible 
with the avoidance of leading questions. Secondly, given the exploratory use of 
attribution definitions in the present study, it cannot be ruled out that the definitions 
provided influenced the types of attributions made. Although this may have been the 
case, the opposite of this may also be true, that the definitions actually clearly 
distinguished between the concepts, and focussed participants on the types of 
responses they should provide. 
The second limitation is that the Just World Scale completed by the pain sufferers has 
not previously been validated on pain samples. This questions the reliability of the 
just world data obtained in the present study. Nonetheless the Just World Scale was 
found to have adequate reliability for use with the pain sufferers in the present study. 
Thirdly, the pain sufferers in the study were largely a self-selected sample, and as 
such there may have been biases among them that could not be controlled for. For 
example, the sample was largely female, with 41-60 years being the most frequent age 
range of the sample. However, in order to avoid potential biases of samples drawn 
from specialised treatment centres, it was necessary to obtain a sample with as little 
criteria imposed on it as possible. 
Fourthly, the sample size obtained was small, and as such may have compromised the 
statistical power of some of the results. Additionally, it has to be acknowledged that 
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there is a strong reliability on the chi-square statistic at the 0.05 level in the analysis 
of the data. However, the exploratory nature of the study allowed this to identify 
trends between the main study variables, and provide some areas for future research to 
consider, using a larger sample size. 
6.6 IMPLICATION OF THE STUDY FINDINGS 
The results of the present study have one main implication for clinicians involved in 
the treatment of adult pain sufferers with mixed pain complaints. The findings 
indicated that around one-third of the pain sufferers made attributions for their pain 
conditions to medical professionals. Most of these attributions were for various 
interactions the participants had with medical professionals, between their pain onset, 
and the time of the interview. These included treatments they had undergone, 
involving surgical procedures, receiving the wrong treatment, and having the 
S)'111ptoms of their condition treated rather than the cause of it. The impression 
obtained from some of these attributions at the time of the interview is that they may 
be misguided, due to a lack of knowledge about the ongoing nature of pain. Clinicians 
should continue to provide patients with information about their pain condition 
throughout the treatment process, in order to avoid these misperceptions. 
6.7 FUTURE STUDIES 
Given the exploratory nature of the present study, the research findings have more 
implications for future studies, than clinical implications. From the results of the study 
the following studies can be proposed. 
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1. The reported adaptive nature of strong just world beliefs over weaker beliefs in 
short-term negative personal situations (Chapter 2, section 2.2.4.6), combined 
with the fact that in the present study the strongest just world beliefs were 
characteristic of people suffering from the shortest pain duration (one month- 2.5 
years) (Chapter 5, section 5.3.4.3) provides the basis for future research to 
hypothetically examine the adaptive nature of these beliefs in short-term pain. 
Specifically, given that the treatment of pain is particularly important at this time 
in the pain experience, it could be hypothesised that people with strong just world 
beliefs would have better treatment outcomes than people with weaker beliefs, and 
as a result would adapt better to their pain after treatment than those with weaker 
beliefs. In order to test this hypothesis, given the problems associated with the 
small, community-based nature of the sample in the present study (Chapter 6, 
section 6.5), a large clinically based sample of newly diagnosed pain sufferers 
who have not yet received treatment for their pain would be required as the 
participants of the study. Type of pain would not be relevant, since the present 
study found no differences in the just world beliefs of different types of pain 
sufferers. However, all participants would be suffering from potentially long-term 
conditions such as arthritis, in order to control for the possibility that anticipation 
of pain resolving completely after treatment might result in positive adjustment 
after treatment, regardless of just world beliefs. In terms of measures to be 
employed in the study, it has to be acknowledged that measuring just world beliefs 
poses problems, because to date no just world belief measures in pain or illness 
situations exist. In the present study a commonly used and robust just world scale 
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was used to examine these beliefs in pain. Whilst acknowledging the non· 
standardised nature of this scale, given that is it robust, and the scale items have 
achieved some reliability (see Chapter 2, section 2.2.4.5), it is the most 
appropriate measure of just world beliefs available, until a measure is developed 
and validated in pain. In terms of adjustment, the literature suggests and the 
present study found that physical and social functioning, and emotional 
adjustment to pain are important adjustment outcomes in pain samples. However, 
the way in which this is measured merits some consideration. In particular, given 
the potential problems of existing adjustment measures in missing important 
elements, such as positive adjustment, perhaps new quantified adjustment 
measures need to be developed and validated on pain samples. Additionally, given 
the issues that were raised using the Short-Form McGill Pain Questionnaire to 
measure pain (Chapter 6, section 6.4), in the present study pain would be 
measured using a short pain scale, such as a 10 or 1 00-point numerical rating 
scale. These measures should be applied in the following way. After the diagnosis 
of a condition, and just before treatment, self-reported just world beliefs would be 
measured. The sample will then be split using percentile ranges into high and low 
just world believers. Additionally, pre-treatment pain intensity and adjustment to 
pain would be measured in order to compare these with post-treatment outcomes, 
to determine whether or not treatment influenced them in a positive or a negative 
way. Then, after treatment, using the guidance of medical professionals, the 
success of treatment could be determined, and pain and adjustment measured, in 
order to determine two things. Firstly, whether strong just world believers had 
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better treatment success than weaker just world believers, and secondly, whether 
stronger just world believers had adapted better to their pain than weak just world 
believers post-treatment, as compared with pre-treatment. Just world beliefs 
would also be measured post-treatment to determine whether treatment alters 
these beliefs, and if so, in a positive or a negative way. The importance of this 
short study is clear through its clinical implications. In particular, to know, for 
example, that the way people view the world influences their treatment success 
and adjustment to pain after this treatment, could allow for the prediction of 
people who might not have a good treatment outcome. The advantage of this for 
limited resources is that people deemed to have a good outcome could be 
prioritised for treatment. 
2. A second study would require a longitudinal examination of attributions and just 
world beliefs in pain. In particular, the study results indicated that these beliefs 
might change across the pain experience. In terms of attributions, although a small 
finding, there was some indication that they might change across the pain 
experience (Chapter 5, sections 5.3.1.5 and 5.3.4.3), and some longitudinal and 
cross-sectional research supported this (Chapter 2, section 2.2.3.8). In terms of 
just world beliefs, the fact that there were differences in strength of just world 
beliefs across pain duration groups, suggests that these beliefs might change over 
time. From these results it could be hypothesised that attributions for pain and just 
world beliefs would vary at different times in the pain experience. Given this 
hypothesised change, and the fact that both the present study findings (Chapter 5, 
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section 5.3.1.5), and the literature (Chapter 2, sections 2.2.4.6 and 2.3) suggest 
that attributions and just world beliefs interact with adjustment, it could also be 
hypothesised that these changes in belief would interact with attributions at 
different times in the pain experience, in the following way. Specifically, as has 
been suggested, positive attributions should be more adaptive than negative 
attributions, and stronger just world beliefs should be more adaptive than weaker 
just world beliefs. In order to examine this change longitudinally, a large clinical 
sample of pain sufferers with potentially long·term conditions such as arthritis 
would be required to be recruited at the onset of their pain. A clinical sample 
would be required in order to limit the number of variables that might influence 
changes in these beliefs over time, such as various community treatments. In 
terms of measurement, just world beliefs, pain intensity, and adjustment could be 
measured in the way described in the first study, for the reasons given. In terms of 
attributions, because responsibility and blame were largely indistinguishable from 
each other (Chapter 5, section 5.3.1.4), only blame attributions would be 
considered, because most participants discussed their situation in terms of blame, 
rather than responsibility. Causal attributions would also be examined, because 
they were the most frequent type of attribution made, and were viewed as separate 
attributions to responsibility and blame. These concepts would be measured as 
interview questions. Causal attributions would be measured in a general way, 
through examining any factors that were perceived to have caused pain (at the 
start), and cause pain (at each longitudinal timepoint). Blame would be examined 
in the same way for each time, but not in a general way. Instead, because most 
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participants either made attributions, to themselves, other people, or no one in the 
present study, and in the literature (see Chapter 2, section 2.2.3.7), they would be 
asked about these attributions specifically at each time. In tenns of longitudinal 
time period, the available literature typically examines attributions at the onset of 
a condition, one year later, and then around seven years later (Chapter 2, section 
2.3.2.3). Given that just world beliefs were found to differ between the first couple 
of years of pain, then between a three to nine year period, and after nine years, it 
makes sense to measure changes in beliefs at a more regular time interval, 
specifically: at pain onset, then one year later (after a treatment programme), 
around two years after that (when just world beliefs were found to differ in the 
present sample), and then again around six years after that (at nine years' pain 
duration when, again, just world beliefs were found to differ) to establish regular 
changes in these beliefs. All just world, pain, attribution and adjustment measures 
would be completed at each time. The importance of such a study are threefold. 
Firstly, it would determine whether attributions and just world beliefs change over 
the pain experience, and in using a clinical sample would help detennine factors 
involved in this change, for example specific pain treatments. Secondly, it would 
help to establish whether strong just world beliefs were consistently adaptive for 
adjustment to pain over time, and thirdly, it would help to detennine which 
attributions were beneficial for adjustment to pain at different times in the pain 
experience. The clinical advantages of knowing which beliefs are adaptive for 
adjustment to pain, and at which times in the pain experience, are that in treatment 
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people could be taught to change maladaptive beliefs at a specific time, to more, 
identified adaptive beliefs, both about their pain, and about the world. 
3. A third future study involves treatment choices in pain. The present study results 
found attributions made for pain, and treatment for pain to be linked in two ways. 
Firstly, various attributions were made to a range of medical professionals for 
either negligence in treatment, or a failure to treat pain (Chapter 5, section 5.2.6). 
Secondly, attributions were found to be associated with pain treatments, including 
complementary treatment, which interacted with attributions involving medical 
treatments (Chapter 5, section 5.3.3). These results suggest that people who make 
attributions to medical professionals or medical treatment for their pain might be 
more likely to seek alternative forms of pain treatment than people who do not 
make these attributions. From this it could be hypothesised that the attributions 
made for pain influence treatment choices. In order to test this hypothesis, a large 
community sample of pain sufferers would be required to form the study sample. 
Although the present study highlighted problems associated with the use of a 
community sample, this would be required in order to account for varied treatment 
choice in pain. People suffering from a similar pain condition, such as chronic low 
back pain, or arthritis would be recruited, in order to account for the fact that 
different pain treatments might be used because of varied conditions experienced. 
These participants would be recruited from various treatment centres, including 
General Practices, and alternative treatment centres, to determine whether people 
who held specific beliefs about their pain were more likely to seek specific pain 
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treatments. In terms of measurement, cause and blame attributions would be 
measured in the way outlined in study two, for the reasons given. The aim of 
examining both types of attribution would be to determine a range of attributions, 
both to various factors, and various people that might account for treatment 
choices. Additionally, treatment history would be examined in order to determine 
whether previous treatments interacted with current attributions, and perhaps 
influenced current treatment choices. Pain intensity should also be measured, 
because, as with treatment history, this might influence treatment choices. Support 
for this idea comes from the present study finding that people with the strongest 
pain intensity most often followed the advice of medical professionals in their 
pain treatment, while people with not so strong a pain intensity were more likely 
to use complementary treatment for their pain (Chapter 5, section 5.3.6.6). This 
would be measured in the same way as outlined in the previous studies outlined, 
for the reasons given. The importance of this study is that it would identify people 
with misplaced beliefs about their pain, leading them to seek inappropriate 
treatments, wasting not only their own time, but also the time of various centres 
who provide the treatment. Those who perhaps have misplaced beliefs could be 
targeted to be educated about the physical cause of their pain, so that with 
information they could select appropriate treatment. 
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Appendix 1: 
Study Poster Advertisement 
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Acute/Chronic Pain 
Sufferers Wanted ... 
TO PARTICIPATE IN A STUDY 
EXAMINING YOUR THOUGHTS 
ABOUT PAIN. 
PARTICIPATION WOULD REQUIRE 
FILLING OUT TWO BRIEF 
QUESTIONNAIRES AND PARTICIPATING 
IN A SHORT INTERVIEW (30-45 
MINUTES IN TOTAL). 
THIS RESEARCH IS BEING UNDERTAKEN AS 
PART OF A PHD. IF INTERESTED IN 
PARTICIPATING IN THE STUDY, OR IF YOU 
WOULD LIKE TO FIND OUT MORE ABOUT THE 
STUDY, PLEASE CONTACT: 
JOANNA MCPARLAND 
DEPARTMENT OF NURSING AND MIDWIFERY 
UNIVERSITY OF STIRLING, STIRLING, 
FK94LA 
TEL: 01786 466287 
Thank You! 
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SHORT-FORM MCGILL PAIN QUESTIONNAIRE 
PARTICIPANT'S NAME: DATE ___ _ 
NONE MILD MODERATE SEVERE 
THROBBING 0) 1) 2) 3) 
SHOOTING 0) 1) 2) 3) 
STABBING 0) 1) 2) 3) 
SHARP 0) 1) 2) 3) 
CRAMPING 0) 1) 2) 3) 
GNAWING 0) 1) 2) 3) 
HOT-BURNING 0) 1) 2) 3) 
ACHING 0) 1) 2) 3) 
HEAVY 0) 1) 2) 3) 
TENDER 0) 1) 2) 3) 
SPLITTING 0) 1) 2) 3) 
TIRING- 0) 1) 2) 3) 
EXHAUSTING 
SICKENING 0) 1) 2) 3) 
FEARFUL 0) 1) 2) 3) 
PUNISHING- 0) 1) 2) 3) 
CRUEL 
NO 1 l WORST 
PAIN ----------------------------------------------- POSSIBLE 
PAIN 
353 
PPI 
0 NO PAIN 
1 MILD 
2 DISCOMFORTING 
3 DISTRESSING 
4 HORRIBLE 
5 EXCRUCIATING 
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Just World Scale 
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SOCIAL OPINION SURVEY 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
I've found that a person 
rarely deserves the reputation 
he has. 
Basically, the world is a just place. 
People who get "lucky breaks" 
have usually earned their 
good fortune. 
Careful drivers are just as 
likely to get hurt in traffic 
accidents as careless ones. 
It is a common occurrence 
for a guilty person to get 
off free in British courts. 
Students almost always 
deserve the grades they 
receive in school 
Men who keep in shape 
have little chance of 
suffering a heart attack. 
The political candidate 
who sticks up for his 
principles rarely gets 
elected. 
It is rare for an innocent 
man to be wrongly sent 
to jail. 
In professional sports, 
many fouls and infractions 
never get called by the referee. 
By and large, people get what 
they deserve. 
6----5----4----3----2----1 
Strongly Strongly 
Agree. Disagree 
6----5----4----3----2---1 
Strongly Strongly 
Agree Disagree 
6----5----4----3----2----1 
Strongly Strongly 
Agree Disagree 
6----5----4----3----2----1 
Strongly Strongly 
Agree Disagree 
6----5----4----3----2---1 
Strongly Strongly 
Agree Disagree 
6----5----4----3----2----1 
Strongly Strongly 
Agree Disagree 
6----5----4----3----2----1 
Strongly Strongly 
Agree Disagree 
6----5----4----3----2----1 
Strongly Strongly 
Agree Disagree 
6----5----4-----3----2----1 
Strongly Strongly 
Agree Disagree 
6----s----4-----3----2----t 
Strongly Strongly 
Agree Disagree 
6----5----4----3----2----1 
Strongly Strongly 
Agree Disagree 
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12 When parents punish 6----5----4----3----2----1 
their children, it is almost Strongly Strongly 
always for good reasons. Agree Disagree 
13 Good deeds often go 6----5----4----3----2----1 
unnoticed and unrewarded. Strongly Strongly 
Agree Disagree 
14 Although evil men may 6----5----4----3----2----1 
hold political power for Strongly Strongly 
a while, in the general Agree Disagree 
course ofhistory good 
wins out. 
15 In almost any business 6----5----4----3----2----1 
or profession, people Strongly Strongly 
who do their job well Agree Disagree 
rise to the top. 
16 British parents tend to 6----5----4----3----2----1 
overlook the things most Strongly Strongly 
to be admired in their Agree Disagree 
children 
17 It is often impossible for 6----5----4----3---2----1 
a person to receive a fair Strongly Strongly 
trial in Britain. Agree Disagree 
18 People who meet with 6----5----4----3----2----1 
misfortune have often Strongly Strongly 
brought it on themselves. Agree Disagree 
19 Crime doesn•t pay. 6----5----4----3----2----1 
Strongly Strongly 
Agree Disagree 
20 Many people suffer 6----5----4----3----2----1 
through absolutely Strongly Strongly 
no fault of their own. Agree Disagree 
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SUBJECT DETAILS 
NAME: 
AGE: 
SEX: 
MARITAL STATUS: 
NUMBER OF CHILDREN: 
PREVIOUS EMPLOYMENT: 
PRESENT EMPLOYMENT: 
RESIDENTIAL CHARACTERISTICS: 
RELIGION: 
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ESTABLISH WHICH PAIN IS TO BE DISCUSSED: START OFF WITH A BRIEF 
DISCUSSION 
1 How long have you had your pain? 
2 How did your pain start in the first place? 
(May need to prompt to get back to the root of the pain) 
FACTORS INFLUENCING THE MAKING OF RESPONSIBILITY AND BLAME 
ATTRIBUTIONS 
3 Do you think the level of your pain is to be expected, considering how it started in 
the first place? 
4 When your pain first began, were you doing something that you would normally do 
at that time? (If not, what were you doing? (How do you feel about this?). 
5 Were you in a place that you would normally be in at that time? (If not, where were 
you?). 
6 Do you believe that the fact you have pain is 'just one of those things .. , or do you 
think it is unfair? (If unfair, how do you feel about this?). 
7 In general, do you think the onset of your pain could have been avoided? (How do 
you feel about this?). 
ATTRIBUTIONS (Tell them that they don't have to have e.g. cause, responsibility, 
blame and reason attributions if they really hadn't considered it). 
Cause(s) of the pain 
ESTABLISH IF THEY HAD EVER THOUGHT ABOliT A CAUSE FOR THETR 
PAIN FIRST. TELL THEM ABOUT THE DEFINITIONS. 
A cause can be defined as something which brings about a change e.g. a branch 
falling from a tree and hitting a person on the head. The falling of the branch is the 
cause, and the resulting headache is the change. This is an example of an impersonal 
cause, since no one was involved. A personal cause would be where e.g. someone 
threw a branch and it hit someone on the head. Whether it was intentional or not, the 
person is still the cause of the headache. 
8 What, if anything, do you yourself believe caused your pain to begin in the first 
place? (Why do you think this? Is there more than one cause? Did anyone cause the 
pain to happen? If so, why do you think this? Do you believe their actions were 
intentional? Do you believe they intended the outcome to happen? How do you feel 
about this?). 
9 What, if anything, do you believe causes your pain now? (Is anyone the cause of 
this? Do you believe they acted intentionally? Do you believe they intended the 
outcome to happen? How do you feel about this?). 
I 0 What factors triggered your pain at the start? (Not caused) (i.e. What factors 
brought on a pain episode?). 
11 What factors trigger your pain now? 
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Responsibility for the pain 
ESTABLISH IF THEY HAD EVER CONSIDERED ANYONE RESPONSIBLE 
FOR THEIR PAIN BEFORE THE QUESTION 
To be held responsible for something involves being held accountable for something, 
although not necessarily to blame. In the branch example, the person would be held 
directly responsible because he/she actually threw the branch, but may not be to 
blame, because the injured person may have stepped into the path of the branch, 
which was supposed to hit a tin can on a wall. A person would be indirectly 
responsible, if he/she didn't actually throw the branch, but e.g. was the parent of a 
child who threw the branch, and was responsible for the child. 
12 Do you yourself believe that you or anyone else was directly or indirectly 
responsible for the onset of your pain in the first place? (If so, who? Why do you 
believe this? How do you feel about this?). 
13 Do you believe that this person/these people foresaw the consequences, or could 
have foreseen the consequences of their actions which led to your pain? 
14 Do you believe that he/she/they acted intentionally? (Do you believe they intended 
the outcome to happen?). 
15 Do you think that the behaviour that he/she/they carried out, which led to the onset 
of your pain was acceptable, considering the situation at the time? (Justification). 
16 Do you believe that you or anyone else is directly or indirectly responsible for you 
still having your pain now? (Is it the same person/people? If not, who is it? How do 
you feel about this?). 
17 (If different) Why do you believe this person/these people are responsible for your 
pain now? 
18 Do you believe that he/she/they acted intentionally? (Do you believe they intended 
the outcome to happen? (i.e. for you to still be in pain). (How do you feel about this? 
Do you believe that they were able to foresee the consequences oftheir behaviour, 
which led to you still being in pain? Do you believe that their actions were 
acceptable?) 
Blame for the pain 
ESTABLISH IF THEY HAD EVER BLAMED SOMEONE FOR THEIR PAIN. 
BEFORE THE QUESTION 
To blame someone for something involves finding fault with someone for the 
occurrence of a negative event. In the branch example, the person throwing the branch 
would be perceived to be directly to blame for the resulting injury, if e.g. he/she 
intentionally threw the branch at the other person, with the aim of hitting the other 
person. A person would be perceived as being indirectly to blame if e.g. he/she 
encouraged someone to throw the branch at the other person. 
19 Do you yourself believe that you or anyone else was directly or indirectly to blame 
for the onset of your pain in the first place? (If so, who? Why do you think this? How 
do you feel about this?). 
20 What is it about the person that you blame, e.g. their character (i.e. them ns n 
person) or their behaviour? 
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21 Do you believe that you or anyone else is directly or indirectly to blame for you 
still having your pain now? (If so, who? How do you feel about this?). 
22 What is it about the person that you blame, e.g. their character (i.e. them as a 
person), or their behaviour? 
Reasons/Meaning for the Pain 
ESTABLISH IF ANY REASON HAD BEEN CONSIDERED BEFORE THE 
QUESTION 
A reason can be defined as a goal or purpose of something. In the branch example, a 
reason may have been that the person threw the branch with the purpose of hitting the 
other person in an act of revenge. 
23 Do you yourself believe that there is a reason why you have your pain? What is 
it/are they? (Does your pain have any meaning to you?). 
EMOTIONS TOWARDS PAIN (May have to give examples) 
24 What, if any emotions did you have towards your pain when it first began? 
25 What, if any emotions do you feel towards your pain now? 
26 In general, would you say that since the onset of your pain, you have experienced 
more positive or more negative emotions? (What are they? Are you still experiencing 
them?). 
MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL OF THE PAIN 
27 What treatments have you had for your pain, throughout the course of your pain? 
28 Do you yourself manage your pain in any way, over and above taking medication? 
(Do you feel like this gives you control of your pain?). 
29 How do others manage your pain now? (e.g. doctors). (How effective do you find 
this?). 
30 Do you believe that your pain can be controlled? (How does this make you feel?). 
LIMITATIONS OF PAIN 
31 Has your pain limited what you are able to do on a daily basis? (In what way?). 
32 Have you had to adapt your life in any way because of your pain? 
33 How well do you feel that you have adapted to your pain? 
SOCIAL COMPARISON 
34 Do you know other people who are experiencing pain similar to your own? 
(Who?). 
35 (If so), how well do you think you manage your pain, in comparison to those who 
have a similar pain to you? 
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36 Are you able to put your pain into perspective (by e.g. saying that there are people 
worse-off than you?). 
IMPORTANCE OF THE PAIN 
37 Where does your pain feature in your life, in comparison to your other life 
experiences? (i.e. is it nothing in comparison to something else?) 
SOCIAL SUPPORT 
38 Have you received any help and/or support since the onset of your pain? If so, 
from who? 
39 How helpful have you found this support? 
KNOWLEDGE/UNCERTAINTY ABOUT PAIN 
40 In general, do you feel you know a lot about your pain condition? 
41 Are you satisfied with the information you have about your condition? 
42 At present, are you uncertain about anything relating to your pain? 
EXPECTATION OF PAIN DURATION 
43 How long do you expect to experience your pain? (How do you feel about this?). 
44 Would you like to tell me anything else about your pain? 
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Pilot Study Results 
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Questionnaire Data 
Table 3.1: Descriptive statistics ofthe questionnaire data 
Scale Mean Standard Deviation 
*Just World 68.5 8.82 
**SF-MPQ 
Overall PPI 
PPI Scale Score 
Overall UPI 
UPI Scale Score 
Overall PAW 
PAW Scale Score 
8.83 
3.3 
15.8 
5.0 
24.8 
7.9 
7.2 
2.8 
8.5 
2.0 
8.9 
1.5 
Range 
56-80 
0-25 
0-8 
4-33 
1-8 
10-41 
S-10 
*Maximum just world score= 120; Data missing from four participants 
**Maximum overall present, usual and worst pain intensity scores= 45; Maximum 
pain scale scores = 10 
Key: 
PPI = Present Pain Intensity 
UPI =Usual Pain Intensity 
PAW =Pain at its Worst 
Interview Schedule Data 
Reliability of the Data 
A 79% level of agreement was obtained on the text assigned to the categories, 
suggesting the coded data was reliable. 
Interview Schedule Results 
The pilot results are arranged according to their corresponding questions and topics in 
Chapter 4. Question numbers of the interview are bracketed along with the table of 
frequencies of responses corresponding to the question. N refers to the number of 
participants who gave a response, *N refers to participants giving multiple responses 
i.e. more than one type of response to a question, while % refers to the percentage of 
the sample who gave a response.*** indicates subcategory definitions. 
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Topic A: Demographic Information 
Table 3.2.1: Sample Demographics (N = 12) 
Measure 
Gender 
Marital status 
Female= 7 (58%) 
Single = 5 ( 42%) 
Divorced= 1 (5%) 
Number of Children 
Present employment 
Male= 5 (42%) 
Married= 4 (33%) 
Widowed= 2 (17%) 
None= 6 (50%) 
Employed= 1 (8%) 
Retired = 3 (25%) 
Religious= 2 (17%) 
Arthritic= 2 
***Upper body= 3 
Has children= 6 (50%) 
Student= 6 (50%) 
None= 2 (17%) 
Religion 
*Type of Pain 
Not religious= 10 (83%) 
Back=2 
***Middle body= 4 
***Lower body= 2 
Mean **(SD) Range 
Age 41.8 (19.97) years 19-81 years 
Duration ofpain 7.75 (7.22) years 6 weeks -21 years 
*Exceeded 12 participants due to one participant reporting more than one type of pain 
**Standard deviation 
***Upper body = head, neck, shoulder pain; Middle body = stomach, hip pain; Lower 
body= knee, ankle, foot pain 
Topic B: Factors Influencing the Making of Responsibility and Blame 
Attributions 
(3) Table 3.2.2: Category: Level of Pain to Be Expected 
Subcategory N Total % of sample 
Pain To Be Expected 8 66.7 
Pain Not to Be Expected 2 16.7 
Unsure 1 08.3 
Missing data 1 08.3 
Total 12 100 
(4) Table 3.2.3: Category: Activity at Pain Onset 
Subcategory N Total % of sample 
Activity Normal 9 75 
Activity Not Normal 3 25 
Total 12 100 
(5) Table 3.2.4: Category: Location At Pain Onset 
Subcategories N Total % of sample 
Normal Place 9 75 
Not Normal Place 3 25 
Total 12 100 
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(7) Table 3.2.5: Category: Avoidance of the Pain 
Subcategory N 
Pain Could Have Been A voided 5 
Pain Could Not Have Been Avoided 4 
DoNotKnow 3 
Total 12 
Topic C: Justice Beliefs 
(6) Table 3.2.6: Category: Fairness of The Pain 
Subcategory *N 
Just "One of Those Things" 9 
Unfair 2 
Accepting the Pain 2 
Deserved the Pain 1 
*Multiple responses 
Total % of sample 
41.7 
33.3 
25.0 
100 
(34 & 35) Table 3.2.7: Category: Social Comparison with Similar Others 
Subcategory N Total% of sample 
Knowledge of Others With Similar Pain 
Do Not Know Others 6 50 
Know Others 6 SO 
Total 12 100 
Management of Pain in Comparison to Others (N =6) 
Manage Well 2 
DoNotKnow 2 
Share Experiences With Each Other 1 
Make an effort with the pain 1 
(36) Table 3.2.8:.Category: Perspective on Pain 
Subcategory N 
Able to Put a Perspective on Pain 11 
DoNotK.now 1 
Total 12 
Total % of sample 
91.2 
08.3 
100 
(37) Table 3.2.9: Category: Pain Feature in Comparison to Life Experiences 
Subcategory N Total % of Sample 
Pain Very Limiting 3 25.0 
Pain Dominating Life 2 16.7 
Pain Not Dominating Life 4 33.3 
Do Not Know 2 16.7 
Missing data 1 8.3 
Total 12 100 
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Topic D: Attributions 
Table 3.2.10: Category: Previous Consideration of Cause ofPain Onset 
Subcategory *N 
Had Previously Considered Cause 
***Physical External Factors 3 
Psychological Factors 3 
***Physical Internal Factors 2 
Had Wondered About Cause 2 
Had Not Previously Considered Cause 3 
*Multiple responses 
***Physical external factors= environmental factors; Physical internal factors= 
factors within the self e.g. disease, heredity 
Table 3.2.11: Category: Previous Consideration of Responsibility for Pain Onset 
Subcategory N Total % of sample 
Had Previously Considered Responsibility: 
Assigned to the Self 3 25 
Had not Previously Considered Responsibility 9 75 
Total 12 100 
Table 3.2.12: Category: Previous Consideration of Blame for Pain Onset 
Subcategory N Total% of sample 
Had Previously Considered Blame: 
Assigned to Physical External Factors 1 08.3 
To Others 1 08.3 
Had not Previously Considered Blame 10 83.3 
Total 12 100 
Table 3.2.13: Category: Previous Consideration of Reason for Pain 
Subcategory N Total % of sample 
Had Previously Considered Reason 3 25.0 
Not Committed to Response 2 16.7 
Had not Previously Considered Reason 7 58.3 
Total 12 100 
368 
(8 & 9) Table 3.2.14: Category: Causal Attributions for the Pain Onset and Now 
Subcategory Cause of pain onset Cause of pain now 
Physical Factors (External) 
Physical Factors (Internal) 
***Psychological Factors 
Do not Know 
Just There 
Missing data 
Total 
*Multiple responses 
N % *N 
8 66.7 2 
1 8.3 3 
1 83 2 
1 8.3 5 
0 0.0 1 
1 8.3 
12 100 
***Psychological factors include e.g. stress 
(10) Table 3.2.15: Category: Pain Triggers at Onset 
Subcategory N Total % of Sample 
Physical Trigger (Internal) 5 42.0 
Physical Trigger (External) 4 33.3 
Pain Is "Just there" 1 08.3 
Unsure of Triggers 1 08.3 
Missing Data 1 08.3 
Total 12 100 
(11) Table 3.2.16: Category: Triggers ofPain Now 
Subcategory N Total % of sample 
Physical Trigger (External) 8 66.7 
Physical Trigger (Internal) 2 16.7 
Do Not Know 1 08.3 
Missing Data 1 08.3 
Total 12 100 
(12-22) Table 3.2.17: Category: Responsibility and Blame Attributions for Pain Onset 
and Now 
Subcategory 
Self 
Other People 
None 
OnsetN (%) NowN(%) 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Responsibility 
5 {41.7) 
1 (8.3) 
6 {50.0) 
Blame 
2 (16.7) 
1 (8.3) 
9 (75.0) 
Responsibility 
6 (50.0) 
1 (8.3) 
5 (41.7) 
Blame 
2 (16.7) 
2 (16.7) 
8 (66.7) 
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(23) Table 3.2.18: Category: Reason for the Pain 
Subcategory N Total % of sample 
Physical Reason (Internal) 4 33.3 
Do Not Know 2 16.7 
Reason Not Assigned 6 50.0 
Total 12 100 
Topic E: Adjustment 
(24-26) Table 3.2.19: Category: Psychological Adjustment for Different Times in the 
Pain Experience 
Subcategory Emotion (onset) 
N(%) 
Negative emotions 8 (66.7) 
***Positive statement 1 (8.3) 
Do not know 3 (25.0) 
No Emotions 
Specified 
Total 
*Multiple responses 
I 
12 (100) 
Emotion (now) 
*N 
8 
6 
I 
I 
Emotion (since) 
N 
9 (75.0) 
2 (16.7) 
I 
1 (8.3) 
12 (100) 
***Positive statements= Positive responses not actually emotions, e.g. reporting an 
acceptance of the pain 
(27 & 29) Table 3.2.20: Category: Medical Treatment of the Pain 
Subcategory *N 
Oral Medications 9 
Physiotherapy 6 
Surgery 4 
***External Items of Support 4 
Injections 2 
*Multiple responses 
***External items of support= Items people use to support their pain e.g. wheelchair 
(28) Table 3.2.21: Category: Self-Management ofthe Pain 
Subcategory *N 
***Physical Management 6 
Do What is Required by Health Professionals 4 
***Psychological Management 1 
Do Not Do Anything 3 
*Multiple responses 
***Physical Management = e.g. exercise; Psychological Management = e.g. 
distraction 
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(30) Table 3.2.22: Category: Belief In Control ofPain 
Subcategory N 
Believe the Pain Can be Controlled 6 
Believe the Pain Cannot be Controlled 3 
Missing Data 3 
Total 12 
Total % of sample 
50 
25 
25 
100 
(31 & 32) Table 3.2.23: Category: Limitations/Adaptations ofthe Pain 
Subcategory *N 
Limitation in Exercise/Hobbies 8 
Limitation in Daily Chores 6 
*Multiple responses 
(33) Table 3.2.24: Category: Feelings of Adaptation to Pain 
Subcategory N Total % of sample 
Adapted Well 6 50.0 
Just Living with the Pain 3 25.0 
Adapted Satisfactorily 2 16.7 
Not Adapted Well 1 08.3 
Total 12 100 
(38) Table 3.2.25: Category: Support Received Since Pain Onset 
Subcategory *N 
Health Professional Support 7 
Support from Family and Friends 5 
Financial Support 1 
SelfHelp Group Support 1 
No Support Received 1 
*Multiple responses 
.(39) Table 3.2.26: Category: Helpfulness of the Support 
Subcategory N Total % of sample 
Very Good 7 58.3 
Satisfactory 4 33.3 
Little Support 1 08.3 
Total 12 100 
371 
Topic F: Factors Influencine the Makin~:: of Causal Attributions 
(40): Table 3.2.27: Category: Knowledge About Pain Condition 
Subcategory N Total % of sample 
Have a lot of Knowledge 4 33.3 
Have a Little Knowledge 3 25.0 
Have No Knowledge 4 33.3 
Trying to Increase Knowledge 1 8.3 
Total 12 
(41) Table 3.2.28: Category: Level of Satisfaction With Information 
Subcategory N Total % of sample 
Satisfied With Information 7 58.3 
Could Find Out More 2 16.7 
Not Satisfied with Information 1 08.3 
Unsure 1 08.3 
Missing data 1 08.3 
Total 12 100 
(42) Table 3.2.29: Category: Uncertainties Related to Pain 
Subcategory N 
Uncertainties Related to Pain Duration 5 
***Physical Uncertainties 3 
Uncertainties Related to Cause ofPain 1 
Uncertainties Related to Coping 1 
No Uncertainties 2 
Total 12 
Total % of sample 
42 
25 
8.3 
8.3 
16.7 
100 
***Physical uncertainties= Uncertainties related to physiological aspects of the pain 
Miscellaneous Questions 
(43) Table 3.2.30: Category: Expectation ofPain Duration 
Subcategory N Total % of sample 
For Rest of Life 4 33.3 
Not Much Longer 3 25.0 
Do Not Know 3 25.0 
Waiting for Future Incidents 2 16.7 
Total 12 100 
( 44) No participants reported any extra information about their pain 
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Improvements and Amendments to the Interview Schedule 
Introduction 
On the basis of the pilot interview schedule results (see Appendix 3.2), some 
improvements and amendments were made to the interview schedule. To improve the 
schedule, some empirically and theoretically derived questions were excluded. 
Additionally, amendments were made to some existing interview questions, and 
improvements were made to the interview format. 
Questions Excluded from the Interview Schedule 
Some of the empirically derived interview questions in the interview schedule were 
excluded from further investigation in the main phase of the study, for three reasons. 
Firstly, the responses given to some questions suggested a similarity among the 
questions asked. Specifically, the responses to questions investigating how the pain 
started in the first place (question two), triggers of both the pain onset and now 
(questions 10 and 11 ), and the question investigating whether the pain has any 
meaning to the participants (question 23) were similar to the causal attribution 
responses. This suggests the participants viewed the causal attribution questions in a 
similar way to these other questions. Subsequently, questions two, 10, 11 and 23 were 
excluded from the interview schedule (see Appendix 3.1). 
Secondly, some questions were not appropriate to ask of mixed samples of pain 
sufferers. These included questions investigating whether the level of pain was to be 
expected considering how it started in the first place, whether the pain could have 
been avoided, and activity and location at the time of the pain onset (questions three, 
four, five and seven respectively). They were developed from literature in spinal-
injured samples as possible factors influencing the nature of the responsibility and 
374 
blame attributions made. Their exploratory use with the pain sufferers in the present 
study was irrelevant because not all pain began through traumatic accidents, like 
spinal-injuries to justify the use of these questions. In anticipation of similar pain 
samples being obtained in the main phase of the study, these questions were excluded 
from further exploration (see Appendix 3.1). 
Two questions were not relevant because it became clear that responses to previous 
questions answered them. Question 30, asking about beliefs concerning whether pain 
could be controlled was excluded because responses to prior questions investigating 
ways in which the pain was managed answered this, i.e. if pain was being managed 
then it was being controlled. Additionally, question 39, asking about perceived 
helpfulness of social support received was excluded because to report receiving social 
support in the first place implies that this support is in some way helpful (see 
Appendix 3.1). 
The third exclusion of the empirically derived interview questions involved all 
questions exploring justice beliefs being excluded, because their responses did not 
reflect justice beliefs. This incorporated questions six, 34,35,36 and 37. Question six 
asked about whether or not the participants thought it was fair that they suffered pain. 
This was excluded because the question may have led most of the participants to 
report their pain to be "One of those things" (see Appendix 3.2 for the pilot study 
results). Questions 34, 35, 36 and 37 examined ways of maintaining just world 
beliefs. Questions 34 and 35 asked about whether the participants knew other people 
with a similar pain to their own. These questions were excluded because most 
participants reported not knowing others with a similar pain, suggesting they did not 
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use social comparison as a means of maintaining justice beliefs. Question 36 asked if 
the participants were able to put a perspective on their pain. This was excluded 
because although most participants reported they were able to put a perspective on 
their pain (see Appendix 3.2), no one elaborated on this. Question 37 asked where the 
pain featured in comparison to the participants' life experiences. It was excluded 
because the responses given were related to limitations of the pain rather than overall 
justice in relation to one's life experiences (see Appendix 3.1 for the questions). This 
being the case, the Just World Scale was the only just world belief measure used in 
the main phase of the study, to investigate general just world beliefs. 
Some theoretically derived attribution questions were also excluded from further 
investigation in the main phase of the study. Questions 13, 14,15 and 18, measuring 
different levels of responsibility were excluded (see Appendix 3.1 for the questions) 
because they were much too detailed and largely irrelevant to ask of pain sufferers. 
For example if a participant attributed responsibility for their pain to a doctor, it was 
not relevant to ask if the doctor intended to harm the person. 
Some theoretical questions from the pilot study were explored further in the main 
study, but were subsequently excluded from analysis. These were questions 
measuring behavioural and characterological self-blame. In the main study it became 
obvious from most participants' responses which type of blame they attributed to 
themselves. For example if someone attributed blame for their pain to their lifestyle, 
this reflected behavioural self-blame. This led to not everyone being asked to make 
distinctions between types of self-blame. Additionally, questions examining previous 
considerations of attributions, and reason attributions were further explored in the 
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main phase of the study, but subsequently excluded from analysis. Previous 
consideration questions were excluded because some participants reported never 
having previously considered attributions but when asked about any attributions they 
had for their pain onset, gave responses straight away. This suggests that the 
participants already held these attributions, and may have misunderstood the 
questions investigating previous considerations. To avoid inconsistencies, responses 
to these questions were excluded from analysis. Questions investigating reason 
attributions were excluded because their responses resembled causal attributions. 
Amendments to Existing Questions 
In addition to excluding some questions from the interview schedule, amendments 
were made to other questions. The results of the pilot study indicated that few 
responsibility and blame attributions were made (see Appendix 3.2 for the pilot 
interview results). It was impossible to determine whether the participants would have 
refrained from attributing responsibility and blame anyway, or if they refrained from 
making attributions to the self and others, the specification of the questions (see 
Appendix 3.1) but would have made other attributions. This was explored further in 
the main study, with no impositions at all being placed on the responsibility and 
blame attributions that could be made. The causal attribution questions and definitions 
of all three concepts were similarly altered to convey this. 
In terms of adjustment, questions 27 and 29 (enquiring about pain treatments and 
management) (see Appendix 3.1) were combined to form a question about general 
treatment, and the question was altered to ask how many treatments, rather than what 
treatments the participants had for their pain. The aim of this was to encourage 
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participants to recall as many different types of treatments as possible. Additionally, 
the similarity of questions 31 (asking about pain limitations), and 32 (asking about 
adaptations to the pain), led to them being merged in the main study interview 
schedule. As a result of this, question 33 on feelings about the pain adaptation was 
omitted. One final alteration involved the social support reported. More participants 
reported receiving social support from health professionals than family members (see 
Appendix 3.2 for the pilot interview results). This suggests that in addition to social 
support with pain, the participants' social lives should also be investigated to examine 
the extent to which they interact with others who could provide them with support in 
the first place. A question asking about social life with the pain was included in the 
main study interview schedule. 
Improvements to the Interview Format 
Over and above the various alterations being made to the nature of the interview 
questions, the order of the questions differed from that outlined in Appendix 3.1 
Additionally, subjects were provided with clear instructions on each aspect of the 
interview schedule. 
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Summary of Revisions from the Pilot to the Main Study 
Table 3.3 summarises the changes in measures made from the pilot to the main study. 
Table 3.3: Summary of revisions from pilot to main study 
Method Pilot Study Main Study 
Measures 
Interview Schedule Just world beliefs (6,34,35,36,37) 
Just World Scale 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Cause, responsibility, blame and 
reason attributions 
(2,8,9,10,11,12,13,14,15,16,17, 
18,19, 20,21,22,23) 
Cause, responsibility, 
blame and reason 
attributions (11,12,13,14, 
15,16,17,18,19) 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Factors influencing the making of 
cause, responsibility and blame 
attributions (3,4,5,7,40,41,42) 
Factors influencing the 
making of causal 
attributions (20,21,22) 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Psychological, physical and health 
adjustment outcomes (24,25,26,27, 
28,29,30,31 ,32,33,38,39) 
Psychological, physical 
and health adjustment 
outcomes (2,3,4,5,6, 7 ,8,9, 
10) 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Expectation of pain duration and 
free response question (1,43,44) 
Expectation of pain 
duration andfree 
response question (1,23, 
24) 
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
The belief in a just world was 
measured using the Just World 
Scale 
The belief in ajust world 
was measured using the 
Just World Scale 
----------------.-----------------------------------------------------------
Short-Form McGill Pain was measured using the 
Pain Questionnaire short-form McGill Pain 
Questionnaire 
Pain was measured using 
the short-form McGill 
Pain Questionnaire 
Sample 
Type of data 
Adult pain sufferers in the 
community 
Adult pain sufferers in 
the community 
Interview data and questionnaires Interview data and 
questionnaires 
( ) in the interview schedule represent the question numbers measuring each concept 
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BEFORE BEGINNING THE INTERVIEW I WOULD LIKE TO ASK YOU TO BE 
AS HONEST AS POSSIBLE IN YOUR RESPONSES. GIVING YOUR OWN 
TRUE RESPONSES. I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO ESTABLISH IF YOU HA VB 
MORE THAN ONE TYPE OF PAIN. AND IF SO. I'D LIKE TO FOCUS ON THE 
PAIN WHICH IS YOUR WORST PAIN. IS ANY COURT ACTION BEING 
TAKEN OVER YOUR PAIN? I'D LIKE TO ASSURE YOU THAT ANY COURT 
ACTION RELATED TO YOUR PAIN WON'T BE AFFECTED BY YOUR 
RESPONSES. ANY INFORMATION YOU GIVE ME WILL BE STRJCTL Y 
CONFIDENTIAL. PLEASE INDICATE IF AT ANY TIME YOU DON'T 
UNDERSTAND SOMETHING IN THE INTERVIEW. 
DEMOGRAPHIC INFORMATION 
NAME: 
AGE: 
SEX: 
MARITAL STATUS: 
NUMBER OF CHILDREN: 
PREVIOUS EMPLOYMENT: 
PRESENT EMPLOYMENT: 
HAS YOUR EMPLOYMENT CHANGED SINCE YOUR PAIN ONSET?: 
RELIGION: 
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DURATION OF PAIN 
(1) How long have you had your pain? 
TREAMENTS FOR PAIN 
(2) How many different types of treatment have you had for your pain, throughout the 
course of the pain? 
(3) How effective have you found them? 
( 4) Do you yourself manage your pain in any way, over and above having the 
treatments already discussed? 
EMOTIONS AND PAIN 
(5) What, if any emotions did you have towards your pain when it first began? 
(6) What if any emotions do you feel towards your pain now? 
(7) In general, would you say that since the onset of your pain you have experienced 
more positive or more negative emotions? 
SOCIAL SUPPORT 
(8) How much support from family, friends etc have you received since the onset of 
your pain? 
LIMITATIONS OF PAIN 
(9) Have you had to adapt your life in any way because of your pain? If so, in what 
way? 
(10) Has your social life suffered due to your pain? Are you socially active at all? 
ATTRIBUTIONS 
I WOULD LIKE TO LET YOU KNOW THAT A FEW ATTRIBUTION 
QUESTIONS MAY BE ASKED MORE THAN ONCE. THE FACT THAT YOU 
MAY BE ASKED THEM MORE THAN ONCE (IT WILL BECOME CLEAR WHY 
THIS IS) DOES NOT NECESSARILY MEAN THAT YOU HAVE TO CHANGE 
YOUR RESPONSES THE SECOND TIME. I AM ONLY LOOKING FOR YOUR 
TRUE RESPONSES IN EACH INSTANCE. IS THIS CLEAR? 
I'd like to begin by asking you about specific beliefs concerning your pain, beginning 
with causes of your pain. Before I do this. I'd like to ask you if you have ever in the 
past thought about there being a cause for the onset of your pain, before I'm going to 
ask you about it now? If yes. what is this? 
I will now provide you with a definition of a cause. so that we are both coming from 
the same angle in understanding what a cause is. 
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Cause(s) of the pain 
A cause can be defined as something which brings about a change e.g. a branch 
falling from a tree and hitting a person on the head. The falling of the branch is the 
cause, and the resulting headache is the change. This is an example of an impersonal 
cause, since no person was involved. It was something which caused the pain. A 
personal cause would be where, e.g. someone threw a branch and it hit someone on 
the head. Whether it was intentional or not, the person is still the cause of the 
headache. 
(11) Who or what, if anything, do you yourself believe caused your pain to begin in 
the first place? (Be aware that it isn't triggers which are being given). 
(If a person is involved, ask ifthey believe the actions of the person were intentional). 
(12) Who or what, if anything, do you believe is the cause of you still having your 
pain now? (Be aware that it isn't triggers which are being given). 
(If a person is involved, ask if they believe the actions of the person were intentional). 
Responsibility for the pain 
I'd like now to ask you about responsibility for your pain. and before I do this I'd like 
to ask you if you have ever in the past thought about anyone or anything being 
responsible for the onset of your pain in the first place? If yes. what is this? 
I will now provide you with a definition of responsibility, so that we are both coming 
from the same angle in understanding what the term responsibility means. 
To be held responsible for something involves being held accountable for something, 
although not necessarily to blame. In the branch example, a person would be held 
directly responsible because he/she actually threw the branch, but may not be to 
blame, because the injured person may have stepped into the path ofthe branch, 
which was supposed to hit a tin can on a wall. A person would be indirectly 
responsible, ifhe/she didn't actually throw the branch, but e.g was the parent of a 
child who threw the branch, and was responsible for the child. In addition to this, it 
may not have been a person who was responsible for the accident; it may just have 
been that the branch fell from the tree of its own account, and so the branch is 
responsible. 
(13) Do you yourself believe that anyone, including yourself, or anything, was 
responsible for the onset of your pain in the first place? 
(If another person was involved, ask them if they think it was intentional). 
{14) Do you believe that anyone, including yourself, or anything is responsible for 
you still having your pain now? 
(If another person was involved, ask them if they think it was intentional). 
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Blame for the Pain 
I'd like now to ask you about blame for your pain and before I do this I'd Jike to ask 
have you ever in the past thought about anyone or anything being to blame for the 
onset of your pain in the first place? If yes, what is this? 
I'd like now to provide you with a definition of blame, so that we are both coming 
from the same angle in understanding what blame means. 
To blame someone for something involves finding fault with someone for the 
occurrence of a negative event. In the branch example, a person throwing the branch 
would be perceived to be directly to blame for the resulting injury, if e.g. he/she 
intentionally threw the branch at the other person, with the aim of hitting the other 
person. A person would be perceived as being indirectly to blame if e.g. he/she 
encouraged someone to throw the branch at the other person. Blame can also be 
attributed not only to people, but to something, e.g. the branch. 
(15) Do you yourself believe that anyone, including yourself, or anything was to 
blame for the onset of your pain in the first place? 
(If attributions made to the self): 
{16) What is it about yourself that you blame, e.g. your character (i.e. you as a person) 
or your behaviour? 
(17) Do you believe that anyone, including yourself, or anything is to blame for you 
still having your pain now? 
(If attributions made to the self): 
(18) What is it about yourselfthat you blame, e.g. your character (i.e. you as a person) 
or your behaviour? 
Reasons for the pain 
I'd like now to ask you about a reason for your pain. and before I do this I'd like to 
know if you have ever in the past thought about there being a reason why you have 
your pain, before I ask you about it. If yes. what is this? 
A reason can be defined as a goal or purpose of something. In the branch example, a 
reason may have been that the person threw the branch with the purpose of hitting the 
other person in an act of revenge. 
(19) Do you yourself believe that there is a reason why you have your pain? 
KNOWLEDGE/UNCERTAINTY ABOUT PAIN 
(20) In general, do you feel you know a lot about your pain condition? 
(21) Are you satisfied with the information you have about your condition? 
{22) At present, are you uncertain about anything relating to your pain? 
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MISCELLANEOUS 
(23) How long do you expect to experience your pain? How do you feel about this? 
(24) Would you like to tell me anything else about your pain? 
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Participant Information Sheet 
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PARTICIPANT INFORMATION SHEET 
The aim of this study is to examine how your thoughts about your pain affect how you 
experience your pain. This will be done using an interview, which contains questions 
related to various factors which may influence your experience of pain. The questions 
themselves will allow you to tell me as much as you can about your pain. In order to 
obtain as much information as possible, the interview will be tape-recorded, and only 
I will be able to identify who you are. You will be allocated a number, to ensure the 
confidentiality of your information. The interview tapes will be carefully stored in a 
locked filing cabinet, and only I will be able to access them. As well as the interview, 
your pain will be measured using a simple Pain Questionnaire; and you will complete 
a short Social Opinion Scale. The whole process should take between 30 minutes-45 
minutes. 
This is not a therapeutic session. You will receive no benefits from participating in the 
study, and any compensation claims won't be affected by your participation. You 
have the right to refuse to answer any questions, and you will be able to leave the 
interview session at any time. Only I will benefit from your participation in this 
research, for my PhD. 
For further information, please contact me on: 01786 466287. I can also be reached at 
the following address: 
Joanna Me Parland 
Department ofNursing and Midwifery 
University of Stirling 
Stirling 
FK94LA 
Thank you for your co-operation in this study. 
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CONSENT FORM 
For more information, please contact: 
Joanna McParland 
Department of Nursing and Midwifery 
University of Stirling 
Stirling 
FK94LA 
Telephone: 01786 466287 
I have read the information sheet and fully understand what is being asked of me. 
I acknowledge that I will not personally benefit from my participation in the study. 
I am aware that I can withdraw from the study at any time, and that I have the right to 
refuse to answer questions, and request that the interview material be destroyed. 
Under these conditions, I am willing to participate in this study. 
SIGNED: 
389 
AppendixS: 
Main Study Adjustment Results 
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Chapter 5 (section 5.3.2.2) reported common types of adjustment entered into 
statistical analyses. Less frequently reported responses can be seen in Table 5. 
Table 5: Less Frequent Types of Adjustment 
Type of Adjustment N 
Health 
Treatments 
Treatment at a specialised centre* 
(Pain Clinic/Psychological Treatment/ 
Pain Management Course) 15 
Injections 8 
Chiropractor 8 
Others (exercise, occupational therapy, 
bone/nerve treatment, scans, X-rays, 
TENS machine) 8 
Pain Self-Management Techniques 
Do not do anything 9 
Unspecified self-management 1 
Functioning 
Physical 
Did not have to adapt/unspecified adaptation 5 
Social Support 
**Negative reactions/anticipate this from others 7 
Support from external agencies 7 
Unspecified origin of support 8 
Little support received 8 
*Some treatments may have been received at a specialised treatment centre but not 
stated as such 
** Although not an actual form of support it is a barrier to receiving support 
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Letter to examiners: response to request for explanation of multivariate statistics. 
"The candidate should document exactly where multivariate analyses have been 
undertaken and exactly what the rationale was, and what the statistical assumptions 
were". 
Three types of multivariate analyses were used in the thesis: factor analysis, analysis 
ofvariance (ANOVA) and regression. The specific types of multivariate analyses 
used will be considered in separate sections in this letter. Within these sections, 
specific thesis extracts corresponding to the analysis are highlighted in bold font, and 
the explanation of the analysis follows this. 
Where factor analysis was used in the thesis (p202-203) 
The fact that associations were found between the categories "Selr' and 
"Others" across cause, responsibility and blame, for both times periods, led to a 
principal components factor analysis being carried out as a means of identifying 
similar patterns across the data. Three factors emerged with eigenvalues greater 
than one, accounting for 69.7% of the total variance. Table 5.5 shows the factor 
loadings that had been subjected to varimax rotation, along with the 
communalities. 
Table 5.5: Varimax factor analysis of 12 items relating to attribution response (2) 
x attribution type (3) x both time periods (2) (N = 43, the number of participants 
who made attributions to the self and/or others) 
Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 
Communality 
Others cause of onset 
The self cause of onset .581 
Others cause now I 
The self cause now .806 
Others responsible onset I 
The self responsible onset • 775 
Others responsible now I 
The self responsible now .843 
Others blame onset I 
The self blame onset • 706 
Others blame now I 
The self blame now • 717 
Eigenvalue 
%variance 
4.74 
37.3 
I 
I 
I 
I 
.831 
I 
I 
I 
.774 
I 
I 
I 
2.87 
23.9 
.882 
Factor 
I 
.822 
I 
I 
I 
.822 
I 
I 
I 
.669 
I 
1.01 
8.5 
I .827 
.389 
.750 
.669 
.770 
.621 
.850 
.802 
.750 
.565 
.743 
.628 
3 
A cut-off point of 0.5 was used for the inclusion of loadings in the interpretation 
of the factors (Comrey, 1978). Each variable loaded on only one factor and no 
variable failed to load on any factor. The first factor, accounting for 37.3% of the 
variance attracted high positive loadings from the category "Selr', across all 
three attribution types, for both time periods. It was named, "Attributions to the 
selr'. Factor 2 accounted for 23.9% of the variance, and attracted loadings from 
the category "Others" for the pain onset, for all three attribution types. This was 
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named, "Attributions to others for the pain onset". The third factor accounted 
for 8.5% of the variance, and attracted high loadings from the category "Others" 
for the pain now, for all three attribution types, and so was called, "Attributions 
to others for the pain now". Combined, the items in each factor produced a 
Cronbach's alpha coefficient score of0.71. These factor scores were retained for 
further analysis. 
Explanation of analysis 
An analysis present in the original thesis, factor analysis was used to identify similar 
patterns across the attribution data. There are several statistical assumptions that must 
be met in order for factor analysis to be conducted (Pallant, 2001, p152-157). These 
include that firstly, there should be a ratio of at least five cases for each of the 
variables. This assumption was approximately met, given that there were 12 variables 
and 43 participants. Secondly, to be considered suitable for factor analysis, the 
correlation matrix should show at least some correlations ofr = 0.3 or greater. This 
assumption was met because the variables generally correlated with each other to a 
value beyond 0.3. Additionally, Bartlett's test of sphericity was statistically 
significant at p<O.OS, (p = 0.00) and the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin value was higher than 
the recommended value of0.6 (0.75). Pages 148-149 of the thesis also justifies and 
explains the procedure for using a principal components analysis. 
Where ANOV A techniques were used in the thesis 
ANOVA was used in a number of thesis sections. There are four key statistical 
assumptions that must be met when conducting ANOV A (Field, 2002, p257-258). 
Firstly, data must be collected from a nonnally distributed population. Secondly, the 
variances within each condition must be similar. Thirdly, observations should be 
independent, and fourthly, the dependent variable must be measured on at least an 
interval scale. These assumptions were met within the following analyses. 
Thesis section (p234-235) 
Differences in Just World Belieft Within Pain-Related Variables 
ANOV A was used to determine any differences in just world scores between the 
different type of pain and pain duration groups. No differences were found 
between the type of pain groups (E(4,57) = 1.5, p = 0.21), but AN OVA comparing 
the just world scores of different pain duration groups produced a significant 
result (E(2, 59)= 4.26, l! = 0.01). This indicated a difference in the strength of 
just world beliefs between the pain duration groups. There was a large difference 
in the mean scores between groups. The effect size, calculated using eta squared, 
was 0.13. Post-hoc comparisons using the Tukey HSD test indicated that the 
mean score for the 1 month- 2.5 years pain duration group <M = 71.95, m = 
10.27) was significantly different from the second, 3-9 years pain duration 
group (M = 64.33, SD = 7.70). The third pain duration group, 9.5+ years <M. • 
66.35, §!! = 9.22), did not significantly differ from either of the other two pain 
duration groups. The results indicate that those who had pain for the shortest 
length of time had stronger beliefs that the world is a just place, than those who 
had suffered pain for the middle pain duration. The effect seemed to level out 
after 9 years' pain duration. This can be seen in Figure 5.2. 
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Figure 5.2: Mean just world scores across pain duration group 
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Explanation of analysis 
One-way between groups ANOVA were used to determine differences in ju t w 
beliefs within type of pain and pain duration groups. Each independent ariabl 
contained two or more categories, and the dependent variable (just world b li f: 
continuous. This supports the requirements for a one-way ANOV (Pallant 2 
p 188. See also thesis, p 153). Within each analysis the statistical assumpti n f 
ANOV A were met in the following way. Firstly, the observations wer ind p nd nt. 
Secondly, the dependent variable was of interval level. Thirdly, the a sumpti n f 
normal distribution was met in theta scores on the dependent variable wcr n rmally 
distributed (see page 234 of the thesis for the normal distribution gr ph· P llant, 2 I, 
P 172), and fourthly, the assumption of equal variances was met, giv n th t th 
significance value for Levenes test ofhomogeneity of variance e ce d d th t t d 
0.05 level (Pallant, 2001, p190). Thus, one-way ANOVA were ppr priat fi r th 
purposes of determining differences in just world belief scores within p in-r I t d 
groups. Given the difference found among pain duration groups, the r mm nd 
post-hoc Tukey HSD test was used to determine where the difference I y Pall nt, 
2001, pl88-189). 
The next part of this analysis began on page 236: 
Further ANOVA were conducted to determine any demographi fa t r th 
might mediate or moderate this effect of pain duration on ju t world b II f 
scores. The results of this analysis can be seen in Table 5.18. 
Table 5.18: Demographic influences on just world scores 
Group df F 
Independent effects 
Pain duration 
Employment status 
Marital status 
Gender 
Age 
Interaction effects 
2 
3 
4 
1 
2 
Pain duration/employment 3 
Pain duration/marital statusl 
Pain duration/gender 1 
Pain duration/age 1 
2.90 
2.93 
2.34 
2.73 
1.15 
0.56 
0.15 
0.55 
0.47 
p 
0.09 
0.07 
0.11 
0.12 
0.35 
0.65 
0.31 
0.47 
0.51 
Table 5.18 indicates that there were no significant differences between 
employment, marital status, gender and age groups, on just world scores, and 
differences between pain duration groups were cancelled out when these other 
variables were entered into the analysis. Additionally, none of the demographic 
variables interacted with pain duration to influence just world scores. These 
results suggest that not only did demographic variables fail to mediate the effect 
of pain duration on just world scores, but also there were no demographic 
differences on just world scores. 
Explanation of this analysis 
This second section of the analysis involved further ANOVA to detennine any 
demographic differences in just world scores, and to detennine whether any ofthese 
variables interacted with pain duration in its effect on just world beliefs. In order to 
conduct this analysis, a five-way ANOVA was conducted, with just world beliefs as 
the dependent variable, and each of the pain duration, employment, marital status, 
gender and age groups as the independent variables. As with the above analysis, the 
statistical assumptions of ANOV A were met. The procedure for conducting this 
analysis is an extension of the two-way ANOVA (see page 153 of the thesis). The 
results indicated that there were no main effects or interactions effects, suggesting that 
there were no differences in just world scores within each of the demographic groups, 
and none of these groups interacted with pain duration in its effect on just world 
beliefs (Table 5.18). 
Thesis section: (p236-237) 
The Role of Attributions in Maintaining Just World Beliefs 
ANOV A to determine any differences in just world scores between those who 
made causal attributions for the pain now and those who did not (reporting their 
pain to be "just there") revealed non-significant main effects for making 
attributions (E(l,57) = 2.46, I!= 0.12), not making them (f(1,S7) = 0.92, J! = 0.43), 
and interactions between them (E(1,57) = 0.65, I!= 0.43). This suggests both 
groups did not differ in their just world scores. Additional AN OVA to determine 
whether those who attributed responsibility or blame to themselves differed In 
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their just world beliefs from those who made these attributions to others 
revealed non-significant main effects for attributing responsibility to the self 
(E(1,57) = 0.003, I!= 0.96), others (E(1,57) = 0.72, I!= 0.79), or interactions 
between them (E(1,57) = 0.01, I!= 0.93). There were also no main effects for 
attributing blame to the self (F(1,55) = 0.25, p = 0.62), others (F(l,SS) = 0.002, p = 
0.97), or interaction effects between them (F(l,SS) = 0.31, p = 0.58). These results 
suggest there were no differences in just world scores between those who made 
attributions to themselves versus others. 
Explanation of analysis 
In order to determine whether there were any differences between attribution groups 
in their just world scores, two-way between-groups ANOV AS were conducted. Three 
separate ANOV AS were conducted, to examine just world differences between firstly 
those who make causal attributions for their pain and those who did not; secondly, 
those who attributed responsibility for their pain to themselves versus others, and 
thirdly, those who attributed blame for their pain to themselves, versus others. These 
analyses were in keeping with the literature reviewed in Chapter 2, which stated that 
making causal attributions were more beneficial in maintaining justice beliefs than not 
making them, and that making attributions to the self over others helps to maintain 
justice beliefs. The statistical assumptions of ANOV A were met, in the following 
way. Firstly, the just world dependent variable was at interval level. Secondly, 
observations were independent. Thirdly, the assumption ofnonnal distribution was 
met, and fourthly, Levenes test of equal variances was supported. Additionally, the 
criteria for a two-way between-groups ANOV A was supported, in that the dependent 
variable was continuous, and there were two groups containing two subgroups entered 
into each analysis (see page 153 ofthe thesis). 
Thesis section (p241) 
AN OVA revealed significant differences between the pain scores, Wilk's 
Lambda= 0.21, (!:(2,58) = 108.12, J!<0.001), multivariate eta squared= 0.79. A 
post-hoc analysis using the Bonferroni procedure revealed each of the overall 
present, usual and worst pain intensity scores to be significantly different from 
each other. 
Explanation of analysis 
In order to detennine whether each of the overall reported present, usual and worst 
pain intensities differed from each other, a repeated measures ANOV A was 
conducted. This was an appropriate analysis because all participants completed the 
same continuous measure, reported for three different time periods (Pallant, 2001, 
p195-196; See also thesis, p153). The reported differences were tested using the 
recommended Bonferroni procedure (Field 2002, p329-333). 
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Thesis section (p242-247) 
Individual Differences in Usual Pain Intensity 
An exploration of individual differences in usual pain intensity produced both 
demographic and pain-related differences. These differences and their 
significant interaction effects are summarised in Table 5.20. 
Table 5.20: Individual differences in usual pain intensity 
Group df F 
Independent effects 
Pain Duration 
Employment 
Marital status 
Gender 
Age 
Interaction effects 
2 
3 
4 
1 
2 
Pain duration and gender 1 
Marital status and gender 2 
***p<0.005; **p<0.01; *p<O.OS 
14.12*** 
0.35 
8.25*** 
5.04* 
6.49* 
10.38** 
8.28** 
Four independent effects emerged (Table 5.20). A post-hoc test could not be 
conducted for gender because there were only two groups, but an analysis of 
mean scores indicated that males (M = 19.12; SD = 1.25), and females <M = 
19.02; SD = 0.85) were similar in their usual pain intensity. In terms of age, a 
post-hoc comparison using the Tukey HSD test indicated that none of young (M 
= 19.12; SD = 1.20), middle-aged {M = 20.66; §!! = 1.18), and older age groups 
{M = 17.26; SD = 1.27) differed significantly from each other on their usual pain 
intensity scores. They all have an effect on usual pain intensity. 
In terms of pain duration groups, a post hoc test indicated that those with pain 
for between three to nine years' duration had significantly different pain scores 
from those who had pain for over nine years' duration. An examination of mean 
scores indicated that those with pain for between three to nine years' duration 
had higher pain scores {M = 21.67, SD = 1.20) than those with pain for over nine 
years' duration (M = 15.53, SD = 1.21). This difference can be seen in Figure 5.3. 
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Figure 5.3: Differences in usual pain intensity between pain duration group 
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In terms of marital status groups, a post-hoc test indicated that those who were 
single had significantly different usual pain intensity scores from tho e who were 
married, and divorced. An examination of mean scores indicated that those who 
were single had significantly lower pain scores (M = 11.81, SD = 1.73), than those 
who were married (M = 20.58, SD = 0.95), and divorced (M = 23.50, SD = 1.82). 
This difference can be seen in Figure 5.4. 
Figure 5.4: Differences in usual pain intensity between marital tatu group 
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An examination of interaction effects indicated that gender mediated the effects 
of both pain duration and marital status on usual pain intensity scores (Table 
5.20). The interaction between pain duration and gender can be seen in Figure 
5.5. 
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Figure 5.5: Interaction between pain duration and gender on usual pain Intensity 
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The graph indicates that males with pain for between three to nine years' 
duration had higher pain scores than the males in the other pain duration 
groups, and the females of the sample. Additionally, females within this pain 
duration had higher usual pain intensity scores than the females in the other 
groups. Further exploration of these gender differences using ANOV A suggested 
that the observed differences in pain intensity between male pain duration 
groups was non-significant (£(2,16) = 2.31, .1! = 0.13), as were those for the female 
pain duration groups (£(2,38) = 0.34, .1! = 0.71). 
The interaction between marital status and gender can be seen in Figure 5.6. 
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Figure 5.6: Interaction between marital status and gender on usual pain Intensity 
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The graph indicates that divorced males had higher usual pain intensity scores 
than married, separated or single males, and the females of the sample. 
Additionally, widowed females had higher usual pain intensity scores than 
females in the other marital status groups. Further exploration of these gender 
differences using ANOV A indicated that the observed difference in usual pain 
intensity between females marital status groups was non-significant (f(2,36)""' 
2.21, J! = 0.09), but the observed differences between male marital status groups 
was statistically significant (f(3,15) = 3.34, l! = 0.05). Post hoc analyses using the 
Tukey HSD test indicated that divorced males bad significantly higher pain 
intensity scores (M = 35.00, SD = 12.73), than single males <M = 6.50, SD = 0.71). 
Explanation of analysis 
A five-way ANOV A was conducted to determine any demographic differences in 
reported usual pain intensity, with usual pain intensity as the continuous dependent 
variable, and pain duration, employment, marital status, gender and age as the 
independent variable groups. Statistical assumptions were met in this analysis in the 
following way. Firstly, criteria were met for Levene's test of equal variance. 
Secondly, the dependent variable was ofintervallevel. Thirdly, observations were 
independent, and fourthly, the assumption of normal distribution was met in that any 
skew in UPI scores was corrected (see page 240 of thesis). Some significant 
independent effects emerged, and were examined further using recommended post-
hoc tests (Pallant, 2001, p201-208). Two interaction effects also emerged, and were 
examined further using recommended one-way ANOV AS to examine particular 
subgroup effects within these results (Pallant, 2001, p207-208). For the interaction 
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between gender and pain duration on usual pain intensity, gender was split into males 
and females using the procedure recommended by Pallant (200 1, p208) to examine 
the effects of pain duration on usual pain intensity separately, for males and females. 
This was also conducted for the interaction between marital status and gender on 
usual pain intensity. 
Where regression was used in the thesis 
In the following sections of the thesis stepwise multiple regression procedures were 
used. This method of regression was adopted for two reasons. Firstly, given the 
exploratory nature ofthe present study, there is no other available research to 
recommend the ordering of predictor variables within regression, which would allow 
hierarchical regression to be carried out, and secondly, there is no theoretical basis for 
ordering the variables in a particular order. Instead, stepwise regression procedures 
were used to allow statistical criteria to determine the order in which the variables 
should be entered and removed from the calculation, based on the amount of variance 
in the dependent variable predicted by the independent variable (Pallant, 2001, p 135-
136. See also thesis, p151-152). The key statistical assumptions to be met when 
conducting multiple regression analyses include that firstly, multicollinearity and 
singularity must be considered. Multicollinearity refers to high correlations between 
independent variables (r = 0.9 or above), and singularity occurs when one 
independent variable is actually a combination of other independent variables. The 
independent variables must be correlated with the dependent variable to a value of at 
least 0.3 and must not be correlated with each to a value beyond 0.7. Secondly, there 
must be no outliers in the data. Thirdly, to check for normality, linearity and 
homoscedacity, the residuals should be normally distributed around the predicted 
dependent variable scores, should have a linear relationship with the dependent 
variable scores, and the variance of the residuals around the predicted dependent 
variable scores should be the same for all predicted scores (Pallant, 2001, p136-137). 
These assumptions were met in the following analyses. 
Thesis section: (P247) 
Pain Intensity and Attributions 
A stepwise multiple regression was conducted to determine whether any of the 
independent variable, attribution factors, "Attributions to the Selr', 
"Attributions to others for the pain onset", and "Attributions to others for the 
pain now" predicted the dependent variable, usual pain intensity. Only the factor 
"Attributions to others for the pain onset" was significant (E(l,S2) = 8.12, J! = 
0.006). However, R2 was only 13.5%, indicating this factor only explained a small 
amount of the variance of usual pain intensity. As such, it is possible that other 
factors might be related to the dependent variable. Further analyses indicated 
that none of the age, gender, pain duration, marital or employment status 
variables, or just world beliefs mediated the effects of attributions on pain 
intensity. 
Explanation of analysis 
A stepwise multiple regression was used to determine whether any of the attribution 
factors predicted usual pain intensity. In order to carry out the regression, usual pain 
intensity was the entered as the continuous variable, and three independent factor 
403 
scores were entered: "Attributions to the self'; "Attributions to others for the pain 
onset", and "Attributions to others for the pain now". Age, gender, pain duration, 
marital and employment status were also included as independent variables. The 
statistical assumptions of regression were met in that the independent variables did 
not correlate with each other beyond the value of 0. 7, and although only one variable 
(attributions to others for the pain onset) correlated with the dependent variable to a 
value beyond 0.3, this assumption was not violated because the stepwise regression 
procedure would find the best model (statistical advice, Kate Howie 2004). Other 
statistical assumptions were met in that there were no outlying values, the residual 
plot indicated that the data was normally distributed, and the assumption of 
homogeneity of variance was met. The results suggested that only one independent 
factor, "Attributions to others for the pain onset", predicted a small amount of 
variance in usual pain intensity. 
Thesis section: (p248) 
Pain Intensity and Adjustment 
Stepwise multiple regression analyses to examine whether any types of 
adjustment predicted usual pain intensity, indicated that types of treatment 
predicted pain intensity. These are listed in Table 5.21. 
5.21: Treatment predictors of usual pain intensity 
Variable R2 AR2 fl final 
Physiotherapy 0.141 0.127 -0.389 
Oral medications 0.225 0.198 0.345 
Do what is required 
by health profession 0.281 0.242 0.246 
t final 
-3.376 
2.956 
2.087 
p final 
0.001 
0.005 
0.041 
Stepwise procedures entered physiotherapy first, and this alone predicted 14.1% 
of the variance in usual pain intensity. When oral medications was entered, 
together this predicted 22.5% of the variance, and when "Do what is required by 
health professionals" was entered, all three variables together predicted 28.1% 
of the variance in usual pain intensity (Table 5.21). 
Explanation of analysis 
Stepwise multiple regression procedures were used to determine whether any ofthe 
adjustment outcomes predicted usual pain intensity. Dr Swanson questioned the use of 
multiple dichotomous variables within linear regression analyses. However, not all of 
the adjustment variables were entered into one regression analysis. Instead, three 
separate regressions were conducted to determine the ability of the health, 
psychological and functioning outcomes to predict pain intensity. This meant that no 
more than seven independent predictor variables were entered into the analysis at a 
time. This is considered a suitable number of independent variables (statistical advice, 
Kate Howie 2004).The statistical assumptions of regression were met in these 
analyses, in that although the reported correlations between variables were low, 
residual plots indicated that the data was approximately normally distributed, and the 
assumption of homogeneity of variance was met. When the health-related adjustment 
outcomes were entered into regression together, three of them predicted some of the 
variance in usual pain intensity. None ofthe other psychological or functioning 
outcomes predicted usual pain intensity. 
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Thesis section: (p237) 
Further exploratory analyses using multiple regression techniques to determine 
the ability of attributions in general to predict just world beliefs were non-
significant (not tabulated), suggesting that beyond no differences in just world 
beliefs being found between attribution groups, attributions did not interact with 
just world beliefs at all. 
Explanation of analysis 
Beyond looking for differences in just world scores between attribution groups, as 
part of the recommended further exploration of the data, stepwise multiple regression 
analyses was conducted to determine the ability of attributions to predict just world 
beliefs. In order to conduct this analysis, three separate regressions were conducted in 
which the just world belief score was entered as the dependent variable, and each of 
the causal (physical external, internal self and others), responsibility (to self and 
others) and blame (to self and others) attributions were entered as independent 
predictor variables within each of the three analyses. Statistical assumptions of 
regression analyses were met in that although the correlations between variables were 
generally low, the residual plots showed that the assumptions of normality and 
homogeneity of variance were valid. Each analysis revealed that none of the 
attributions predicted any variance in just world scores. 
Thesis section: (p239) 
Further exploratory analyses using multiple regression techniques to determine 
the ability of the health, psychological and functioning outcomes to predict just 
world beliefs were non-significant (not tabulated), suggesting that in the present 
study adjustment did not interact with just world beliefs at all. 
Explanation of analysis 
As part of a further exploration of the data, after considering differences in adjustment 
between the different strength of just world belief groups, three stepwise regression 
analyses were conducted to determine the ability of each of the independent variable 
health, psychological and functioning outcomes to predict the dependent variable, just 
world beliefs. Again, although the correlations between variables were generally low, 
the residual plots showed that the assumptions of normality and homogeneity of 
variance were valid. Each analysis revealed that none of the adjustment outcomes 
predicted any variance in just world scores. 
Thesis section(p222) 
Differences in Adjustment Between Making/Not Making Causal Attributio11s 
Logistic regression analyses were conducted to determine whether making causal 
attributions for the pain now predicted more adjustment outcomes than not 
making causal attributions, to establish any differences between both groups. All 
analyses between these independent variables and each of the health, 
psychological and functioning dependent variables (see Table 5.11), were non-
significant (not tabulated). This suggests that neither making attributions as a 
whole, nor refraining from making them, predicted any of the adjustment 
outcomes, indicating they did not differ in their ability to predict adjustment. 
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Explanation of analysis 
In this section of the thesis a logistic regression analysis was used instead of multiple 
regression, because both the dependent and independent variables in this analysis 
were categorical, and several assumptions of multiple regression were not met. In 
particular, logistic regression does not assume a linear relationship between the 
dependent and independent variables; the dependent variable does not need to be 
normally distributed, homogeneity of variance is not assumed; and the dependent 
variable need not be of interval level. However, there are some assumptions of 
logistic regression that must be met 
(http://www2.chass.ncsu.ed/garson/pa765/logistic.htm), including that the data must 
be coded in a meaningful way. This assumption was met, with the categorical 
presence of a response being coded as 1 and the absence of the response coded as 0. 
Additionally, all relevant variables must be included in the model, and irrelevant 
variables excluded. Given that the ordering of the variables was dictated by the 
literature, this was achieved. An analysis present in the original thesis, logistic 
regression was used to determine whether there were any differences in adjustment 
between those who made causal attributions for their pain, and those who did not. 
Although testing for differences, logistic regression was the method employed to 
examine this, because this would determine whether making causal attributions 
predicted more or fewer adjustment outcomes than not making causal attributions. 
Although Dr Swanson questioned the skewed nature of the categorical variables, by 
its nature categorical data are not normally distributed. Additionally, with categorical 
data equal numbers cannot be expected within each group (statistical advice, Kate 
Howie 2004). This analysis was conducted in the following way. Separate regression 
analyses were run for each of the health, psychological and functioning types of 
adjustment, with each outcome as the dependent variable and making causal 
attributions and not making them as categorical independent predictors in each 
analysis. This procedure is in keeping with suggested ways of conducting logistic 
regression analyses (Field, 2002, p166-167).Within each analysis the default forced 
entry method was selected to determine any initial predictors of the adjustment 
outcomes (page 152 of thesis, and statistical advice, Kate Howie 2004). However, in 
all analyses none of the categorical variables contributed to the predictive power of 
each of the adjustment outcomes, suggesting that making causal attributions and not 
making them, did not differ in their ability to predict adjustment. 
Joanna McParland 
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